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CONTESTED CONCEPTS AND COMPETING CONCEPTIONS
Mark Edward Criley, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2007
I explore and defend the distinction between an abstract concept and conceptions of that
concept—different ways of explicating the content of that concept. In particular, I in-
vestigate contested concepts: concepts for which there appear to be genuine, principled
disputes about which of several competing conceptions is the correct one.
Although philosophers (e.g., John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin) and others often em-
ploy the concept/conception distinction, it has seldom been the subject of sustained philo-
sophical inquiry. In particular, little attention has been paid to its consequences for philos-
ophy of language and philosophy of mind. This is unfortunate, for if they are adequately
to explain certain common and important features of language and thought, theories of
content must find a place for the concept/conception framework.
I begin with a presentation of some examples of contested concepts, and then offer
four conditions that jointly specify contested concepts and articulate four desiderata for
an account of contested concepts. Next, I assess work in this area by W.B. Gallie, Christo-
pher Peacocke, and James Higginbotham, and briefly consider the ramifications of the
concept/conception framework for any general account of concepts. After presenting a
hypothetical example of an extended conceptual contest, surveying the features of such
disputes, I argue that the contested concept phenomenon is theoretically novel with re-
spect to theories of content, in the sense that it resists assimilation to similar, familiar
phenomena (e.g., ambiguity, vagueness, or confusion). Finally, I develop a positive ac-
iv
count of contested concepts, arguing that when we attend to the considerations that exert
rational force in disputes over contested concepts, we see that the contents of such con-
cepts are intimately connected with the notion of reflective equilibrium. I close with a
brief survey of some areas for future research and applications.
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PREFACE
It customary in dissertation acknowledgments to credit a number of people without whom
the thesis could not have been written. But I suppose that very few of those who offer those
thanks have actually submitted those claims to controlled empirical testing. I speak from
experience when I say of those I thank below that I could not have written the thesis
without them. For long stretches of time, I tried; each time, I failed miserably. I met with
success only during those times when I was willing to accept the help and support of the
friends, mentors, and loved ones I acknowledge below.
I have had the good fortune of having two outstanding dissertation directors, one after
the other, each of whom I greatly admire for his philosophical and pedagogical brilliance.
The first was Joe Camp. Like the projects of the dozens of students before me who
worked with Joe over his nearly forty years at Pitt, this project took root and began to grow
during many, many late night sessions conducted at Joe’s home. As my wife can attest, I
would invariably return home from meeting with Joe on what might best be described as a
sort of philosophical high: exhilarated; challenged; exhausted from sustained and probing
questioning; light-headed from giddy laughter at Joe’s apt but outrageous examples; and
eager to wake up the next day to prepare for next week’s meeting. I am grateful for
Joe’s hospitality and ceaseless enthusiasm, and for helping through his own example to
strengthen my love for philosophy to the point where no other sort of life for me seemed
conceivable. This dissertation would not have been possible without Joe, and my greatest
regret about this project is that I was unable to complete it under his direction. Those
dozens of earlier students who worked under Joe, many of whom traveled from all over to
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Pittsburgh to attend the April 2006 “Camp Out!” conference in his honor, know what I
mean when I say that I will simply never have another friend or mentor like him. He is
irreplaceable.
Nevertheless, upon Joe’s retirement I found myself having to replace the irreplaceable.
Only Anil Gupta could have stepped into the breach created by Joe’s departure. Everything
that you need to know about Anil’s character is encapsulated in his willingness to commit
himself to a year of long distance work directing a Ph.D. student whom at that point
he hardly knew. This was the most selfless and generous act anyone outside my family
has ever undertaken for my sake. I thank him for all of the lengthy e-mail and phone
conversations, and for all that he has done to encourage me, to shape and improve the
project, to gently but firmly demand more and better material where it was needed, and to
curb my tendency to want to pursue every tangent in every direction all at once. Without
him, I would never have been able to finish this work; much of what I hope to do in the
next stage of work on this project will attempt to address the questions and concerns that
he has raised during our discussions. For all of this I owe Anil a debt that I can never
repay.
Charlotte Brown, Ted Morris, and Jamie Tappenden have at various points been so
closely involved in this project and my career that they served as de facto dissertation direc-
tors. I thank them for their philosophical acumen, guidance, humor, and deep friendship,
and for their heartening conviction that I might have something worthwhile to say, even
when I was dubious on that count myself.
Thanks also to Ken Manders, Mark Wilson, and George Sparling for their time, ad-
vice, and counsel, and for their service on my dissertation committee. I also wish to thank
Joe’s late partner, Tamara Horowitz, who was an original member of my committee and
who is sorely missed.
Lenny Clapp, Carl Gillett, Doug Lavin, and Ram Neta provided me not only with
invaluable friendship but with close and careful feedback at a number of stages of the
project. Comments from friends and comrades Janice Dowell, Brian Hill, Lionel Shapiro,
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Tommie Shelby, and Matt Weiner on earlier versions of this document were also incredibly
helpful.
I would also like to thank the members of my 2006 IWU May Term course on this
topic and the audience at my January 2007 talk at IWU, including Victoria Johnson,
Kenton Machina, Katherine (KP) Paton, Adam Simon, Larry Stout, Hans-Jörg Tiede,
Nick Timme, and Adam Wentland.
For friendship and philosophical conversation I wish to thank Alp Aker, Alison Bai-
ley, John Beer, David Beisecker, Tom Berry, Adam Betz, Donald Bruckner, Arthur Cun-
ningham, Derrick Darby, Kevin Davey, Carl Davulis, David Finkelstein (the Younger),
Anton Ford, Aryeh Frankfurter, Karen Frost-Arnold, Mitch Green, Jeremy Heis, Lisa
Hoelle, Chris Horvath, Henry Jackman, Emily Kelahan, Ben Laurence, Hans Lottenbach,
Ted McNair, John MacFarlane, Eric Marcus, Dale Miller, Carol Moeller, Jennifer Nagel,
Doug Patterson, Bill Porter, Steve Puryear, Andrea Rieber, Evan Riley, John Roberts, Laura
Ruetsche, Susanna Schellenberg, Lisa Shapiro, Sergio Tenenbaum, Lisa van Alstyne, An-
ders Weinstein, Joan Wellman, and Herb Wilson.
For friendship and support outside of the philosophical profession, I wish to thank Eli
Cates, Jeremy Cantlon, Peter Chang, James and Rachel Cramton, (Granville) Scott Craw-
ford, (William) Scott Crawford, Steve Cummer, Matthew Dresden, Kevin and Joumana
Driscoll, Andy Elder, Molly Brown Forstall, Scott Forstall, Thomas J. Hunter, Keith Kar-
raker, Regina Linsalata, Carole Myscofski, Alison Sainsbury, and John K. Wilson.
Thank you to Kathy Rivet for administrative help, to Alp Aker for being my LATEX
guru, and to Frederico Garcia for authoring the pittetd LATEX 2ε class.
The sympathetic ear and support of Jennifer Whiting in my earliest days at Pitt made
it possible for me to continue my graduate career. Years later, Dr. Joellen Popma and
the members of the University of Pittsburgh Dissertation Support Group played much
the same role. Karen Grandstrand Gervais, family friend and the first philosopher I ever
knew, was an inspiration to me throughout graduate school, as she has been since I was a
small child.
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My family members in central and northern Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin
made this work possible. Thank you to my sister, Jennie Criley, for her support, commis-
eration, and good humor, and to my beloved late grandmother, Florence Johnson.
My parents, Bruce and Norma Criley, were my first and most prized teachers. They
have been tremendously supportive, loving, and patient throughout my life, and were
there from the beginning to tell me things I did not know.
Above all, I thank my wife, Amy Smith, a philosopher in intellect and temperament,
even if not by trade. Amy has been my constant (and incredibly patient) partner for the
last thirteen years. I cannot begin to find the words to thank her for her love and support,
including her willingness to listen to various half-baked ideas on our walks with Chance
and her careful editorial advice on the final version of this document. I am glad to have
the rest of our lives together to try to show her the love I cannot express in words.
Finally, this work is dedicated to my son, Saed Jamal Smith, who has been there
throughout its creation and who, on the day of its defense, is precisely the same age that
I was on the day of his birth: 7035 days old. Among many other reasons, I love him for
being precisely the sort of fellow nerd who finds that sort of pointless coincidence worth
noting.
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1.0 CONTESTED CONCEPTS: AN INTRODUCTION
1.1 A “TOO CRUDE” THEORY OF MEANING
In a passage in his article “Constitutional Cases,” Ronald Dworkin objects that a certain
theory of legal interpretation rests upon a “too crude” theory of meaning—a theory of
meaning that “ignores a distinction that philosophers have made but lawyers have not
yet appreciated.”(Dworkin, 1977, p. 134). What the suspect theory ignores, according
to Dworkin, is the difference between an abstract concept and the various, more specific
conceptions of which that concept admits. And without that distinction in place, a theory
of meaning will be too crude for failing to accommodate another, related crucial philo-
sophical advance: the recognition that some such abstract concepts—including, say, the
concepts of fairness, equality, and cruelty—are contested concepts, which admit of compet-
ing conceptions.
Upon reading Dworkin’s remark, the philosophical reader might well wonder what she
has missed: Have philosophers in fact incorporated a distinction between contested con-
cepts and competing conceptions into their “theories of meaning”? Of course Dworkin
himself discusses the topic, but his remarks add up to a rather cursory but suggestive ac-
count that occupies only a few pages of text over the course of his distinguished career.1
And in fact, very little further philosophical attention has been paid to a purported dis-
tinction between concepts and conceptions or to “contested concepts.” There are a few
1See Dworkin (1977, pp. 103, 134–136, 226–227) and (Dworkin, 1986, pp. 70–71).
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noteworthy and distinguished exceptions, which I consider in due course.2 However, most
of these exceptions have, like Dworkin, worked in philosophical subfields other than the
philosophy of language or philosophy of mind, and have not had much to say about how
such a distinction plays out within a theory of meaning. It is hard to claim on the basis of
these few instances that philosophers have made or appreciated the distinction with which
Dworkin credits them.
Nevertheless, in another respect Dworkin’s remark should strike the philosophical
reader as apt. Even though philosophers have seldom had much to say about a puta-
tive distinction between abstract contested concepts and competing conceptions of those
concepts, we actually employ the distinction quite regularly, as when we talk about, say,
deontological conceptions of rights, reliabilist conceptions of justification, counterfactual
conceptions of causation, and so on. The investigation and assessment of competing
conceptions of abstract, contested concepts is part of our stock in trade. Although the
phenomenon is perhaps featured most prominently in philosophical work and tracked
most carefully by philosophical, vocabulary, it is not limited to philosophical discussions.
Dworkin surely doesn’t mean to suggest that philosophers have “made” the distinction in
the sense that they have invented it out of whole cloth for their own parochial, profes-
sional purposes. Rather, he clearly means to suggest that philosophers have fastened onto
an important distinction that was already exhibited in everyday, ordinary discourse.
One of my central claims in this dissertation is that the core of Dworkin’s point is
correct: On pain of being “too crude”—that is, on pain of failing adequately to explain
certain common and important features of language and thought—theories of linguistic
and mental content must find a place for the concept/conception framework and for the
related notion of a “contested concept.” However, I also am convinced that Dworkin
is overly optimistic in his contention that philosophers have appreciated this distinction.
Despite its significance for theories of meaning or content, I argue that the framework
is theoretically novel with respect to present work in that field. That is, I shall argue
2The philosophers Dworkin likely has in mind are W.B. Gallie’s work on “essentially contested concepts”
(Gallie, 1962), and John Rawls’s employment of the distinction for the concept of justice in (Rawls, 1971).
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that none of the devices that presently come “standard” or even “special order” in the
philosopher’s toolkit can adequately account for the phenomena that contested concepts
are used to explain; a new tool must be developed and added to the kit. My objective in
this thesis is to start that development and point the way toward its completion.
This project should be of interest for several further reasons. First, attention to this
topic will provide new material for those who are interested in cases of (at least apparent)
indeterminacy and their resolution. An account of contested concepts would provide us
with a framework for understanding concept use and development, as well as for under-
standing the way that these are related to the inquiries, arguments, and objections that
often shape and direct them.
Second, a successful explication and defense of the concept/conception distinction
would help repay a loan taken out against theories of meaning by those philosophers
working in value theory—including Dworkin and John Rawls—who have explicitly relied
upon the distinction in their own work. Their fruitful exploitation of that distinction—
controversial though the details of their projects might be—constitutes at least a par-
tial vindication of it. Nevertheless, the device ought to be submitted to broader critical
scrutiny in its own right. I will argue that much of our philosophical practice and every-
day discourse outside of value theory also appeals to the distinction. If I am right, then a
successful account would serve not only to explain but to underwrite those uses as well.
Third, and finally, I believe that coming to terms with the concept/conception dis-
tinction will recast and clarify a panoply of heated debates over philosophical questions in
related areas. Among those I will briefly address in the epilogue to the thesis in Chapter 7
include the topics of conceptual analysis, analytic truth, and the appeal to intuitions and
conceivability in arguments for modal claims.
Here is how I will proceed in the remainder of this chapter in order to get the discus-
sion underway. In §1.2, I present some simple but central examples of contested concepts,
introducing them within one sort of setting in which their contested character is on dis-
play: a dispute over the question whether a concept applies or fails to apply in a particular
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concrete case. Then, in §1.3, I draw on features of these examples to develop a preliminary
specification of my target in the thesis: I present four criteria that I think jointly charac-
terize contested concepts and pick out the target of my inquiry. I close the chapter in §1.4
with a presentation of four desiderata that I believe any account of that target should strive
to satisfy.
1.2 THREE TARGET CASES
To fix ideas, it will be helpful to have some very simple examples of contested concepts
in place. Here are three concepts—, , and 3—that I think are
central cases of contested concepts, in the following sense: If any concepts are contested
concepts, these are. But rather than merely considering a list of such concepts, we will
confront them in a setting in which they prompt the sort of “contests” from which their
label derives.
The first example, concerning fairness, is adapted from Dworkin (1977, p. 277); the
other concepts have not, to my knowledge, been discussed elsewhere.
3Throughout the thesis, I will alternate between talking about individual concepts by using small-capitals
strings to function as names for them, as I do here, and referring to them as “the concept of . . . ”. I extend
both of these practices to schematic references to arbitrary concepts e.g., by discussing “the concept of C” or
“the concept of F,” C or F stand in for some arbitrary concept. Also, for ease of discussion, I will restrict my
consideration in the thesis to concepts that correspond to unary natural language predicates, such as “. . . is
fair” or “. . . is cruel.” I believe that I can do this without any loss of generality.
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Case 1 (FAIRNESS)
Goofus and Gallant are each afflicted with the same horrible disease. But while Goo-
fus’s condition is merely painful, Gallant’s borders on fatal. They have only one dose
of medicine in their joint possession, with no prospect of getting another. Goofus and
Gallant disagree over whether it would be fair for Goofus to take one half of the dose
for himself. Now, Goofus admits that it would be noble and fine for him to yield the
whole dose to Gallant. But he contends that since neither of them has a prior claim to
the medicine, fairness requires nothing more of him than that he split the dose evenly
with Gallant. When pressed to defend this contention, Goofus claims that fairness is
the equal allocation of commonly held goods. Gallant disagrees: given the severity of his
illness, fairness requires that Goofus concede to him the entire dose. When pressed to
5
defend his contention, Gallant says that fairness involves allocation of commonly held
goods in accordance with the needs of the parties.
Case 2 (CRUELTY)
Goofus and Gallant are discussing a mutual acquaintance named Guy. As they con-
verse, Goofus doodles a terribly unflattering caricature of Guy performing unmen-
tionable acts, along with a caption that calls into question Guy’s character, parentage,
and sense of fashion. Gallant exclaims that Goofus’s act of caricature is cruel. After a
moment’s reflection, Goofus concedes that he should not have made the drawing, but
says that his doing so was not cruel. Why not? Because, Goofus says, cruelty is the
unwarranted infliction of physical or emotional harm, and Guy, since he was not present,
could not have suffered any such harm from the caricature. Gallant demurs. Cruelty,
he claims, is broader than that: to be cruel is to compromise without warrant the dignity
of the aggrieved party, which might, but need not, involve physical or emotional harm.
Case 3 (APOLOGY)
Gallant gives a piano recital; Goofus is in attendance. At the reception afterward,
Goofus provokes giggles around the punchbowl by loudly speculating that Gallant
might have learned his fingering techniques by observing chimpanzees at the zoo.
Gallant demands that Goofus apologize. Goofus replies that while he does not think
his remarks were offensive or inappropriate, he nevertheless apologizes for having made
them and for having angered Gallant. Gallant hotly denies that what Goofus has
offered is an apology. Goofus protests that to apologize is to utter the phrase “I apologize”
(or some equivalent) as an expression of genuine regret for the harm one’s action has caused.
Gallant disagrees, on the grounds that an apology must involve the sincere recognition of
the wrongness of the act for which one is apologizing.
6
1.3 CONTESTED CONCEPTS: SPECIFICATION AND DISCUSSION
With these specimens on the table, I would like to propose four conditions that I think
characterize and specify the sort of concepts that I have in mind. I think that these condi-
tions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for a concept to fit into the category
I have in mind, and hope over the course of the thesis to convince the reader that this
is so—that is, that the concepts that I have in mind fit naturally into this class. For the
moment, however, I put forward these conditions as hypotheses about what is distinctive
about contested concepts.
It will be a running theme throughout the thesis that in order to begin to understand
contested concepts, we will have to understand the sort of contests or disputes to which
they are subject. I propose that we start by asking: What sort of disagreements are in-
volved in the disputes in the target case? Each dispute concerns the question whether the
particular case in question is an instance of fairness, cruelty, or apology—whether each
case is one to which those terms apply. Loosely put, what is at issue is the question of
fit between what we might (very loosely) call the “facts of the case” and what we might
(again, very loosely) call the “criteria” for the correct application of the term in question.
But unlike many such disputes about fit between facts and criteria, in the target cases
the disagreements over fit do not turn on the question of what the “facts of the case” are.
To see the difference, we may compare the target cases with variants in which the particular
facts are precisely the subject of the dispute. For instance, compare Case (1) with a variant
in which Goofus and Gallant disagree about the precariousness of Gallant’s condition, and
compare Case (3) with a variant in which the dispute turns on the question of whether
Goofus genuinely felt bad about hurting Gallant’s feelings. In these variant cases, we may
suppose that the criteria for the application of the term are fixed and held in common
between Goofus and Gallant, and the issue to be settled in the dispute is the question of
what the facts are, and whether they are such as to fit the criteria.
In the target cases, however, we may suppose—indeed, we can just go ahead and
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stipulate—that the disputants views about all of the relevant facts are fixed and held in
common. The disagreement in the target cases, however, still turns on the question of fit
between facts and criteria, but in the target cases the issue that is under dispute is what the
correct criteria of application are.
Each of the disputes presented in the target cases, then, turns upon conceptual ques-
tions. That is, the dispute is grounded in the parties’ divergent views about the criteria
imposed by the concept in question: that is, over what properly makes an arrangement
count as fair, what makes an act count as cruel, or what makes a speech-act count as an
apology.
The parties to these disputes understand themselves to have a single shared concept,
which they employ in common and which has a history of employment within their com-
munity. The particular concepts under discussion in the target cases are ones with which
it is comparatively easy to achieve competence: the very young and very dim can come
to grasp these concepts. Concept-users can acquire the capacity say, to recognize certain
canonical cases of unfairness, and to make rather basic inferences to and from the judg-
ment that an act is unfair. In the present dispute, each participant treats the other as
“possessing” the concept: having a grip upon it and as being capable of making judgments
or inferences involving it. That is, neither lodges a charge against the other that he is
incompetent with the concept, or that in denying her opponent’s claim she has changed
the topic or is equivocating.
These observations lead to the first condition that distinguishes a contested concept:
that it must be univocal.
Condition 1 (The Univocality Condition)
A contested concept is a single concept, used univocally across a community over
time, rather than a collection of several distinct or shifting concepts.
Note that this condition insists upon both synchronic and diachronic univocality.
That is, the concept in question must be one and the same concept employed in common
by different members of the community and that it must be employed in common members
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of the community at different temporal stages of the community’s concept use.
Of course, deciding whether a conceptual community has one concept associated with
a general term rather than several distinct concepts is a thorny question. What makes for
sameness of concept or continuity of concept? How are we to individuate concepts? Of
course, the answers to these questions will depend upon how we answer the question of
what concepts themselves are—a question to which I present a tentative answer only later,
in Chapter 3. However, as just a rough indication of what is to follow, I want to suggest
here that any answer to the questions of concept individuation and identity will turn out
to place a great deal of weight on the views of the concept-users, but it is none the worse
for that. Whether we are dealing with a single concept depends, I suppose, in large part
upon the community’s conceptual behavior with respect to that concept, as well as their
own explicit or implicit commitments to univocality.
Nevertheless, questions of concept-identity cannot be resolved simply by appeal to the
explicit pronouncements of community members that they are employing one and the
same concept in common: The members of a community might turn out to be wrong
on this count. Despite a history of overlapping use and despite a commitment to reason-
ing with a single concept, a conceptual community will sometimes find their claims of
univocality unsustainable.
The concepts that are under discussion in the target cases—, , and
—are, as Dworkin suggests, abstract. By this I mean that the concepts impose
only limited explicit constraints on the correct employment of their corresponding terms.
Members of our own conceptual community readily employ these concepts and rest their
arguments and appeals and analyses upon them, but usually with only a limited or hazy
view of what those concepts involve. Without some further spelling-out—without some
further specification of what fairness or cruelty or apology consists in—these concepts are
thin and provide a great deal of room for disagreement and discord. This provides us with
the second condition in our specification of contested concepts.
Condition 2 (The Indeterminacy Condition)
The concept C is abstract or indeterminate, in the following sense: There are some
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cases for which persons who are competent with respect to that concept, and who
suffer from no epistemic or linguistic deficiency, may reasonably disagree over whether
the concept applies or fails to apply.
This condition recognizes the fact that disputes of the sort canvassed above are different
in kind from, say, disputes in which Goofus and Gallant disagree about whether it is
correct to call flame-retardant objects “inflammable” or where they disagree about whether
the term “fruit” applies to tomatoes. Such case are ones where the dispute can easily be
resolved by appealing to settled semantic or biological facts in a way that recourse to any
expert or encyclopedia could easily remedy. There don’t appear to be any such facts to
appeal to in the controversies above that could provide such a resolution.
However, it is clear that the disputes in the target cases above emerge precisely because
Goofus and Gallant each subscribes to a rather more detailed view about what fairness,
cruelty, and apology each involves. That is, they subscribe to different precisifications
or spellings-out of the concepts in question—what we shall call different conceptions of
fairness, cruelty, and apology. This observation underpins the next condition in the speci-
fication:
Condition 3 (The Conception Condition)
There are a number of distinct, plausible, but incompatible ways of spelling out the
concept in question—different ways of making its content thicker, more precise, or
more determinate—that is, different ways of reducing the range of cases described
in the Indeterminacy Condition above. Call these ways of spelling out the concept
conceptions of C.
It is important in what follows that the reader keeps in mind that we must distinguish
the use of the word “conception” here from some other, closely related senses in which
the word is sometimes used. On occasion, we use the term “conception of F” to refer to
someone’s stereotypes, connotations, or set of beliefs concerning F. This is the sense in
which the term is used when Woody Allen reports that his “conception of Canada” is of
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a cold and blustery country where criminals are simply too cold to practice their craft, or
that when Polly reports that her “conception of a snake” is of a slimy, poisonous creature.
A conception, as I intend it here is an answer—perhaps only a partial answer—to the
constitutive conceptual question, What is it to be an F? That is, a particular conception is
an attempt to specify what an object must be like in order properly to qualify as an F, what
must follow from the claim that an object is an F, and similar questions with that sort of
conceptual character.
Conceptions can be articulated at different levels of specificity. The target cases in §1.2
above attribute to Goofus and Gallant uncommon facility in providing linguistic formu-
lations of their respective conceptions. For ease of discussion and to take us through the
details of the dispute more quickly, the cases we will consider will principally involve dis-
putants who are similarly adept. But disputes of this sort can take place even without that
level of semantic self-awareness, and without explicitly invoking the concept/conception
terminology: Nothing crucial depends upon it. Disputes over contested concepts can
take place—if more awkwardly and slowly—even when the participants are unable to ar-
ticulate particular conceptions. For instance, if in case (2) Goofus had merely defended
himself against Gallant’s charge of cruelty by claiming that “Guy wouldn’t ever know”
about the caricature, or by insisting that the drawing “hadn’t hurt anybody,” we might
well understand that as an appeal to the conception he so deftly articulates in the example
as it is described. Disputants often work their way to conceptions only in this gradual,
piece-by-piece manner. (I return to this point below, in §4.3.1.)
A particular conception may itself in turn involve another contested concept. For
instance, in example (2), Gallant’s conception of cruelty invokes the concept ,
which might well turn out to be a contested concept in its own right.
Thus, for the kind of concepts I want to discuss, there will be several plausible or
what we might call “admissible” conceptions of a concept. Roughly, these are ones that a
concept-user might adopt without being liable to a charge of semantic incompetence. But
what is distinctive about contested concepts is that the disputes over them are oriented
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around the question of which among these admissible conceptions provides the correct
way of spelling out the concept in question. Hence our final condition:
Condition 4 (The Competition Condition)
The conceptions of the concept C are properly understood to be in competition with
one another for status as the proper, correct, or best conception of C. That is, each is
regarded as an attempt to explicate what thought and talk involving the concept has
“been about” all along.
I contend that a concept may be contested even before the different conceptions are
appreciated or made explicit. This requires some more defense and elaboration, but the
gist of the idea is that the availability of hypothetical cases over which reasonable persons
without epistemic or linguistic deficiency might disagree is sufficient to show that the
concept is contested in the sense under discussion here. Note that the appeal to the
continuity of use in this condition reinforces the insistence on diachronic univocality.
A competing conception is not offered as an attempt to stipulate a new usage or to invoke
a change in meaning. Rather, it is to be understood as continuous with prior employment
of the concept, and as an attempt to explicate that concept.
A dispute over competing conceptions is not of the sort that is liable to satisfactory
resolution by, say, a linguist’s survey of native speakers’ reports of whether they could call
caricaturing someone in absentia “cruel.” It doesn’t seem as if a survey of the linguistic
intuitions of native speakers should resolve the matter to anyone’s satisfaction. For I want
to contend that, curiously, it seems that the apt thing to say about this sort of case is
that even though the bulk of the conceptual community might articulate or embrace a
conception of, say, cruelty, that does not flout any semantic norms or run counter to
the judgments of any cruelty experts (for there aren’t any), that the bulk of the linguistic
community might nevertheless be wrong in the fine details of its view about what “cruelty”
means.
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1.4 DESIDERATA AND DISCUSSION
The four criteria presented in the previous section specify the target of inquiry for the
thesis, and they begin that inquiry by present a preliminary account of the distinctive
features of contested concepts. In the remainder of the thesis, I will be elaborating and
developing my account. But before embarking on that task, I would like to proffer four
desiderata that it seems any account of contested concepts should try to meet.
(A) An account of contested concepts ought to explain why there are contested concepts, and
explain the conditions under which they emerge.
I take it that contested concepts are not a necessary or ineliminable feature of a conceptual
scheme: There is nothing incoherent in the idea of a community of concept users none
of whose concepts are contested. We can even (very roughly) describe the adjustments
that a community that presently employs contested concepts would have to make in their
practices in order to eliminate them from their use. What would be required would be a
lot of subscripting, or some equivalent disambiguation technique, in order to distinguish
between distinct concepts when disputes arise. An account of contested concepts, then,
ought to survey the conditions under which contested concepts arise, and explain how
those conditions give rise to them. It would also redound to the credit of an account if it
not only explained but justified communities’ employment of contested concepts, perhaps
by distinguishing some of the advantages that accrue to a community in virtue of the
employment of contested concepts, for instance by highlighting things that a conceptual
community would be able to do only if they have concepts that fit those four criteria.
(B) An account of contested concepts and competing conceptions ought to explain the connec-
tion between contested concepts and the rest of the theoretical machinery of philosophy of
language and mind.
This desideratum is extremely broad, and points us toward more questions than I can
hope to answer within the space of the present work. However, there are some pressing
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questions raised under this heading that I will address. Does the phenomenon of con-
tested concepts have anything tell us about the nature of concepts in general? What are
the ramifications of the phenomenon for other theories of linguistic and mental content?
What is the relationship between the concept/conception distinction and other curious
semantic phenomena? In particular, why shouldn’t we think that the tools that have been
developed in the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind to accommodate other,
similar phenomena will be able to accommodate these sorts of cases without any further
theoretical innovation?
(C) An account of contested concepts and competing conceptions ought to explain the distinctive
features of disputes about contested concepts, and the connection between these features and
the content of those concepts.
In order to understand contested concepts, we will have to pay attention to the kinds
of considerations that may be presented as having rational force or appeal during the
course of the disputes over them. For part of what is troubling about conceptual disputes
of this sort is that, despite the vehemence one tends to bring to such disputes and despite
one’s conviction that one’s conception is correct, it is sometimes unclear (especially to an
“outsider” to the dispute: someone who does not have a stake in the debate or any strong
convictions concerning the conceptual issues at stake) why anyone should think that there
is a fact of the matter about which party (if either!) is correct about what fairness, cruelty,
or apology consists in.
Nevertheless, participants in the dispute regularly understand themselves as having a
genuine disagreement, and one that is subject to the force of the better reasons. In order
to take contested concepts seriously, I think that an account ought to do its best to credit
the participants’ convictions on this count. An account ought to try to explain the sense
in which these disputes are instances of genuine disagreement, liable to resolution through
principled argumentation rather than simply competing stipulations.
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Finally, an account of contested concepts ought to recognize and try to explain an
apparent paradox that emerges from the four conditions provided in the specification in
the previous section.
On the one hand, contested concepts seem, in virtue of their abstract character, to
tolerate a great deal of pluralism about their content. Indeed, the Indeterminacy Con-
dition tells us that competent concept users who lack no relevant empirical information
concerning a specific case may reasonably disagree about whether the case falls or fails to
fall under the concept. This pluralism is further exhibited in the Conception Condition,
which tells us that there are a variety of different plausible ways of spelling out concept—a
number of what we called “admissible” conceptions. The Competition Condition appears
to preclude that pluralism, since it contends that the competing conceptions are properly
understood as candidates for the status of the best, proper, or correct conception of the
corresponding concept—as an attempt to correctly specify the content of that concept as
it has been employed within the community.
Thus, an apparent paradox emerges from the four conditions I have articulated above:
The Indeterminacy and Conception Conditions appear to preclude the satisfaction of the
Competition Condition, and vice versa. A successful account of contested concepts will
have to address and resolve this apparent paradox. Hence, our final desideratum:
(D) An account of contested concepts ought to resolve the apparent paradox generated by the
seemingly incompatible demands of the Indeterminacy and Conception Conditions on the
one hand and the Competition Condition on the other.
Developing an account of contested concepts that satisfies these desiderata will be no
easy task, and I do not claim to have fully discharged it in the present work. I intend the
thesis in part as an advertisement for the importance of the phenomenon and the merits of
having such an account, and in part as a first stage in the development of such an account.
Here, briefly, is the road-map I will follow in the remainder of the thesis in order to begin
to bring this aim to fruition.
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In Chapter 2, I present a discussion of some previous forays into this area. §2.1
presents an extended discussion of the first and, to date, most extensive examination of
contested concepts: W.B. Gallie’s “Essentially contested concepts” (Gallie, 1962). §2.2
turns to the relatively recent work of Christopher Peacocke and James Higginbotham on
the distinction between concepts and implicit conceptions.
In Chapter 3 I consider the ramifications of my preliminary specification for theories
of linguistic and mental content in general and for an account of concepts in particular,
with the aim of contributing to the satisfaction of desideratum (B).
Chapter 4 presents some extended hypothetical examples of disputes over contested
concepts, and displays in a condensed form the sort of considerations that may be brought
to bear in those disputes. The aim here is to contribute to the satisfaction of desideratum
(C).
Chapter 5 consists of a sustained argument by elimination designed to show that the
contested concept and competing conception framework is theoretically novel to theories
of content in the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, in the sense that the
phenomena it is invoked to explain cannot be adequately accounted for by other frame-
works that are currently on offer. I consider seven such alternative strategies and for each
explain why it is inadequate to the task. This chapter is not strictly negative, however.
Considering the ways in which these other approaches fall short of explaining contested
concepts will shed further light on the distinctive characteristics of those concepts, helping
us to satisfy desideratum (B).
In Chapter 6, I draw together the lessons and develop a more detailed, though still
tentative, account of contested concepts. In that chapter, I draw some lessons out of our
earlier discussion of the characteristics of disputes over contested concepts, and I suggest
that the distinctive semantic characteristics of these concepts are due to the characteristics
of those disputes. In particular, I argue that the account snaps into place, and the vexing
apparent paradox from desideratum (D) may be resolved, once we understand the content
of contested concepts as subject to the demands of the method of reflective equilibrium.
16
Chapter 7 closes the thesis with a brief summary and a brief discussion of the ways in
which I foresee the concept/conception distinction can be employed to make progress on
a number of other philosophical investigations.
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2.0 EARLIER, RELATED PROJECTS
In the previous chapter, I mentioned that while many philosophers make use of the no-
tion of contested concepts and the distinction between a more general, abstract concept
on the one hand and more specific conceptions of that concept on the other, few philoso-
phers have actually turned their critical scrutiny on these notions in order to provide a
systematic treatment of them. In this chapter, I turn to consideration of two philosophical
research programs that have . In §2.1, I consider the work, briefly mentioned above, by
W.B. Gallie on the notion of “essentially contested concepts.” In §2.2, I consider the work
of Christopher Peacocke and James Higginbotham in developing the notion of “implicit
conceptions” of a concept. My aim in each of these discussions is to acknowledge these
philosophers’ contributions and consider the ways in which understanding their projects
can deepen our understanding of one developed here. However, in each case, we will see
that much work remains to be done in order to carry out the project of the thesis. As such,
this Chapter is largely oriented around desideratum (B)—explaining the connection be-
tween contested concepts and other issues in philosophy of mind and language. However,
the discussion also draws lessons concerning desideratum (C) out of Gallie’s attempt to
show that disputes of the kind we are interested in satisfy certain standards of genuineness
and rationality.
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2.1 W.B. GALLIE
The first philosopher to use the phrase “contested concept” was W.B. Gallie, in his 1956
article “Essentially contested concepts.”1 Gallie’s article is explicitly cited by Dworkin
(Dworkin, 1977, p. 103) in his own discussion of the contested concept and competing
conception phenomenon. Gallie’s work is often cited as an influence on H.L.A. Hart’s
treatment of justice in Chapter VIII of Hart (1998). No doubt the most widely known
employment of the distinction is that of John Rawls in Rawls (1971) and his subsequent
work.
The influence of Gallie’s article is perhaps even greater in the social sciences, where
a number of theorists will occasionally claim that one concept or another is essentially
contested. Quite recently, for instance, linguist George Lakoff has reintroduced, with-
out revision or critical scrutiny, Gallie’s account into his own work on political discourse
(Lakoff, 2006a, pp.83–84),(Lakoff, 2006b, pp. 23–24).
Despite his inclusion of the modifier “essentially,” I believe Gallie’s explanatory target
overlaps significantly with my own: I suspect that we are interested in many of the same
concepts and conceptual disputes, although the details of the discussion below will reveal
that the match is not perfect. Although I will not independently discuss the “real life”
examples of essentially contested concepts that Gallie briefly discusses—, ,
 , and C—I suppose that at least some of those satisfy the con-
ditions that I presented in my earlier specification of contested concepts above in §1.3.
Moreover, I suspect that the examples that I have presented in the target cases are ones
that, upon reflection, Gallie would want to count as essentially contested, even though
as we shall see, his conditions as they stand would seem to exclude them. Perhaps Gallie
would characterize his project differently. Perhaps, although the text seems not to bear
this interpretation, he means his conditions to be strictly stipulative, picking out a care-
1Gallie (1962). All page references are to this reprinted version rather than the original. The topic of
contested concept is also discussed in Gallie (1956), although nothing in the discussion there deepens or
revises the account offered in Gallie (1962).
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fully circumscribed set of concepts for some specific purpose. Nevertheless, for the sake of
providing a comparison with my own account, in what follows I will presume that Gallie
and I are interested in roughly the same sort of conceptual phenomenon, driven by the
same sort of disputes. I will consider the question which of our accounts provides the
superior specification and explanation of that target.
Moreover, Gallie and I have similar justificatory or vindicatory ambitions for our
projects. In particular, we each suspect, and are each concerned to demonstrate, that
disputes of the kind in question may properly be understood as genuine, principled dis-
putes, rather than as instances of equivocation, confusion, or baldly partisan squabbles.
We each hope that our account of contested concepts will be able to show that these dis-
putes are, as Gallie puts it, “of such a character that the notions of evidence, cogency and
rational persuasion can properly be applied to them” (p. 138), and that those who carry
out these disputes are not left with only “at best unconscious rationalizations and at worst
sophistical special pleadings” at their disposal (p. 122). Gallie’s stated aim is to show that
contests over contested concepts
are perfectly genuine [disputes]: which, although not resolvable by argument of any kind, are
nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and evidence. (p. 123, emphasis
mine)
The italicized clause in the quote above suggests the reason that Gallie labels these
concepts “essentially contested,” and highlights one supposition that Gallie makes which
I do not. Gallie supposes that despite the fact that these disputes answer to standards of
evidence, cogency, and argument, application of these standards will never, as a matter of
fact, bring the dispute to resolution. In fact, Gallie seems to make a stronger claim than
this: For essentially contested concepts the standards of evidence, cogency, and argument
are always and in principle insufficient to fix a correct resolution to the dispute. Indeed, we
will ultimately see that Gallie appears to be committed to the view that in such disputes,
despite the convictions of the participants, no party to the dispute could be correct, simply
because there cannot be a fact of the matter about the detailed content of a contested
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concept.
2.1.1 Gallie’s artificial example
Gallie’s argumentative strategy begins with the stipulation of an artificial example involv-
ing a specialized and non-standard use of the concept . Drawing on the features
of that artificial case, he then constructs a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions for the essential contestedness of a concept , and then argues that those con-
ditions capture the contested character of the “real life” aesthetic, political, and religious
concepts that triggered his original interest in the phenomenon. But before we consider
the set of conditions Gallie constructs, it is worth pausing to consider the details of his
artificial example.
Gallie asks us to imagine a league dedicated to a competitive team bowling sport.
Although the rules of the sport—its permissible moves, its order of turns, etc.—are clear
and uncontroversial, the standards by which teams are to be evaluated are not. All of the
teams and their fans agree that the number of pins a team knocks over during a period
of play is important in the assessment of a team’s performance; however, those tallies do
not constitute a score for the game by which one team may decisively be said to triumph
over another in a match. The consensus among all of the teams and their fans is that
other elements of play—say, the speed with which the ball is pitched, the spin placed on
it—are ones in virtue of which one team might be able to outperform or defeat another.
However, we are to suppose that there is no consensus on the question of how these various
elements are to weigh against one another in assessing a team’s performance, and there are
no judges or referees who are charged with the task of declaring one team the winner or
loser of a match. Nevertheless, it is a competitive sport: Its teams and fans are concerned
with determining “the champions” of the league—the team whose play is the best. This
concern will lead to pitched and sustained disputes. Gallie asks us to further suppose that
each squad excels in some particular element of the game, and that fans of that team will
tend to praise performances that demonstrate those elements, and will contend that their
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favored element displays what the sport is “really about.” Each of the various squads and
their fans will proclaim their own team the “champions,” and will attempt win converts
to their side by presenting arguments for the relative importance of those elements of the
sport in which their own team excels compared to those elements in which other teams
admittedly outperform their own.2
In this setting, Gallie tells us, the concept  serves as a perfect (though ad-
mittedly artificial and somewhat strained) specimen of what he means by an “essentially
contested concept.”
2.1.2 Gallie’s conditions
With this hypothetical example in view, Gallie elicits seven individually necessary and
jointly sufficient conditions that he takes to define the essentially contested character of a
concept . In the interest of clarity and concision I will list them in a rather quick and
compressed form, and then follow up with a few quick expository remarks concerning his
conditions (2)–(5). These are the conditions which are the most elusive and in need of
exposition; they are also the conditions which I think most closely approximate my own
preliminary account earlier in this chapter. Once we have his account in view, I turn in
section §2.1.3 to a critical assessment of Gallie’s project.
Here, then, are Gallie’s seven conditions on the essential contestedness of a concept :
(1)  must be appraisive or evaluative, “in the sense that it signifies or accredits some kind
of valued achievement” (p. 122).
(2)  must be “internally complex” and “multi-dimensional.”
(3)  must be “variously describable.”
(4)  must be “open,” i.e., “persistently vague” (p. 122).
2If the reader finds Gallie’s example too far-fetched and at too far remove from actual variants of bowling
games, perhaps an easier example would be a sport like figure-skating, only absent any judges to render an
official score and proclaim a recognized champion.
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(5) Community members must use  “aggressively and defensively.”
(6) There must be an exemplar (or a set of exemplars) that all of the community members
accept as authoritative instances to which the concept  is correctly applied.
(7) The contests concerning  must “probabl[y] and plausibl[y]” allow for the achieve-
ment mentioned in condition (1) to be “sustained and/or developed” (p. 133).
Conditions (2), (3), and (4) form a tightly interconnected set, centered on the ways
in which the “internal complexity” of a concept is involved in its contestedness. Let’s be-
gin with condition (2), which demands that in order to be contested a concept  must
be “internally complex” and “multi-dimensional.” By these phrases, Gallie means that the
employment of the concept must be responsive to a number of different “component parts
or features” of the targets to which it is applied. For instance, the concept  from
his artificial example is internally complex in that it is responsive to several distinct aspects
or “dimensions” of game-play—speed of attack, the spin placed on the ball, effectiveness
in knocking over pins, etc. Likewise, Gallie maintains that the concept  is
responsive to a number of distinct features of political organizations (the presence of some
form of popular election; equality of political opportunities of citizens, etc.). Gallie re-
marks that these features and elements that are appealed to here are to be understood as
descriptive. For Gallie, the term “descriptive” appears to be interchangeable with “natural-
istic”; he does not independently or explicitly specify what he understands by those two
terms, although the relevant contrasting term, for Gallie, is “evaluative.”
Condition (3)—the condition that states that an essentially contested concept  must
be “variously describable”—that there must be a number of different “Descriptions”3 D1,
D2, etc., which place different emphases or weights upon the distinct, descriptive “com-
ponent parts or features” from condition (2).
To fix ideas, let us provide a simple example of some possible Descriptions, following
up on the “component parts” Gallie discusses in his artificial example. Take the three
elements of the sport mentioned above: speed, spin, and effectiveness at knocking over
3I will follow Gallie in using the capitalized “Descriptions” to signify these items.
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pins (“score,” for ease of reference). We can then construct three very simple Gallie-style
“Descriptions” of championship by assigning to each description a rank ordering of those
three elements:
D1=<speed, spin, score>
D2=<spin, score, speed>
D3=<score, speed, spin>
Thus Description D1 ranks speed over spin, and spin over score. Although Descrip-
tions need not fit this pattern, for simplicity’s sake let us suppose (as Gallie does) that
the orderings for each Di are lexical rankings: For an adherent of description D1, even
marginal advantages in speed are sufficient to crown a team as “champions” over other
teams who possess great advantages in spin and score; in case of ties in speed, D1 adher-
ents turn to spin.
In order to meet condition (3), there must be at least two such descriptions that are
at least superficially plausible ways of spelling out the criteria for application of the corre-
sponding term.
(4) is by far the most recondite of Gallie’s conditions.4 Gallie explains that this con-
dition ensures that the “achievement [that  picks out] must be of a kind that admits of
considerable modification in the light of changing circumstances; and such modification
cannot be prescribed or predicted in advance” (p. 125). Explained in terms of his artificial
example, Gallie says that this condition ensures that “tomorrow’s circumstances may bring
out hitherto latent virtues in the play of any of the contestant teams” (p. 127, fn. 2, em-
phases in original). The example of “changing circumstances” Gallie introduces into his
sporting example is that of bowling in new alleys that might propose special problems for
a particular style of play. But his discussion here is not particularly illustrative: his remarks
focus on the lowering or raising of standards, suggesting that adherents of a description
like D1, when they encounter a challenging new alley that poses difficulty for a speed
4It is also one of the most influential, as it appears to have directly informed H.L.A. Hart’s discussion of
the “open texture” of general terms (see Hart (1998)).
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bowling team, pointing to their team’s performance as showing what “speed can do when
everything seems against it” (p. 127).
. . . a proper use of it by P1 [an adherent to D1] in a situation S1 affords no sure guide to
anyone else as to P1’s next, and perhaps equally proper, use of it in some future situation
S2. (p. 125, fn. 1)
This is the condition that is supposed to secure for Gallie that the contested concepts
in question are essentially and perpetually contested.
. . . even in a situation which conforms to conditions (1), (2) and (3) it is conceivable that
experience should establish one style of description as again, for the purpose of moral or
aesthetic persuasion, universally more acceptable than any other. This result could hardly
be expected, however, if condition (4) be added . . . . (p. 127, fn. 2, emphasis in original)
I think that Gallie is on to something here, but it will take a little bit of digging to
extract it. The gist of Gallie’s contention is that the concept  is such that the conditions
under which correct application are sufficiently subtle and variable that as new, unfore-
seen situations and settings emerge, these will pose problems and challenges for those who
favor a particular Description Di, who will then have to modify or refine their descrip-
tions. And the way in which that Description will be modified will not be predictable
in advance, and indeed it will be unpredictable along two dimensions. First, it will be in
principle impossible to envisage all of the possible cases in which the concept might be
called upon to perform its work. Some novel circumstances will always emerge, and they
will put pressure and tension on the concept use. The second sort of unpredictability de-
rives from the way in which those who have a particular Di will accommodate these new
features or combinations of features that emerge in this setting. There are branching possi-
bilities available here—a concept-user might, for instance, virtually ignore the new feature
altogether, or she might take it to present an occasion for a refinement or modification
of the elements of their preferred Description. Thus, for instances, the introduction of
balls of a variety of weights might lead some who had previously favored a speed attack to
favor lighter balls and greater speed, while others who were proponents of the speed attack
might favor whatever sized ball permits the greatest momentum in striking the pins.
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A concept that meets conditions (1)–(4) is ripe for contest and dispute. Condition (5)
requires that there be an actual dispute: community members must be actively engaged in
disputing the question which of the various Di is the correct one. For Gallie, in order for
this condition to be satisfied, concept-users must view the employment of the concept as
its own sort of competitive sport, seizing and remarking upon events that reflect favorably
on their own preferred Di and those events that reflect poorly on others’. As for the details
of what this aggressive and defensive use of  consists in, Gallie does not give us much
to go on, other than gesturing at exhortations and exclamations that the various partisans
can be expected to offer in borderline situations. So, for instances, when a slowly pitched
ball knocks over all of the pins, but in a rather weak and unimpressive fashion, the speed
partisans should be expected to offer snide remarks along the lines of “. . . and you call that
bowling?!” or “Some champions you lot are.”
2.1.3 Critical discussion
I will turn in a moment to discussion of Gallie’s remaining conditions, (6) and (7). For ease
of exposition, however, I will orient the remainder of this section (§2.1) around critical
scrutiny of Gallie’s project. As we proceed, we should keep in mind that I am willing
to accept that Gallie and I are discussing largely the same conceptual phenomenon: our
explanatory targets are the same. Moreover, our explanatory projects are much the same:
We are both interested in the question of how such disputes may properly be understood
as turning on matters of evidence, argument, and justification, rather than on confusion,
ambiguity, or merely partisan or rhetorical appeals. The critical questions I will be posing
as we discuss Gallie’s account, then, are (a) how well it specifies that explanatory target,
and (b) whether it helps us to discharge that explanatory task.
2.1.3.1 Exemplars and equivocation Gallie’s condition (6) claims that disputes over
an essentially contested concept  will be anchored by a set of authoritative exemplars
which all of the concept users recognize as instances where the concept correctly applies.
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This condition plays at least two important roles in Gallie’s explanation of essentially
contested concepts. First, the presence of an authoritative example is supposed to explain
how arguments over contested concepts can appeal to considerations of evidence, argu-
ment and cogency. As we shall see in §2.1.3.3, Gallie will argue one of the features that
disputants appeal to in the course of arguing for the correctness of their preferred Descrip-
tion Di is the superiority of that Description in characterizing the exemplar’s achievement.
I defer until that point consideration of whether authoritative exemplars are fit to play that
role in the way Gallie hopes they can.
For now, let us consider the second role that exemplars are supposed to play in Gallie’s
account of essentially contested concepts: aiding in answering a substantial objection.
That objection holds that most—perhaps all—disputes over apparently contested concepts
are simply cases in which the parties have distinct concepts and hence are not engaged in
disagreement over the correct application of a single concept. Gallie is also concerned to
answer this objection, which he nicely expresses in the voice of an objector:
“[T]he kind of situation you have described is indistinguishable from those situations in
which people engage in apparently endless contests as to the right application of some
epithet or slogan, which in fact serves simply to confuse two different concepts about
whose proper application no one need have contested at all. The important question is
how are these all-too-familiar cases to be distinguished from the artificial example which
you have presented? To all appearances your concept of ‘the champions’ not only denotes
consistently different sets of individuals (teams) according as it is used by different parties
(supporters); it also connotes different achievements (in the way of different methods,
strategies, and styles favored by the different teams) according as it is used by different
groups of supporters. Is there, then, any real ground for maintaining that it has a single
meaning, that could be contested?” (pp. 127–128, emphases in original)
My own response to this objection was to include as an explicit condition on the con-
testedness of a concept that it must be single, univocal concept. Once that condition was
in place, of course, I owe an account—which I have only begun to sketch—of the differ-
ences that distinguish cases of genuine conceptual disagreement from cases of conceptual
equivocation. But Gallie responds to the equivocation challenge differently. Rather than
insisting on univocality as its own separate condition, Gallie contends that the presence
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of authoritative exemplars—ensured by condition (6)—will provide him with basis for
answering the equivocation objection.
Is Gallie’s condition (6) true of all conceptual contests? Must such contests always
involve examples that the whole conceptual community accepts as falling under the con-
cept? Gallie does not provide an argument to that effect. What reason, then, do we have
for accepting it? It seems to me that the plausibility of Gallie’s condition derives from the
difficulty we have in imagining a conceptual dispute between two parties where there is
not even one example that they would both affirm falls under the concept. If two parties
cannot find an actual case on which they agree, that fact would presumably go a long
way to undermining their—indeed, anyone’s—conviction that the two were engaged in a
dispute over a single concept. Hence we are led to the plausible general claim that for any
two parties to a conceptual contest there will be some example on which they agree. I do
not wish at present to consider whether this plausible claim is true. But note that the truth
of this plausible claim—for any two parties to a dispute there is an example on which they
agree—would not entail that for any given dispute there is some example on which all par-
ties agree. Suppose, as Gallie allows, that there are disputes to which there are more than
two parties. Then even if the plausible claim were true, we might nevertheless have a kind
overlapping but imperfect consensus that would appear to be fit to ground a conceptual
dispute even in the absence of an exemplar which all parties agree falls under the concept.
For instance, suppose we have five parties to a conceptual dispute, each of whom favors
a distinct, competing Description (one of D1, D2, . . . D5) of the concept under dispute.
Further suppose that we have five candidate examples E1, . . . E5, which happen to generate
as much consensus as we can manage to get from these disputants. Now suppose that for
every Di, Di bars exactly Ei from that set from counting as falling under the concept.
Without filling in further details from a specific example, it is hard to make any sort of
definitive claim on the matter; but the general structure of the case described surely seems
coherent. And on its face it seems that when there is that sort of overlap and agreement
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between the parties, there is nothing absurd or implausible in thinking that it is a single
concept that is under dispute, even though there is no single example that all parties agree
falls under the concept.
We should also note that Gallie’s inclusion of this condition bars what seems to me
to be a salient characteristic of contested concepts: that even when there are cases that are
understood as central or canonical exemplars on which a community broadly agrees, later
conceptual inquiry can sometimes lead a community to retract as mistaken their judgment
that those cases were instance to which the concept applies.
If it is false that all conceptual disputes require agreement on at least one example,
then a fortiori it is false that all conceptual disputes require agreement on at least one
shared authoritative example. That much we can know without knowing anything about
what it means to say that an example is authoritative. But—given that we are about to ask
the question whether the presence of authoritative exemplars would equip Gallie with an
answer to the equivocation objection—we should ask what Gallie means by saying that an
example is an authoritative exemplar. An answer is not evident from the text. Other than
the feature presently under consideration—that they anchor the univocality of a concept
under dispute—all we are told about authoritative exemplars is (a) that they are cases
to which all members of the community agree the concept applies and (b) that they are
appealed to in the course of arguments in conceptual contests. Perhaps these two features
are, for Gallie, all that are involved in the authoritativeness of an exemplar. Of course, each
new independent feature we attempt to shoehorn into authoritativeness makes it harder
for Gallie to demonstrate that condition (6) holds for every conceptual contest. So if the
question is whether condition (6) is a necessary condition, then charity seems to demand
that we stop with the minimal specification of authoritativeness. However, I propose
to take it as read, for the reasons canvassed above, that the condition is false. Hence
the remainder of our discussion of condition (6) will concern the question of whether
authoritative exemplars, when they are present, are capable of fulfilling the roles that Gallie
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intends for them. In considering that question, charity seems to require that we invest
authoritativeness with as many compelling features as we can.
So here are some reasonable candidates for a robust account of the authoritativeness of
these exemplars. Perhaps to say that an exemplar for a concept  is authoritative is to say
that its status is unimpeachable and indefeasible: it is and forever shall be an instance of ,
no matter what anyone says or does. Perhaps it is to say that no member of the community
can reasonably deny that the exemplar is an instance of , or can ever have any evidence
that it is not an instance of . Perhaps, if  is a gradable or comparative concept, it is to say
that it is necessarily a perfect or superlative exemplar: that no other object could exceed
or surpass the exemplar with respect to C-ness. Perhaps it is to say that the concept  was
introduced through some manner of demonstrative, reference-fixing baptism exercised
upon the exemplar. Or perhaps it is to say that resemblance or similarity to the exemplar
is constitutive of what it is to be a C. Perhaps—and notice that this does not follow from
the presence of the minimal features (a) and (b) above—it is even to say that an assertion
that the exemplar is C is true or correct.
In order to try out these stronger versions of authoritativeness, let us turn to Gal-
lie’s preferred bowling example. Suppose that there is some team of yore, T0, that is an
authoritative exemplar of : authoritative in all of the respects canvassed
above. Suppose that the concept  was introduced or coined with the exemplar
in mind; suppose that no one can ever doubt or deny the championship of this team,
that it is by all accounts the unsurpassed and unequaled greatest champion of all time.
Would the presence of an exemplar with all of these features be sufficient to answer the
equivocation challenge: that is, would the existence an exemplar with all of these features
provide sufficient grounds for showing that the parties are engaged in a dispute over the
same concept?
I think that the answer is pretty clearly no. To see why, we need go no further than
to consider the different Descriptions D1–D3 we have sketched above, based on Gallie’s
own characterization of potential positions in the dispute. Now, suppose that adherents
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of D1, D2, and D3 (call them P1, P2, and P3, respectively) all accept T0 as an authoritative
exemplar in the robust sense we are now considering. Such a supposition is only plausible
provided that T0 was a team that exhibited, in a remarkable and salient way, each of the
elements of the game that Descriptions D1, D2, and D3 rate over all others: speed, spin,
and score, respectively. For if T0 failed to exhibit any one these elements in a remarkable
and unsurpassed way, then it would fail to serve as an authoritative exemplar for whichever
party that favors the Description emphasizing that element to the virtual exclusion of the
others.
Now consider: what follows from the fact that all three parties all correctly regard
T0 as the authoritative exemplar of the concept ? Does this entail that
all three have a single, shared, contested concept in common rather than three different
concepts that each associates with the same linguistic term? For in contending that having
an authoritative example in common is sufficient to block equivocation, that seems to be
precisely the inference that Gallie wants us to make. He encourages us to reason as follows:
1. T0 is the authoritative exemplar for P1’s concept 
2. T0 is the authoritative exemplar for P2’s concept 
3. T0 is the authoritative exemplar for P3’s concept 
4. Therefore, P1, P2, P3 have the same concept 
However, this inference is only acceptable provided that we suppose that T0—or any
other authoritative exemplar—can only be an authoritative exemplar for a single con-
cept. But surely there is no reason why this must be so: given T0’s remarkable perfor-
mance in the elements of speed, spin, and score, there is nothing incoherent in supposing
that the parties’ different Descriptions D1, D2, and D3 just correspond to three distinct
concepts—-, -, and -—each of which is
authoritatively exemplified in the performance of T0, and each of which governs the use
of their respective adherents’ uses of the term “champion.”
The conclusion to draw from the discussion of this section, I believe, is that Gallie’s
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condition (6) is not, in fact, a necessary condition for the contestedness of a concept.
Moreover, if we hope to block the equivocation objection, it is not enough to appeal to
the presence of exemplars on which the parties agree, even if those exemplars are in some
extravagant sense “authoritative.”
This does not yet mean that Gallie cannot answer in some other way to the (quite
plausible) equivocation diagnosis of his own artificial example. Indeed, I think that there
is considerable merit in the “easy answer” Gallie initially offers to the challenge—which
he subsequently finds insufficient and supplements by instituting condition (6). That
“easy answer” is simply that all of the parties believe themselves to be employing a single
concept: they believe themselves to be playing the same game and competing for the
same “championship.” As Gallie points out, the objector may, just as simply, respond that
this belief might be a “persistent delusion” (p. 128). Indeed, given Gallie’s description
of his artificial case, it is difficult to see how the participants in that dispute could avoid
reaching the conclusion that their earlier belief that they were playing the same game was
erroneous. That is why I should prefer the following modification of the “easy answer”:
All of the parties to the dispute are committed to employing a single concept in common.
However, as we shall see, this version of the answer does not seem to be available on Gallie’s
account.
What is missing from Gallie’s discussion is a feature that is central to the idea of uni-
vocality. One has to give weight to other parties’ convictions concerning championship:
that a concept user’s own deliberation about which conception or Description is correct
must draw not only on their own—or their own like-minded partisan group’s— prior use,
but that it must involve some measure of deference or accommodation of prior patterns of
use and judgments of others whom they take to be employing the same concept but with
whom they disagree. We will have to make sure that the account of contested concepts
developed here respects this demand.
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2.1.3.2 The descriptive versus the evaluative In condition (1), Gallie explicitly re-
stricts essentially contested concepts to evaluative domains. Perhaps this is not a surprise:
the examples of contested concepts that come most readily to mind—including the “real
life” examples Gallie introduces and my own target cases from §1.2 in Chapter 1—are all
situated within value theory, broadly construed. But Gallie’s position is that this is a nec-
essary feature of contested concepts: only evaluative or appraisive concepts could possibly
qualify as contested. My own account of contested concepts to this point remains agnostic
on this issue: nothing I have said thus far commits me to one position or the other. But
by insisting upon condition (1), Gallie’s account has foreclosed on the possibility that this
might have been coincidental or an accidental generalization rather than the reflection of
some deeper characteristic of essentially contested concepts. We should consider whether
he has reasons for doing so.
But before we address the more general question of whether contested concepts must
be evaluative, we should briefly note that the gloss I quoted as part of Gallie’s condition
(1) is even more stringent than that. Gallie contends that a contested concept is appraisive
“in the sense that it signifies or accredits some kind of valued achievement” (p. 122). That
is, any essentially contested concept must (a) classify only the results of agentive activities
and endeavors—it must be directed toward taking stock of human achievements—and
(b) that the characterization of these endeavors must be positive: Contested concepts must
be understood to pick out activities, practices, or goals that the community’s members
are prepared to praise in others or strive to achieve themselves. Moreover, condition (7)
tells us that conceptual disputes must play a role in developing or sustaining that achieve-
ment. This derives from Gallie’s view about the distinctive social function that essentially
contested concepts play, which is reflected in his condition (7). For Gallie, essentially con-
tested concepts have special social significance because the competition over them provides
community members additional incentive to strive for achievement, above and beyond the
value found in the praiseworthy achievement itself: the thrill of competition through ag-
gressive and defensive uses of a concept will provide further incentive to excel. So, for
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instance, a community that contests the concept of democracy, Gallie thinks, is more
likely to dedicate itself to realizing the various elements involved in the Description of
that concept.
Let us grant to Gallie that some contested concepts are certainly concerned with the
commendatory evaluation of human activity: After all, my own target case of the concept
 seems to fit that bill. Must all essentially contested concepts be restricted to the
commendatory? The example of  from target case (2) in Chapter 1 shows that
the disputes characteristic of contested concepts may emerge just as easily over negative
“achievements”—over what counts as a result that community members are enjoined to
condemn and avoid. Moreover, even if we suppose that all essentially contested concepts
are evaluative, whether commendatory or condemnatory, that would not give us reason to
think that all such concepts are concerned with the evaluation of agency and its results,
unless we were provided with some reason to think that there are no evaluative concepts
that apply outside of that domain.
But let us return to the more pressing general question of whether essentially contested
concepts must be evaluative at all. Other than by stipulation or a hasty generalization
based on his own preferred examples of essentially contested concepts, how can Gallie
argue that this condition obtains?
Remarkably, Gallie’s arguments for the necessity of his conditions are mainly packed
into a single footnote. In considering the status of condition (1), he writes:
There remains the possibility that the addition of condition (4) renders condition (1)
superfluous. This could be maintained if, and only if, instances could be produced of
a concept which conforms to my conditions (2), (3) and (4) and which is yet wholly
non-appraisive in character. My suspicion is, however, that no purely naturalistic concept
will be found conforming to my conditions (2), (3) and (4). (p. 127, fn. 2, emphasis in
original)
Unless I am mistaken, Gallie has gotten himself turned around here. Surely he means
to say that condition (1) will be superfluous—i.e., it will not further provide additional
constriction of the set of essentially contested concepts—unless there  some “wholly non-
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appraisive” concept that nevertheless conforms to conditions (2)–(4). But the upshot of
his remarks for the question at hand is clear: He suspects that condition (1) correctly char-
acterizes essentially contested concepts because he suspects that no “purely naturalistic”—
i.e., no nonappraisive—concepts will satisfy the “internal complexity” conditions (2)–(4).
These, the reader will recall, are the conditions that most closely approximate the condi-
tions from my own preliminary account, and in this passage we find Gallie giving them
pride of place over the (he thinks, likely superfluous) condition (1). In fact, he allows
that if a concept were to satisfy conditions (2)–(4), he would be prepared to count it as
contested even if it failed to meet condition (1). As necessary conditions go, this is about
as weak as they come.5
Nevertheless, despite the failure of this argument, Gallie has presented us with a rea-
sonable challenge: If we are curious about whether there could be non-evaluative concepts
that exhibit the features that characterize contestedness, then we ought to try to find some
examples and consider whether non-evaluative may exhibit the characteristics described in
the specification above. This question will be taken up again later, in §4.2.
But before we prepare to undertake that challenge, we should take note of why Gallie
suspects that it cannot be met. What are his reasons for thinking that every contested
concept will have to be evaluative? His remarks, compressed within that same footnote,
reveal certain key features of his views about descriptive (“naturalistic”, “non-appraisive”)
classification and evaluative classification—features that explain why Gallie thinks no non-
evaluative concept could exhibit contested behavior:
Given conditions (2) and (3) we have the sort of situation where a multi-dimensional
description or classification of certain facts is possible. But in any such situation, spe-
cific evidential or methodological reasons apart, it would be absurd to prefer one style of
possible description or classification to the others. But substitute achievements for facts,
i.e., an appraisive concept or classification for a purely naturalistic one, and the absurdity
disappears, since for the purposes of moral or aesthetic persuasion one style of description
or classification may very definitely be preferable to another which is logically equipollent
with it. (p. 127, fn. 2, emphasis in original)
5This concession presumably means that Gallie is likewise prepared to hedge on the necessity of condi-
tion (7), since it could only be necessary if (1) were.
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The view that underlies these remarks seems to be something like the following. The
activity of description is a naturalistic, non-appraisive attempt to report the facts—the
way the world is. A description is the sort of utterance that can be either true or false,
depending upon whether it reports the facts correctly. Descriptive concepts are either re-
sponsive to a simple sort of fact about the world, or else they are complex in a way that
we might call “flatly conjunctive”: They are responsive to the co-presence of a number of
distinct descriptive or naturalistic features of the world, each of which must be of equal
weight. Disagreements over descriptive claims, or over the content of a descriptive con-
cept, are, at least in principle, objectively resolvable into general agreement by means of
general intersubjective rational procedures that appeal to evidence and argumentation.
By contrast, the activity of valuation, whatever it might be, is not an attempt to report
any facts. As such, an evaluation is not the sort of utterance that can be true or false.
Evaluative concepts are, at least in some respects, responsive to the way that the world
is—indeed, they are anchored in descriptive features of the world, as we can see from the
example of the various Descriptions that attempt to encapsulate the evaluative concept
. However, although evaluative concepts may be complex and responsive to a
variety of different descriptive features of the world, they need not be flatly conjunctive:
they can be responsive to these descriptive or naturalistic features in a way that reflects
different weight or influence among the descriptive features. Hence a single descriptive
concept can correspond to a variety of different evaluative concepts that are responsive to
the same naturalistic features, where each of these evaluative concepts may be differenti-
ated by the distribution of weights accorded to the various descriptive features. However,
disagreements over evaluative claims, or over the content of an evaluative concept, are
not even in principle objectively resolvable into general agreement by means of general
intersubjective rational procedures that appeal to evidence and argumentation.
This is a lot to take in, even if it is rather sketchy and schematic. I will want to return
to this account of the contrast between the evaluative and the non-evaluative once we start
to consider whether, and how, non-evaluative concepts might be contested.
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In the next section, our discussion will turn to the vindicatory burden: the challenge
both Gallie and I hope to address by explaining how disputes over contested concepts
can be genuine, rational disputes. As we proceed, it will be worth noting the serious con-
straints under which Gallie must labor to meet this burden given his view of the distinction
between descriptive and evaluative concepts.
2.1.3.3 Rational and genuine disputes: The vindicatory burden Both Gallie and I
are concerned to show that disputes over contested concepts may be genuine and principled
disputes—and we understand this burden in roughly the same way. Each of us wants to
consider whether these disputes may be conducted in a way that is subject to rational stan-
dards of evidence, cogency, and justification. We both accept that such disputes certainly
may be carried out in ways that blatantly disregard these standards, that rely instead upon
appeals to emotion or greed, or what we might generally regard as attempts to provide
arational psychological causes that may bring about “conversion” of other parties to the
dispute. But is such the fate of every such dispute? How seriously can we take the claims
of the parties that there are reasons for thinking that a particular conception or Description
is the best, correct or proper way of spelling out the content of the concept?6
In broad terms, Gallie and I agree that these disputes may be rationally grounded. Ul-
timately, however, I think that Gallie’s attempt to show that essentially contested concepts
meet the rationality burden is deficient. In particular, I think that, because of his overly
restrictive view of the rational constraints on evaluative disputes, Gallie is in a position to
show that these contests are rational and genuine only in an attenuated and inadequate
sense. But in order to see what I think he gets right and where I think he goes wrong, and
in order to learn from his attempt, let us consider Gallie’s strategy for demonstrating the
rationality of disputes over contested concepts.
6In this respect at least, Gallie surely gets off on the wrong foot with the choice of his artificial example.
In order to illustrate the liability disputes over contested concepts might pose to standards of evidence,
reason, and cogency, he could scarcely have done worse than to choose the concept , which aligns
these two sorts of competitions—contests within the game (where team allegiance, blind partisanship, and
rationalizing, bad faith arguments are par for the course) and contests over the correct way of spelling out
contested concepts.
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The first stage of Gallie’s approach to this question is defensive, amounting to an at-
tempt to shift the burden of proof. Why, he asks, would we suspect that disputes over
contested concepts couldn’t be genuine or rational? The reason, he thinks, is that we pre-
sume that a dispute can be genuine or rational only if it is possible, through rational means,7
to achieve a universally acceptable resolution of that dispute. However, as we have already
seen, by Gallie’s own stipulation, disputes over essentially contested concepts are such that
they “are not resolvable by arguments of any kind” (see the quote on my page 20) and
such that there is no “general principle for deciding which of two contestant uses of an
essentially contested concept really ‘uses it best’” (p. 139). Together with the presump-
tion that the rationality of a dispute requires the possibility of rational consensus, these
concessions would entail that disputes over contested concepts cannot be genuine or ra-
tional. However, Gallie says, there is little reason to credit the presumption, since (a)
“universal agreement does not figure among the familiarly recognized criteria of rational
justification” (p. 138), and since (b) there is no convincing defense of this requirement on
rationality. That presumption, Gallie tells us, simply sets too demanding a standard for
the genuineness and rationality of a dispute.
Instead, Gallie hopes to demonstrate that a weaker standard will suffice. Even though,
he contends, it is not possible in the case of essentially contested concepts to find prin-
ciples or arguments that exert a general rational force, and even though, he contends,
it is not possible to come up with a general assessment of the rationality of the parties’
positions, Gallie nevertheless will venture to claim that there is another way of showing
that a dispute is rational and genuine. We can do so, Gallie claims, by satisfying a more
modest standard: by showing that individual disputants’ conduct and positions within the
dispute—their “continued use (or in the more dramatic case of conversion . . . change of
use) of the concept in question” (p. 139)—is liable to rational assessment.
Equipped with this new standard for the rationality and genuineness of a dispute,
7Gallie does not explicitly include the “through rational means” qualification here, but it seems to fit his
position, since he countenances the possibility that universal agreement regarding a contested concept might
be achieved through nefarious arational means like bribery, bullying, or extermination.
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Gallie sets out to demonstrate that it can be met by disputes over essentially contested
concepts, and in particular that it can be met by his artificial example of the concept
. In demonstrating this, he aims to convince us, by means of careful consider-
ation of a hypothetical case of the rationally driven conversion of one of the participants
in the dispute, that the standard is sufficient. Let us note that, whatever its deficiencies,
this will be the first detailed attempt presented thus far in the thesis that attempts to show,
by means of example, how a dispute over a contested concept can meet the vindicatory
burden and exhibit liability to standards of cogency, evidence, and the like. Since that
vindicatory burden is so central to our discussion, and since the details of Gallie’s attempt
are going to prove important to our later discussion, I will quote from Gallie’s presentation
at considerable length.
Gallie begins by stipulating the configuration of various parties within his artificial
example:
To show how [individual conversion that is subject to rational demands] is possible let
me revert, yet once again, to my artificial example and consider the supporters of three
contestant teams T1, T2, and T3. And for simplicity let us assume that the style of play of
T2 can be said to stand midway between the styles of T1 and T3. Let us recall, too, that in
each of these groups of supporters there will always be wavering or marginal individuals,
who are more than usually aware of the appeals—the characteristic excellences—of teams
other than that which at the moment they favor and support. Let us concentrate on an
individual I2, at present a marginal supporter of T2. (p. 139)
The case, as recounted here, is rather maddeningly unspecific. We are left to guess what
sort of specifications of styles of play might fit the pattern that Gallie describes, and what
it might mean to say that team T2 has a style of play (and presumably, that I2 subscribes
to a Description D2 of the concept ) that stands midway between the others.
And here is Gallie’s recounting of I2’s conversion:
A particular performance of Team T1, or some shrewd appraisive comment from one of
T1’s supporters, suddenly makes him realize much more completely than heretofore the
justice of T1’s claim to be sustaining and advancing the original exemplar team’s style of
play in “the best possible way.” This tips the scale for him and he is converted to being a
supporter of T1. (p. 139)
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The example continues to be terribly under-described. Nevertheless, it is difficult
to see how we could fill in the details so that any piece of this transaction could count
as providing an argument or evidence or a reason that would support or compel I2’s re-
jection of Description D2 in favor of D1. What could a performance by T1 be like in
order for that mere performance to give I2 a reason for her conversion? And what sort of
“shrewd appraisive remark” should we expect from I1? Can we construct an explicit line
of reasoning—an argument—that traces the line of rational force that leads I2 to convert?
What form would an argument take if it were to draw upon that performance or that
remark as evidence?
Gallie continues:
But now we may assume that the same particular performance (or shrewd appraisive com-
ment) has had a comparable—though not so dramatically effective—influence on other
supporters of T2. It has slightly shaken them, we might say. At least it has made them
aware that, in comparable circumstances T2 must make a comparable effective adaptation
of its style of play if it is to keep their unwavering support. Further, we may assume that
although supporters of T3 are less shaken by the particular performance, they have at least
been made to “sit up and take notice”; and similarly, with decreasing degrees of force for
supporters of other teams whose styles of play are still remoter from that of T1. (p. 139)
Certainly we may assume or suppose that T1’s performance or I1’s shrewd remark has
had this pattern of influence, if we like. And if we do so, the conversion and revision
we have stipulated will have roughly the sort of ripple pattern we might expect a piece of
evidence or a rational appeal might have.
While insisting that there may be this much objectivity in the grounds of any particular
conversion, we may nevertheless agree . . . that fundamental differences in attitude, of a
kind for which no logical justification can be given, must lie at the back of the kind of
situation which we have just discussed. Why should one style of play (as in our artificial
example) appeal to one group of supporters and another style to a second group? Why
should one facet of Democracy or of the Christian Message appeal so strongly to one type
or group or communion, another to a second? (p. 141)
Remember Gallie’s contention in support of his more modest standard for the rational-
ity of a dispute: that in order to show that a dispute is rational or genuine, it is sufficient
to show that an individual’s position within that dispute is liable to rational assessment
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or revision. We have just seen that Gallie’s own particular exposition of that standard is
deeply troubling. However, I think that there are general reasons to be suspicious of the
standard’s sufficiency. Indeed, I think that there are disputes that are neither rational nor
genuine, but where individual parties’ views are rationally assessable.
Take, as an example, the following dispute. Suppose you and I are arguing over
whether rattlesnake meat is tasty: You claim that it is, I claim that it is not. The “dispute”
in which we are engaged surely should not count as a dispute over a contested concept.
Surely if any dispute is arational, if any dispute fails to be genuine, if any dispute is a case
of interlocutors talking past one another, this would be one. There is simply nothing that
you might say that would provide me with a reason for thinking that rattlesnake meat
is tasty; there is simply nothing that I could say that would provide you with a reason
for thinking that it is not.8 However, individuals’ stances and conduct within the discus-
sion nevertheless remain liable to some form of rational assessment. To see that this is
so, suppose that at various points during the course of our discussion, I make each of the
following three assertions:
(A) Rattlesnake meat is not tasty.
(B) Rattlesnake meat tastes exactly like chicken meat.
(C) Chicken meat is tasty.
The position that I have thereby staked out in the dispute is rationally untenable. No
matter how permissive and relativized the semantics of the predicate “. . . is tasty,” there is
no plausible understanding of it on which I can coherently remain committed to all three
of these assertions at the same time. When you pointed this out to me, you presented
me with a reason for changing my stated position (although you have not given me a
reason to give up any particular one of the claims), and you have done so by exploiting
my position’s liability to argument and demands of cogency and coherence. But despite
that, it does not follow that our dispute over whether rattlesnake is tasty is a genuine or
rational dispute. Thus, the fact that an individual position within a dispute is subject to
8This is not to deny that there might be some contested concepts in culinary settings.
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rational force or assessment does not entail that the dispute itself—the apparent interper-
sonal disagreement—is genuine or rational. Thus, Gallie’s proposed modest standard for
meeting the vindicatory burden fails.
But why has it failed? What has gone wrong? Why has this standard for the rational-
ity and genuineness of a dispute failed, and might there be a way to correct it or at least
learn from the error? Here is a tentative suggestion. Notice that Gallie considers only two
extreme positions concerning the scope or force of argumentative, evidential or rational
appeal. The first position—the one that Gallie apparently thinks is the appropriate po-
sition for non-evaluative disputes—supposes that the scope of those considerations will
be universal, such as might in principle or under ideal conditions lead to complete con-
sensus among all reasoners. However, when he considers the prospects for this standard
in the case of evaluative disputes, he (perhaps quite properly) rejects it as too stringent.
In response, Gallie switches instead to the other extreme: Rather than considering ratio-
nal standards or evidence that has the broadest possible, universal scope, he considers an
incredibly weak and narrow, strictly individualistic or solipsistic standard: one according
to which only the individual’s values, convictions, judgments, or assertions can count as
exerting rational force for that individual.
2.2 PEACOCKE, HIGGINBOTHAM, AND “IMPLICIT CONCEPTIONS”
In a set of articles a number of years ago, Christopher Peacocke and James Higginbotham
articulated an account of conceptions and their relationship to concepts.9 While there are
points of contact between their views and my own, there are marked differences as well.
Peacocke’s and Higginbotham’s accounts have roughly the same view about the basic
structure of the relationship between concepts and conceptions as my own account. All
three of us agree that there are some concepts the contents of which establish some condi-
9See Peacocke (1998b,a); Higginbotham (1998a,b)
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tions on our employment of the concepts, but which are indeterminate across a range of
cases. We agree that a conception of a concept is essentially a more determinate version of
that same concept, one whose content provides conditions or criteria that are more specific
and more determinate than those provided by the corresponding concept.
The grand and overarching difference between my view and Peacocke’s and Higgin-
botham’s—the one that is responsible for the remainder of the differences—lies in the
different kind of explanatory projects in which we’re engaged. Let me briefly sketch the
role that concepts and conceptions play in Peacocke’s and Higginbotham’s projects. But
first: certain key notions recur with different labels in Peacocke’s and Higginbotham’s
articles. For the sake of clarity, let’s stipulate some terminology. Say that a thinker has
mastered a concept  just in case she is consistently able to employ  correctly across a
wide range of cases: That is, she is consistently able to make very fine-grained, specific,
and correct applications and inferences involving . Next, say that a thinker’s formulation
or explicit grasp of a concept  is the linguistic explication of the content of  that she
is able explicitly to frame at a given time. Finally, say that a thinker is able to correctly
formulate  just in case she can produce a detailed explication of the content of the concept
that would correctly guide the employment of  across a wide range of cases.
Peacocke (Peacocke, 1998b) is struck by the following phenomenon: In some cases a
thinker who has mastered a concept  is nevertheless unable correctly to formulate it. That
is, thinkers are sometimes able to employ a concept in a way that outstrips the guidance
provided by any formulation of the concept she can muster. A beginning logic student,
for instance, might be unable to provide an explication of the concept of conjunction, but
might nevertheless be able to judge and infer perfectly well about conjunction, almost as
if she had, say, a written explication before her to use as a guide. Isaac Newton might
not have been able to formulate the concept , but he was nevertheless able to reason
about convergent series almost as if he had an explication of it before him to use as a guide.
Moreover, Peacocke suggests, a thinker who is unable to formulate a concept correctly will
sometimes be able to put herself in a position to do so by careful scrutiny of her own
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employment of the concept across a suitable range of hypothetical (“simulated”) cases.10
For Peacocke, this ability demands explanation. Unless we are willing to count such
a thinker’s persistent correct employment of a concept as a string of happy accidents (and
hence as unprincipled or unjustified), there must be some account of how a thinker’s
understanding of that concept could somehow be more determinate than her conscious
grasp of that concept. Peacocke suggests the best way of accounting for that success is to
posit some sub-personal contentful state in that thinker, where (a) the content of this state
is the (determinate) explication of the content of the concept and (b) this state is causally
responsible for guiding the thinker’s correct employment of the concept. A thinker who
has such a state is said to possess an implicit conception of the concept.
Higginbotham (Higginbotham, 1998a) also has as a central example the case of a
thinker who has mastered a concept but cannot formulate it. But while Peacocke focuses
on the transition from implicit to explicit mastery, Higginbotham pivots in the other
direction: he contrasts such a thinker with one who merely possesses a concept she has
not (yet) mastered. (The notion of possessing a concept that is in play here is much
less demanding than the one developed in Peacocke (1992), which involves something
closer to what is called “concept mastery” in these articles.) The criteria for possessing
a concept do not emerge crisply in the Higginbotham articles. Perhaps it involves the
capacity to have thoughts that involve the concept. Or perhaps it involves something akin
to minimal competence—the ability to employ the concept in a range of central cases.
Nevertheless, Higginbotham’s project is to explain what it is that a concept master has
and that the conceptual novice lacks and therefore must gradually develop on the way to
achieving mastery. And Higginbotham’s answer is that the master has, while the novice
lacks, a conception of the concept in question. As in Peacocke’s discussion, a conception
for Higginbotham is to be understood as a state of the thinker, the content of which more
10A note about motivation: Peacocke claims that the knowledge produced by such reasoning is a priori,
since it is not grounded in empirical inquiry. Peacocke’s work in this area is connected with his recent project
of rehabilitating some of the central tenets of classical Rationalism.
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determinate than the content of the corresponding concept, and which accounts for the
master’s expertise in employment of the concept.
Thus, Peacocke and Higginbotham are each intrigued by cases in which a thinker’s
employment of a concept is more determinate than her explicit grasp of that concept.
Each claims that the phenomenon is to be explained by the presence of these more de-
terminate, submerged, subpersonal states. As such, to a rough approximation, Peacocke
and Higginbotham are both concerned to use conceptions as a device for explaining an
individual’s grasp and exercise of concepts, and, as a result, their accounts are closely tied
to the idea of conceptions as contentful (though not always consciously available) mental
states of individuals, the contents of which are to be revealed through judgments about
hypothetical cases.
We should also notice that the cases that interest Peacocke and Higginbotham all
are supposed to be ones in which there is a unique and settled correct conception of
the concept in question: Their discussion of each of their examples proceed as if there
were a unique, uncontroversial correct explication of the concept. Some commentators in
Villanueva (1998) press Peacocke or Higginbotham on precisely this point regarding some
of the examples discussed in their articles, either suggesting alternative conceptions of a
concept under discussion or challenging them to defend the correctness of the candidate
conception that they suggest. (For example, see Jacob (1998, pp. 173-4).)
It is worth noting here a parallel between Peacocke and Higginbotham’s research
project and a use of the concept/conception distinction that fits squarely within the tra-
dition in which I am interested. I am thinking here of John Rawls’s tentative claim in
(Rawls, 1971, p. 47) that the thought experiments he describes concerning justice might
be understood as making explicit a body of implicit moral principles that guide and ex-
plain our moral judgments, on the model of Chomsky’s implicit grammar. Rawls backed
off of this suggestion in later work, but it is serves as an illustration of the way in which
the uses of the concept/conception distinction that descend from W.B. Gallie are related
to the projects that are under discussion in Villanueva (1998).
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Now, Peacocke and Higginbotham might be wrong about whether there is in fact a
single, uncontroversial conception of the particular concepts they consider. But given the
aims of their projects they are entitled not to be interested in the possibility that there
might be a number of distinct candidate conceptions. They are each happy to presume
for their discussion of examples that there is a single correct conception of a concept, or
to suggest that the reader may transpose the discussion to the case of a concept that she
thinks actually does have a unique correct explication. Sticking to concepts that have an
uncontroversial unique correct conception is, in light of their aims, an appropriate simpli-
fication rather than an evasion or an oversight. Doing so merely removes a complication
that would not enrich their discussions, and allows them to focus on the questions that
matter for them.
We are now finally in a position to see the differences between my view and the view
that emerges in Higginbotham’s and Peacocke’s programs.
The first difference is that I treat concepts and conceptions strictly as abstracta, as units
of content or meaning, and I am not concerned with the question whether there are any
corresponding states within a thinker. I do not wish to reject Peacocke and Higginbotham’s
claim that there are such contentful states. Moreover, I am not interested in explaining
concept possession, concept acquisition, concept attribution, or concept mastery. I will
also not be concerned about implicit conceptions, subpersonal content, or inarticulate
mastery: as I have mentioned above, I will for the most part simply assume in the examples
I discuss that all the thinkers involved are able to formulate the concepts and conceptions
without much difficulty.
Second, the phenomenon that I am interested in—the phenomenon of contested
concepts—comes into view only once we relax Peacocke’s and Higginbotham’s simpli-
fying supposition that there is a single uncontroversial candidate conception of a concept.
In his commentary on Peacocke’s article, Georges Rey (Rey, 1998) presses hard on the
improbability of the claim that Newton or Leibniz have embedded within them a deter-
minate sub-personal conception that guided their employment of the concept . One
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might even urge that there are a number of different conceptions of limit that would fit
the bill. Peacocke allows that some concepts might amount to what I will call contested
concepts, but that his own research program requires “only the recognition that not all
cases of theoretical development are the resolutions of indeterminacies” (Peacocke, 1998a,
p. 63, emphasis mine).
Notice, however, that the point of having a distinction between concepts and concep-
tions becomes much clearer once we turn our attention to the possibility of distinct rival
candidate conceptions of a concept. If we focus exclusively on those concepts that have
a single, uncontroversial, determinate conception that is implicit in any thinker who is
competent with respect to that concept, then it becomes hard to see the importance of a
distinction between concepts and conceptions. Why not just say that the content of the
concept  is that content provided in the full, correct explication of the concept, and
then say that thinkers like Newton have a grasp only of part of the (settled and determinate
content of the) concept?
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3.0 WHAT CONCEPTS (AND CONCEPTIONS) JUST MIGHT BE
As its title advertises, this is a thesis about a particular type of concept. However, like
many fairly ordinary everyday terms that are made to bear a lot of philosophical weight,
“concept” has been appropriated and pressed into service in very different philosophical
projects. So in order to avoid confusion, I aim in this chapter to make it clear what I am
talking about when I talk about concepts. A thorough treatment of the general topic of
concepts is beyond the scope of a work of this size, so the work developed in this chapter
will of necessity raise many questions and beg a few others. But I am not terribly interested
in engaging in squabbles about whether this or that account is correct or fits best with our
pretheoretic notion of “concept.” To put this in the terminology of the dissertation: I
do not want to offer a competing conception of the concept . Instead, I have
a relatively modest aim: I hope merely to carve out my general topic area and make
the notion of concept I plan to use clear, plausible, and defensible, and sufficiently well
connected to some interesting philosophical problems before I go on to employ it in the
succeeding chapters. Let others use the term as they may, so long as all those who use it
are clear in advance about what they mean.
Once I have sketched the sense in which I have been using the term “concept,” I will
be in a position in (§3.3) to give a quick parallel treatment to the cognate term that also
plays a role in the project: “conception.”
One thing on which most accounts of concepts seem to agree is that concepts are in-
gredients in, or constituents of, content-laden entities (e.g., thoughts, representations, or
propositions), and that the content of these ingredient concepts contribute to the content
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of the entities containing them. Most accounts also accept the general methodological po-
sition that it makes sense to investigate concepts by considering those which correspond
to lexical entries in natural language: If you want to investigate a concept, on this presup-
position, you might as well start by investigating the concept that corresponds to the word
“cat” or the one that corresponds to “red.”
One angle of approach comes at the topic of concepts with the aim of understanding
them in the context of psychology or cognitive science, and thus have started by under-
standing concepts as particular mental representations or as mental representation-types,
perhaps sub-personal states. In this thesis, I neither suppose nor preclude the possibility
that there are these sort of discrete distinguishable processes or states, at either the level of
token or type. If there are such states, then the connections between work on concepts in
psychology and the cognitive sciences and my own work will turn out to be unproblem-
atic: the states or state-types that they call concepts will then turn out to be those states or
state-types that play a central role in a psychological explanation of how humans are the
kind of creatures who employ (what I call) concepts. But, again, nothing in my own view
will depend upon there being any such states.
3.1 CONCEPTS AS CLUSTERS OF NORMS
Once we approach concepts from the point of view of contents or meanings, we can
see that concepts are normative: They provide standards for the correct employment of
linguistic terms.
I propose that we can build a fecund account of concepts by taking the normative
character of concepts to be their definitive characteristic. On the account I propose, a
concept F simply is a cluster of norms providing standards for the correct employment of
the corresponding linguistic term “F.”1 More specifically, for the type of concepts stud-
1This allows me to sidestep controversies about whether there is non-conceptual content, i.e., content
that doesn’t have a corresponding lexical entry, so to speak.
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ied in this thesis—those concepts corresponding to unary natural language predicates—I
propose that the concept  is a cluster of norms that provide standards for the correct clas-
sification of objects as F.2 Call a norm that is a member of that cluster—one of the sort
that we are sometimes given to describe as “part of the concept of F”—a conceptual norm.
Note that the formulation I have suggested is framed in terms of a cluster or collection
of norms, rather than the cluster or collection that governs the employment of the term.
We are going to have to come up with a way of narrowing down the various clusters to
find the concept. Intuitively, not all of the norms that provide standards for employment
of that term will be conceptual norms that make up the concept . For instance, norms
of etiquette and prudence (e.g., those that counsel against the explicit application of the
term to the utterances of a superior) and norms of implicature (e.g., those that enjoin the
use of the term when a stronger term may correctly be applied instead) do not count as
conceptual norms. We want to be able to say which norms are “part of the concept” and
which ones are not. Again, speaking loosely, what we mean when we say that something
is “part of the concept” is that it is part of an answer to the question what it is to be an F.
In fact, not even all of the norms that provide standards for the correctness of clas-
sification will be suitable candidates for membership of the cluster that constitutes the
concept. For the sake of concreteness, I’ll try to bring out the difficulties here by working
through a particular example.
Consider the concept of a lie, in the sense of an act of mendacity. The concept ,
then, is a cluster of norms that provides standards for the employment of the correspond-
ing general term “lie”. In particular, the concept  provides standards for classifying
items (canonically, spoken or written assertions) as “lies.” As was mentioned above, not
all of the norms that govern the application of the term will count as conceptual. Some,
for instance, will concern whether an overt assertion of one’s classificatory judgment of
an assertion as a lie is correct by certain other standards, e.g., standards of politeness, of
2“Objects” here should be understood very broadly, so as not to preclude the inclusion of events, states
of affairs, or hypothetical objects—we will want to keep the door open to just about any sort of “thing” we
might classify using a unary natural language predicate.
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prudence, of legal burdens of proof, and so on.
And surely there are other norms that concern the application of a term in cases where
thinkers have incomplete evidence. For instance, there might be norms that defeasibly
license and encourage the application of the term “cat” to fuzzy four-legged critters who
present a certain sort of appearance. But presumably it isn’t part of the concept  that
cats have four legs. Similarly, there are likely norms that defeasibly license or encourage
the application of the term “lie” when a speaker is sweating profusely and looking evasive.
Such norms concern the application of the terms under partial or imperfect information
about the case in question, and hence such a norm doesn’t constitute part of the answer to
the question of what it is to be a lie.
Conceptual norms, then, are those norms that are involved in answering the question,
“What is it to be an F?” So, then: how are we to determine which norms are part of the
concept, or “analytic” or “part of the meaning of a term,” and which ones are not? Is there
any way of taking the general formulations expressed above and turning them into more
concrete tests?
We might have a hard time selecting the features that distinguish the conceptual norms
from the non-conceptual ones, but as a first, provisional pass, one well suited to the kind
of project undertaken in the other chapters of the thesis I hazard the following: To be a
conceptual norm is to be a norm that governs the application of the corresponding linguis-
tic term across those cases where a thinker takes herself to have answered these unresolved
questions in the case—in the case of the concept , once it is settled by evidence or stip-
ulation that the utterance is false, that the speaker knew it to be so, and so on. Conceptual
norms, then, apply across the range of cases—both actual and counterfactual—where de-
ficiencies of relevant information about the objects are taken to be resolved, either by
stipulation or investigation.
This account of the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual norms does
not provide the sort of sharp, hard and fast boundaries for our concepts that previous
generations have hoped for or feared. Examples that debunk the idea that there is a hard-
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and-fast boundary of that sort, including the discussion in Putnam’s (1962) of the question
of whether the norm #apply term t only to animals# is a part of the concept .
No doubt alarm bells are going off in the readers’ minds. What I have written thus far
might be thought to signal a return to the bad old days, where concepts were definitions,
or necessary and sufficient conditions. Am I urging a return to the bad old days where
conceptual analysis and intuition-mongering held sway? Not at all. But I think that con-
struing concepts as norms provides us with ways around some of the most common and
devastating concerns about concepts, and allows us to view the philosophical predilections
for conceptual analysis and intuition-pumping in a new light.
3.2 NORM-LIKE FEATURES OF CONCEPTS
This account of concepts rests squarely on the back of the notion of the normative. Un-
fortunately, in the space of this thesis, I cannot really even begin to address the whole host
of intriguing and crucial philosophical questions that this dependence will raise. I will not
develop a general account of what norms are, or where they come from. Nor will I be able
to address the various types of skeptical challenges to their existence or even their possibil-
ity. For the purposes of this thesis, I remain neutral on most questions about the origins or
the metaphysics of the normative, e.g., whether, or how, the existence of norms might be
accounted for in a materialist or physicalist world view, and whether norms are fundamen-
tally social or conventional or whether there are “transcendental” norms that derive their
authority from something other than a community’s social practices. I also take no stand
on the question of whether norms must be public or private, although my discussion of
conceptual norms proceeds as if these norms are in fact shared and sometimes capable of
joint investigation and scrutiny. I do suppose that there can be norms that no community
has yet adopted: One can consider a set of rules for a game that no one has yet played.
Rather than mounting a general account and defense of the normative, I will have
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to rely on the plausibility of the position that there are norms, whatever their origin or
make-up. Surely there are some rules, principles, standards for correctness, at least in
some areas of human activity—wherever these come from, whatever they must depend
upon, however skeptical challenges to their existence may be rebutted.
In addition, my account of concepts will draw upon some of the plausible features of
norms which it seems that just about any account of the normative should have to accom-
modate. I highlight some of these features of norms, to point out that, once concepts are
understood as clusters of norms, these features can now reasonably be thought to carry
over to concepts. This, I claim, is a good thing, since these features comport nicely with
the features that concepts are generally understood to have—including some features that
have been marshaled to strike down alternative accounts of concepts that were unable to
accommodate them.
3.2.1 Norms may be of various types and origins
Norms may be introduced into a community in myriad ways. Some are introduced by
stipulation or fiat by specific community members who are authorized to do so, others
by the community’s explicit joint adoption of a convention, others by a tacit integration
into a community’s activities. As I said above, I take no stand on the question of whether
norms may or must have an extra-normative foundation. Nevertheless, any plausible view
of the normative will also have to accommodate the fact that norms may surely incorpo-
rate or confer normative significance upon facts that seem clearly not to be in themselves
socially generated or normative. (Consider, for instance, a nomadic tribe that has adopted
a rule that enjoins them to travel each day whichever direction the wind is blowing at a
certain hour of the morning.) In fact, a norm may even confer status and set standards of
conduct in ways that outstrip a community’s epistemic reach. There is nothing incoher-
ent in supposing that a community has to rely upon evidence or guesswork in trying to
meet a norm’s demands, or in supposing that a community might be governed by a norm
without ever having any way of knowing whether their actions were in conformity with it.
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Consider a rule within the tribe that confers special status on the eldest member of a tribe,
despite the fact that no tribe member knows which community member was born first.
Concepts seem to enjoy a parallel variety of origins and types, as we should expect if
concepts are clusters of norms. A concept might be introduced in one fell swoop by a par-
ticular act by an individual or sub-community, or it might have a more obscure origin that
no community member can recall. Moreover, a concept might require deference to extra-
social facts. Suppose, for instance, that Kripkean theories about the semantics of natural
kind terms are correct. Then the concept  dictates that what it is for a substance
to be water—what it is for the term “water” correctly to apply to a substance—is for that
substance to have the same underlying microphysical composition as the stuff that was
originally dubbed “water”—even when a community is unable to settle questions about
underlying microphysical composition. The account of concepts as clusters of norms,
indeed, is compatible with a variety of competing views in the philosophy of language.
Rather than a competitor in among them, then, this theory is perhaps best understood as
a higher-level framework from which we can view these disputes. In particular, we can
view many disputes within the philosophy of language as disputes over how best to limn
the conceptual norms that govern the employment of a particular type of linguistic term:
If we understand those norms as Kripke proposes we should understand them, how well
does that capture the proprieties of our employment of natural kind terms?
3.2.2 Not all norms admit of crisp and comprehensive verbal formulations
Some norms—e.g., the rules that constitute and govern the game of “Tic Tac Toe,” —are
susceptible of rather clear, specific, and exhaustive verbal formulation. Such also appears
to be the case with at least some concepts, including perhaps that hoary philosophical
favorite, the concept bachelor. What philosophers have come to call an analysis of a
concept, then, may be understood as an attempt to provide a linguistic formulation of the
norms that constitute a concept; an analysis of this sort is correct or successful to the extent
that it completely and correctly expresses those norms. Of course, even formulations that
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are initially plausible and widely accepted might prove to be unstable, in that they might
prove susceptible to challenges in the form of cases where the norms direct us to one
judgment while adherence to the accepted formulation of those norms appears to direct
us to the opposite verdict.
But for other norms, such formulation is at least hard to provide, and may in fact
be in principle impossible. As an example of this outside the domain of concepts, con-
sider pronominal anaphora. Evidently there are norms that govern the selection of the
anaphoric referent of a pronoun—in unambiguous grammatical sentences there are un-
controversial correct answers to the question of which noun phrase a pronoun refers to.
And native speakers of a language can in fact wend their way through complicated con-
structions and without much effort select that correct noun phrase. But speakers who can
easily perform these tasks cannot provide a formulation of the standards that distinguish
between the correct noun phrase and the incorrect alternatives; indeed even the best at-
tempts of professional linguists to render a clear, complete, and specific formulation of
rules that govern this selection have long met with a rather discouraging success rate (see,
for instance, Lappin and Leass (1994)). So it appears that humans are subject to, and
capable of following, norms that they cannot formulate or express.
A parallel claim appears to hold for concepts as well. We are capable of using con-
cepts for which we are incapable of constructing such a linguistic formulation—indeed,
for which we may have little reason to suppose such a formulation would be possible.
The concepts  and , for example, might well have no formulation; so too
with the concept . This is the pitfall that famously was the undoing of various ear-
lier, discredited views of concepts—e.g., those views that, generalizing from their putative
successes in some cases (like ), just identified concepts with their definitions or
verbal formulations. But understanding concepts as clusters of norms provides us with a
general and uniform account of concepts, as well as a way of explaining the tight connec-
tion between a concept and its putative analysis, while nevertheless freeing us from being
committed to the claim that every concept must have such an analysis.
55
Concepts, then, can be made a subject of shared inquiry and scrutiny. Sometimes a
concept that cannot be given a full formulation may be given a partial formulation.
3.2.3 Norms can be indeterminate
Norms need not, and generally will not, cover all of the possible cases that emerge under
their scope. A set of rules might simply be silent in some cases, neither requiring nor
forbidding nor permitting a particular action. For instance, suppose that the rules for
eligibility for membership in a Philosophy Graduate Student organization expressly de-
clare that any Ph.D. student in the department is eligible for membership, and suppose
that these rules also declare that those who are not graduate students in the department
are ineligible for membership. Further suppose that these are the only provisions in the
rulebook that concern eligibility for membership. These rules provide us with no verdict
concerning the eligibility of Masters students, if any are enrolled. Alternatively, a set of
norms might present us with standards of correctness that provide conflicting verdicts in a
particular case. For instance, our graduate student organization might have a membership
rule that dictates that no Ph.D. student shall be declared ineligible for membership, and
another rule that bars convicted felons from eligibility. In the case of a Ph.D. student with
a serious criminal record, each of these rules, considered singly, requires a verdict that is
incompatible with the verdict of the other. And so the set of rules, considered as an aggre-
gate, does not provide us with determinate guidance in such a case.3 Of course, carefully
crafted or amended sets of rules will be less likely to run into such difficulties. Moreover,
sets of rules may be modified to accommodate some specific troubling cases that emerge,
or they may be made to incorporate general interpretive principles that provide instruc-
tion for how to handle cases of mute or conflicting norms—a closure clause, for instance,
indicating that only those explicitly listed as eligible are eligible. Or they may contain rules
that tell us which rules’ verdicts have priority over others’. But the general point remains:
norms may have areas of indeterminacy.
3Tappenden (1993, p. 243), discusses similar examples, for rather different purposes.
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Once we understand them as clusters of norms, concepts can be understood to admit
of the same varieties of indeterminacy. It might be the case that for some concept F and
some object o, the norms that constitute F fail to render a classificatory verdict: The con-
cept might neither require, permit, nor forbid a given classification, or might appear both
to require and forbid a particular classification. Hence the concept might, with respect to
some objects, just render no classificatory verdict at all. And despite various philosophers’
demands that concepts must be understood to have sharp, determinate boundaries, this
indeterminacy seems a better fit with the way that we normally think about concepts. For
instance, for a borderline case on the color spectrum, the concept  might not entitle
or require us to classify the object as red, and also might not entitle or require us to reject
a classification of it as red.
The plausibility of each of these claims about norms, and the parallel claims about
concepts, constitutes evidence, albeit weak evidence, that the normative theory of concepts
is correct. My reason for bringing them up is that they are features that I think concepts
must have in order to admit of the type that I discuss in the thesis. I hope that even if
the reader rejects the account of the concepts that I am sketching, she will recognize the
importance of the notion of a contested concept and that this recognition will be reflected
in her own account of concepts.
3.2.4 Concept individuation and identification
At various points throughout the thesis, I, and the various fictitious concept-users I intro-
duce to illustrate the phenomena I wish to investigate, will make claims about the identity
or distinctness of concepts. As a result it will be helpful to have at least a rudimentary view
about how concepts are supposed to be identified and individuated. What distinguishes
between a case where two different concepts are in play within a discussion and a case in
which one and the same concept is in play? Part of the difficulty that emerges from this
will derive from the difficulties in individuating or identifying norms. But I aim to show
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that there are (i) straightforward cases where we do a decent enough job distinguishing
and identifying concepts, and (ii) other cases where raising the question is intelligible.
Straightforward cases indicate that we often do a fairly good job of managing our
conceptual kennels. I suppose that it is possible in principle to individuate and distinguish
concepts from one another, and that in fact we do so in a loose and colloquial manner
all the time. Sometimes, for instance, clearly the right thing to say is that there are two
concepts associated with one and the same natural language term; that is, there can be
instances of homonym. This is what occurs, for instance, when there is one concept
affiliated with the term “bank” that concerns the classification of financial institutions, and
another that concerns the classification of terrain around bodies of water. I also suppose
that it is reasonable to say that two distinct natural language terms—perhaps terms from
different natural languages—may be governed by the same concept. These are cases of
synonymy. Across different languages, we suppose that we have enough information about
the classificatory norms of, say, German speakers in applying the term “Katze” across
actual and hypothetical cases, to hazard a judgment that the concept that bears on their
classification is the same as that which bears on our classifications employing the term
“cat.” The same applies to cases of synonymy within a language, as is presumably the case
for the concept(s) associated with synonymous English words like “couch” and “sofa.” Our
claims of homonymy and synonymy stem from, and are grounded in, a judgment that the
norms that govern their application are the same.
But are there any general identity conditions for concepts that we can develop that
will help us to adjudicate harder cases? Let us consider the options.
Once we say that a concept is a cluster of norms, we would appear to have an easy
option for stating identity conditions. Why not just say that a concept is to be indi-
viduated by the norms that compose it: That is, why not say that numerical identity
of concepts—being one and the same concept—is to be understood as compositional
identity—consisting of exactly the same norms. (Again, modulo puzzles about how to
individuate norms.) But this easy option appears to impose an identity condition that is
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too strict to make sense of actual judgments of conceptual identity: sometimes concept-
users will assert numerical identity of concept—being one and the same concept—despite
acknowledging compositional difference—i.e., despite differences in the norms that con-
stitute the concept.
Perhaps sufficient similarity will serve as an appropriate standard for identity: two
concepts are one and the same if they have enough overlap, or if their norms are sufficiently
similar. But there are problems with this account, too. There are the general sorts of
puzzles about similarity. But, more specifically and more troubling, there are extremely
similar concepts that communities do recognize as distinct—concepts which are perhaps
more similar than other concepts that communities regard as distinct.
Both of the standards that we have rejected to this point have been rejected on the
grounds that they conflict with the ways in which concept-using communities make judg-
ments regarding concept identity and difference. So perhaps our standard should just be
that concept identity or difference is settled by whether a community that uses it explic-
itly regards two concepts as distinct or the same. The problem with that approach is that
communities will sometimes, by their very own retrospective lights, make mistakes on
this count, distinguishing between concepts that are later understood to be the same, or
running together concepts that are later adjudged to be distinct.
The lesson, I think, is that while communities of concept-users do approach and re-
solve questions of concept identity and distinctness, and while outsiders can make similar
decisions, there is no general, hard-and-fast, set of criteria. The judgments that are right to
make will sometimes, it seems, rest upon sufficient or relevant similarity, or compositional
identity. In other cases, judgments will have to do with historical features regarding the
employment of a concept—whether present usage is profitably thought of as continuous
with prior usage. Sometimes the claims of identity or difference will rest upon an inten-
tion to use the term in common with other communities or sub-communities, but this
seems to be neither necessary nor sufficient for these claims. And to some extent questions
of concept identity or difference will be sensitive to concept or purpose, or to the range of
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conceptual questions that are being asked.
I think that the negative lesson we should draw from this discussion is this: it seems
that there are no hard-and-fast criteria for identifying and individuating concepts. We
should not expect to find ourselves, as philosophers, drawing upon them; nor should we
expect to find our toy case example interlocutors drawing upon them. But there are two
key positive observations: (a) Conceptual communities sometimes take very seriously the
question of whether two concepts are the same or different, and (b) when they do take
these questions seriously, there are matters for them to argue about and material for them
to draw upon, with the result that it gets argued about in a principled way.
3.3 CONCEPTIONS
With my view of concepts now more fully sketched, I am now in a position to quickly
indicate how this view will accommodate the other item that features in the thesis: that of
“conception.”
On this account, conceptions are, like concepts, clusters of conceptual norms. A
cluster of norms is a properly regarded as a conception only relative to some other, less
determinate cluster of conceptual norms: a conception of F takes a concept F and offers
a resolution of some area of indeterminacy or conflict in the cluster of norms. That
is, something is a conception of F in virtue of its making the “What is it to be an F?”
norms—the conceptual norms—more precise, coherent, and determinate.
A conception might be a cluster of norms that no community has yet adopted: a
particular conception of F might be a proposal for a novel or innovative manner of more
determinate use. This is in line with my assumption (on page 52) that it makes sense to
talk about norms that no community has yet endorsed.
60
3.3.1 Conception-relative assessment
Assessment of the truth of utterances or beliefs involving contested concepts, and assess-
ments of the integrity of inferences involving them may be made relative to a conception.
(Strictly speaking, I think the point applies not only to contested concepts but to any ab-
stract concept that admits of a variety of different conceptions, even if those conceptions
are not understood as competing.) At this stage in the project, I do not yet have a formal
apparatus for working this out, but what I have in mind can be approximated in English
by a pseudo-formal operator such as
On conception Ck of concept c, . . .
such that, when this operator has scope over a sentence S, it fixes the semantic assessment
of the corresponding linguistic term “C” in S to a particular conception Ck of that concept.
This allows us to assess as true certain intuitively true sentences such as “On Goofus’s
conception of cruelty, his caricaturing of Gus was not cruel” and “On Gallant’s concep-
tion of cruelty, Goofus’s caricature was cruel.” This construction allows a conceptual
community—and outsiders who observe their conceptual behavior—to discuss and ex-
plore different conceptions of a concept and assess applications of them and inferences
involving them without endorsing the particular conception in question.
But now we can also use this formulation to express the idea that underwrites the
Competition Condition: that there is a unique correct conception of that concept. For
now, let us use that sort of pseudo-formal operator in the following construction:
On the correct conception Cc of C, . . .
which is understood as fixing the assessment of the sentence to the correct conception of
the concept.
Given that in the case of contested concepts community members are committed to
deferring to a unique correct conception of the concept, we should normally understand
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utterances and beliefs as prefixed in this way, i.e., as liable to assessment relative to the
correct conception of the concept.
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4.0 SOME EXAMPLES: CONCEPTUAL CONTESTS IN ACTION
A central claim of the thesis is that in order to understand the character of contested
concepts—in order to understand their structure, their development, their semantics—we
will have to understand the contests that are distinctive of them. From our discussion
of the target cases, we have a view of how those contests start: We have seen the initial
disagreement over a case, followed by a declaration of divergent conceptions of the relevant
concept. But in order to address the desiderata, we are going to have to consider the way
in which these disputes play out beyond that initial disagreement.
One of the first things that we learned from the discussion of Gallie’s attempt to exhibit
“the logic of conversion” through the discussion of an extended example is that we need
more careful attention to the sort of reasons that are offered in support of a particular
conception or against one. It won’t do to, as Gallie does, simply to stipulate that one party
makes a “shrewd” remark that triggers a change of view. We want to know what sort of
remarks might be made, how they might be thought to provide a reason for a change of
view, and what sort of reasons those are.
So in the following section I propose to develop two extended examples that trace the
contours of another artificial dispute, but to trace them more closely rather than Gallie
has. These will serve a number of purposes, the primary of which will be to exhibit an
extended discussion. But it will also provide us with us with a way into discussion of two
issues that have lingered in the background.
The first issue is the distinction between what we might call (following here H.L.A.
Hart’s terminology from Hart (1998) in discussing social rules or conventions) an inter-
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nal perspective and an external perspective on the dispute. The examples that we have
discussed up to this point concern concepts that are contested within the community of
English speakers. That is, the examples that we are discussing to this point concern cases
where the reader herself will likely have intuitions about the concept’s use. The examples
that we are going to pursue will not have that obvious connection—they will govern terms
that we do not actually use, so there will be no question of the reader’s tacitly inserting
herself in the dispute.
What we will discover is that when we view concepts of this sort—from this sort of
external perspective, where the concepts in question govern the employment of terms that
we do not use, or involve concepts with which we do not have an extended history of
use—the temptation will be strong to suppose that the concept is nonsensical or empty.
The second issue that will be drawn out of the discussion of these examples is the
question of whether contested concepts must only be “evaluative”—and by this I mean
appraisive or conduct-guiding—in character, or whether some contested concepts might
be found that derive from other domains.
4.1 THE CONCEPT BORBITY
Let us imagine a remote village with a population whose linguistic and conceptual behavior
is for the most part similar with our own, with one area of exception: They are wont to
proclaim some of the acts that they and their fellow village-folk perform “borb.” Until
recently, their employment of the term has largely been coincident and uncontroversial.
For example, when Motta twisted Abner’s arm until he screamed, all of the neighbors
agreed that they would not have thought Motta capable of such a borb deed. And when
Shep tied poor Vic to his own horse and dragged him through the town square, the village
newspaper’s editorial page used “borb” or cognate terms no fewer than six times to describe
what Shep had done, and the locals thought it quite apt. Naturally, there have been
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some controversies. Everyone agreed that Letta shouldn’t have punched Hector, but some
weren’t sure that she had hit him hard enough for the act really to count as borb. Others
weren’t even sure that she had meant to hit him—which, everyone granted, would have
meant the act could not have been a borb one.
Let us suppose that “borb” is a term that features prominently and weighs heavily in
the affairs in our little village. For instance, let us stipulate that these villagers are for the
most part so docile and peaceful that they’ve never bothered to develop a political or penal
system. Instead, the residents care deeply about “borbity,” and (most) try to avoid actions
they judge to be borb, censure those who commit borb acts, and so on. In addition, our
villagers have done a bit of what we might call primitive theorizing about borbity: They
have a number of platitudes that they express and which they take as guides to their actions
(“Better borb to yourself than borb to others,” “Only time heals the sting of a borb act”)
and fables, to boot (“The Boy Who Cried ‘Borb!’”).
But now let us suppose that a recent incident has thrown the village into turmoil.
One of the locals—a widower named Poppy—has taken to painting a large scarlet “R”
(for “Rapscallion”) on the foreheads of his children when their misbehavior displeases
him.
The controversy concerns not whether Poppy is in the wrong; everyone agrees that
he is. Nor is the dispute over whether he should desist; all agree that he should. Rather,
the issue is whether what is he is doing is borb. Let us suppose that primitive polling
data from the local gossips indicate that the villagers are divided on the question: 48%
think the punishment is borb; 48% think the punishment is not borb; and 4% just report
being unsure. Everyone agrees that Poppy’s children are not physically pained by being
painted; and therein lies the heart of the dispute. Some villagers claim that because there’s
no pain associated with it, the act cannot be borb; others claim that cases like Poppy’s acts
of brandings can be borb even though they cause no physical pain.
In order for us—the readers—to have a proxy in the discussion, we’ll introduce a
stranger from another village—a village where the denizens, like us readers—have never
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ever heard of the term “borb”. Call this proxy—this visitor to the village—Smith. Smith
spends an afternoon in the village square listening to villagers talking about old Poppy and
his poor children, and decides to wade into the fracas and help them sort it out.
“Well,” says Smith, “in the village where I live, we had a big fight over whether the Big
Old Tree in our village square was over a hundred years old. We cut it down and counted
the rings, and then we all agreed it was over a hundred years old—or had been, anyway,
before we cut it down. Maybe you villagers just need to spend a bit more time and figure
out the facts before you argue any more. Perhaps you can do some measuring, or maybe
you could build a sort of ‘borb detector’—a device you could hook up to tell you whether
an act is borb.”
“Mister,” says one of the village folk, “if we could have cut something open to resolve
this dispute, we’d have done it days ago. But unlike interlopers such as yourself, we all
know borb acts aren’t like that. You can’t measure something, weigh it, or count something
to tell whether it is borb. In fact, there could never be a contraption you could build that
could settle this dispute. And anyone who thinks there could be, is either just plain crazy
or doesn’t know what borbity is.”
“And what’s more,” the villager continues, “we all pretty much agree on all the facts we
can hope to find out. This isn’t like that time with Letta, when we weren’t sure whether
she meant to punch Hector. We all know it didn’t cause the kids pain when they were
painted, and we all agree that they were terribly embarrassed and ashamed.” The rest of
the villagers in the square solemnly nod in agreement.
“You know,” says Smith, “I remember another time, back in my village, when we got
into a big argument over whether this old-timer in our village was bald. We knew all the
facts, there, too. We counted and found out that the fellow had exactly 88 hairs growing
out of his scalp. And then we had another couple of fellows double-check the count. But
that didn’t settle the matter for us. Some of us said that having only 88 hairs made him
bald; others said that no man with 88 hairs on his head could count as bald. But then
some other very smart fellow showed us that we could get ourselves all tangled up trying
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to say whether someone was bald or wasn’t, since we all agree that taking away one hair
couldn’t make someone bald and adding one more hair couldn’t make someone stop being
bald. Perhaps this problem of yours with borbity is like that kind of disagreement.”
“We already had a case like that, Mister,” a villager intones, “back when we weren’t
sure whether Letta hit Hector hard enough for the punch to be borb. We went through
the same thing, and it didn’t take very long for us to figure out that we were getting into
the kind of trouble you describe. But this is different. It’s not an issue like that, where we
all agree about what matters in terms of being bald is the amount of hair someone has on
their head, but disagree about where to draw the line on the question of how many hairs
you have to have. The question with Poppy is kind of an all or nothing question: whether
something that doesn’t cause any pain at all can still be borb.”
Smith ponders this for a moment. “Okay, then,” he finally says, “I guess I just don’t
have any idea what kind of thing borbity could be, then. Maybe you should just quit
arguing, shake hands, and say that there isn’t any such thing as an act’s being borb. Maybe
it is just a local superstition. Or maybe it’s just a word that you made up to use to express
your disapproval of acts you don’t like, or stuff you don’t think people should do.”
At this, cries go up in the crowd, and a villager hisses, “Fellow, we know that there is
a world of difference between stuff that we disapprove of and stuff that’s borb. Most of us
here would approve of putting you over someone’s knee and whupping you hard, if only
it wouldn’t be borb to do that. The borbity of that explains why we ultimately disapprove
of it. And as for whether there is such a thing as an act’s being borb, well, the only thing
stopping us from doing just that is that everyone here knows that would be borb.” Again:
solemn—and now vaguely menacing—nods.
Smith shifts uneasily, and quickly decides upon another approach. “Look, the way
this stands now, it seems you all agree on a whole bunch of cases of ‘borbity’ where pain
was involved. I’ve always suspected that a word couldn’t mean something unless at least a
majority of folks who use it agree on it. I reckon that’s true. And even if it isn’t true now,
it sounds like a sensible policy to adopt. That would settle this once and for all—‘borb’
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will only apply to acts that cause pain, and Poppy’s painting won’t be borb. And it would
prevent this kind of dispute from emerging again with any similar issue.”
This suggestion is greeted with happy nods from 48% of those gathered, but their
glee is short-lived. For a voice from the crowd says, “Stranger, maybe we could do that. I
suppose there’s nothing incoherent about it. But it’s not the way we’ve always done things
around these parts, and there’s good reason for us not to start now. There have been lots
of times where that policy just would have gotten things wrong. For instance, time was
when almost all of us agreed that only the whole numbers we used for counting were
numbers, and that those new-fangled ‘so-called’ negative numbers weren’t really numbers.
But it turned out that we were wrong: Those really were numbers, all along. If we’d have
adopted your policy before that, we would have been in a mess. We’d either have to have
said that we had changed the meaning of the word ‘number’—and it didn’t seem to us that
we had—or we would have had to keep ‘number’ to pick out what we now call ‘positive
numbers’, and we’d have had to come up with a new word for the stuff that included the
positive numbers and the negative numbers. I think that just struck most of us as a heck of
a long way to go just to avoid saying we had made a mistake about numbers. We were all
comfortable saying that we had just been wrong about what numbers were before. Now,
in that case, it worked out really nicely for us not to follow the majority rule method that
you’re suggesting. So I see no reason why we should try this out now with ‘borb’.” The
other villagers, remembering the ‘number’ incident, slowly nod in agreement.
Undaunted, Smith offers, “Well, where I come from, we had a tussle a while back over
whether a thing you sit on was a chair even if it had no back to the seat. Half of us thought
it was, half of us thought it wasn’t. So what we did was strike an agreement. We agreed
that we would just call ones with backs ‘chairs1’ and ones without backs ‘chairs2’, and since
then we haven’t had any problems over ‘chairs’. Maybe you should do the same thing. Just
break up your language so that you have two words: ‘borb1’—which you will apply only
to stuff that involves physical pain—and ‘borb2’—which you’ll apply to the other kinds of
stuff the rest of you are worried about.”
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A voice pipes up from the back of the square: “Maybe that worked out for you guys
only because that was a such a pointless thing to have a tussle over in the first place! Why
would anyone care whether a thing was a chair? I can’t see how that would possibly matter!
But this question about borbity matters a lot to us, Stranger, and no one here is going to
be made happy by splitting things up like that. What words we use don’t matter to us:
we’re still going to be arguing about which of these two picks out acts that are really borb.
“See, those of us Poppy supporters who think it has to involve pain would discount
‘borb2’ as a weak sibling of the real ‘borb’, the one that we use in all those sayings and
stories. The rest of us—the ones who think that borbity doesn’t have to involve pain—
are going to think that ‘borb1’ is too narrow to pick out all of the genuinely borb acts,
and they’re going to be upset when we refuse to apply our old sayings and stories to cases
like Poppy’s. See, having different words won’t solve anything: we’re arguing about what
borbity really is. Did you guys argue afterward about which word really picked out chairs?”
Smith had to allow as they had not.
“And please don’t suggest that we hold a vote to decide whether what Poppy did was
borb,” a last villager muttered with disgust. “You should know from what we said before
that none of us is going to be happy with that suggestion. Sure, maybe some of Poppy’s
friends could do some politicking, handing out candy to get people to vote that borb acts
have to involve pain. Or maybe some sweet talker could tell us all about Poppy’s kids’
plight in a way that made us all so welled up with tears that we decided that his act just
had to be borb. But none of us thinks that this is the kind of question where people are
entitled to take that kind of approach. That stuff is beside the point, and it would be a
mistake to fall for it! We are supposed to be arguing about what borbity is! What it really
is! What it is that we’ve been talking about, and scolding people for, all this time! People
have got to argue about this, and use reasons to get us to see the other side. Maybe that
will end our troubles, or maybe it won’t and we’ll just be arguing until we drop dead. But
nobody here thinks that a vote or a pretty speech is going to change what is already really
borb. That is a cheap way out.”
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“Well,” says Smith, “what is left, then? What kind of reasons are you talking about?
What kind of arguments could you possibly have in mind to do the job?”
“Well, for instance,” says one villager named Jones, “I am one of the folks who thinks
that an act can be borb just by being especially humiliating. For instance, that time when
Shep dragged Vic all around the town square with his own horse, we thought that was
an especially borb deed. And I think the reason it struck as all that way is that it was so
especially humiliating.”
“Come on, now, Jones,” says another, “that hurt Vic pretty badly. He was hollering in
pain, and he has scars up and down his back to this day. I don’t see how that helps your
side; that’s a case where there was a lot of pain present.”
“Well,” said Jones, “think about it this way. Borbity isn’t an all-or-nothing kind of
thing. Some acts are more borb than others, right? I mean, we do sometimes sit around
and talk about whether one act was more borb than another.”—General agreement on this
point.
“All right, then, you all remember that time back a few years ago when Shep dragged
Clem around the square? If I am remembering aright, we all pretty much agreed that this
time with Vic was more borb than that time with Clem.”—“Well, maybe, go on.”
“Well, think about it now. Clem didn’t suffer any less pain than what Vic suffered this
time around. So there must have been something else about it that made Vic’s dragging
more borb. And it wasn’t that Clem had done more to get Shep all riled up, or anything
else like that. We all agree that these were both pretty much unprovoked incidents. Now,
if you think back to that time, you might recall that the one big difference that we all
remarked on was how Vic got it worse than Clem, because at least Clem wasn’t dragged
around by his own horse. We didn’t connect those two things at the time and say that was
what made Vic’s dragging borbier than Clem’s, but I’m starting to think that just is what
made the difference.”
“Well, Jones,” said one his opposite numbers, “you’ve given us something I guess we
need to go think about for a while. But maybe we just got confused about borbity this
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time around. Maybe we just got more upset at Shep this time because he was a repeat
offender, and in our anger we just mistakenly slipped into saying that this time around the
dragging was borbier.”
“Well, then, how about this,” says Jones. “We all know that Shep has got a thing
about dragging folks around the square here. But suppose Shep had taken Vic out into
the woods, where no one could have seen him get dragged. Wouldn’t we say then that
Shep’s treatment of Vic was less borb?”
“Now wait just one minute,” says the stranger Smith. “That didn’t really happen, did
it? Shep only dragged Vic the one time. How can making up an imaginary story help tell
you anything about what borbity is?”
“Well, these imaginary cases get our reckoning going and help us to make sure that
we know what we’re all talking about. We all think we’ve got a pretty good handle on
what ‘borbity’ means, and that we know how to ‘get along’ using it in new cases. Since we
pretty much know how to think about borbity and whether to count acts as borb when
we really see them happen, we all think that we should all be able to think about it in
these imaginary cases. Now, if I start telling such a tale, I’m opening myself up to have
to provide more details as the discussion goes on about it, so people can ask about other
features of this out-of-town dragging that they might think were relevant. But for the
moment, I am just going to ask the question again: If Shep had dragged Vic outside of
town, where no one else could see it, wouldn’t that have been less borb?”
“I guess so,” “Yeah, sure,” “Sounds about right, I think,” come the sheepish replies.
Jones lets the words settle in, the glances be exchanged, the eyebrows arch. “See now,
Smith,” says Jones, “that’s the kind of arguing we’re talking about. I lay out an example
like that, where it seems to suggest that there’s something more to the borbity in Shep’s
dragging Vic than just what resulted from the pain. It looks as if folks are inclined to say
that it would have been less borb if Shep had dragged Vic someplace not so public. But it
wouldn’t necessarily have been more painful if he had done that. So if you say that, well
then, it sure looks hard to say that borbity depends only with the amount of pain involved.
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And if that’s true, well, then, that looks a bit rosier for those of us who have been saying
that Poppy’s painting is borb.”
“So, I guess you win the argument, then,” says Smith.
“Whoa; hold up there, stranger,” says Jones, “that doesn’t end this thing. There are lots
of different paths things could take from here. One thing these folks might do is decide
that their reckoning is just plain wrong.”
“That’s pretty much how I feel about it,” says a voice from the middle of the crowd.
“I think something’s just throwing me off track.”
“Well,” says Jones, “perhaps there’s something else you have in the back of your mind
that is messing around with the way you are reckoning about the story.”
“Well, there’s a lot more cement in the town square. Maybe part of what affected my
reckoning about your story is that, without really noticing it, I was imagining that Vic was
being dragged on nice soft pine needles and mud, and that’s why I was inclined to say that
it was going to be less borb than being dragged around the square.”
“Well, then, I guess maybe to get this to line up with the other case you need to think
about him being dragged around up on the mountain peak, where it’s pretty much as hard
and bumpy as the square,” counters Jones.
“Or better yet, how about supposing I was dragged around the square when there
was nobody around. And make sure you’re supposing I got hurt just as much and in the
same way as when that rascal dragged me here in broad daylight. What would you reckon
then?” asks Vic.
“See, stranger,” says Jones to Smith, “we’re all thinking about it, and thinking hard
and thinking honestly. Now, maybe someone might come up with a way of changing
the example where our reckonings seem to get pulled in the other direction. Or maybe
someone’s going to trot out other kinds of examples that seem to get our reckoning toward
thinking that there’s got to be pain present before something counts as borb. They might
trot out old cases where there was humiliation present but we declined to call the act
borb, and try to show that there are lots of humiliating acts that we never called out as
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borb before. That’s a pretty serious challenge, and I’m not sure I could answer it right
now, other than to say that we were just neglecting part of borbity that some of us see
pretty clear now. Another thing they could try would be taking out a bunch of our sayings
about borbity that are near and dear to our hearts, like ‘Only time can heal the sting of
a borb act,’ and try to convince us that these near and dear sayings don’t fit with what
we’re saying about borbity. Or they might try to push folks with my view for some kind
of a connection between humiliation and pain; after all, if I’m saying that either one of
them can make an act borb, then I should probably have something to say about why it
is that these two pretty different things could make something borb. It’d be good if I had
something to say about that, too. But it doesn’t mean that the dispute is over just because
one side or the other can’t think of something to say at the moment. We’re a careful and
ponderous folk, and we don’t take to forcing one another to hurry along in our thinking.
We want to get things right. Maybe a few of us are disingenuous or have axes to grind,
whether we know it or not. But, like we said before, for the most part we just want to find
out what borbity really is.”
4.2 THE CONCEPT SNORKER
Smith takes a while to carefully ponder this himself. At last he says, “I still don’t see why
you fellows should think that there’s any such thing as borbity, or any way of getting things
right or wrong with it. It looks to me, as an outsider, as if you guys have this word, and
about one half of you take it to mean one thing, and the other half take it to mean another.
Sure, you have a lot of cases where you both apply that term, but that doesn’t mean you’re
using the word with the same meaning, or that there’s any right answer to the question
what it really means.
“Now, since you guys like the imaginary stories so much, let me tell one. Let’s say that
at the next village I pass through, half the people in some village use the word ‘snorker’
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to mean a horse and the other half used the word ‘snorker’ to mean a big, four-legged
mammal. They may get along a good long time in calling all the horses ‘snorkers,’ but
that peace is gonna break down real fast when the first elk wanders into town and half the
folks say it’s a snorker and half the folks say that it isn’t. And it just doesn’t make any sense
to ask who’s right about whether that elk’s really a snorker. There’s nothing about the way
the world is that could tell you whether the thing is really a snorker, or which half of town
is using the word right. Half of them use it one way, half of them use it the other. And
there just isn’t any right or wrong about it, either way.”
“And I have to say,” Smith continues, “right about now you guys look as silly to me
as those folks arguing about snorkers. And it isn’t any use in threatening again to beat me
up and saying that the only thing stopping you is that it would be borb to cause me that
much pain. That’d be just like these other villagers trying to argue me into accepting that
there must be such a thing as snorkers because, after all, I rode into town on one.”
At this the villagers are slightly abashed. Jones steps forward again. “Stranger, now I
have to ask you some questions about this little town you’re imagining. It sure sounds,
from the way you tell the tale, as if these folks were already pretty set in their ways about
how to use ‘snorker’ before that elk wandered into town. You said that half of them use
it to mean horses and the other half used it to mean big four-legged mammals in general.
What do you mean by that? What does that tell us about the state of things before that elk
wandered into town? Does it mean these folks were already sitting around arguing about
what the word meant?”
“No, I guess not. Not before they saw that elk,” replies Smith. “I guess that as I’m
telling the story, they have never seen another big, four-legged mammal before.”
“Okay then,” Jones asks, “I guess we have to wonder how half of them could mean
‘big, four-legged mammal’ and not to mean horse. Saying that they meant different things
by snorker—does that mean that each of them has a little picture or a little rulebook in
his head that they drew on in using the word, and half of them had a horsey picture or a
voice in their heads that says, ‘Only call horses ‘snorkers,’ and the other half had, what,
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mammally pictures in their heads, or a rule that says ‘It’s okay to call any big four-legged
mammal a ‘snorker’?”
“Well, that makes it sound kind of silly,” Smith replies. “But I guess that I do mean
something like half of them have something like a definition in their heads, and that
definition of ‘snorker’ tells them that snorkers have got to be horses. And then the other
half, well they just got a different definition. Or maybe I just want to say that half of
them are disposed to call only horses snorkers and half of them are disposed to call any
big, four-legged mammal a snorker.”
“Now wait a minute,” says Jones, “it isn’t just that they’re disposed to use ‘snorker’ this
way—it’s also that they’re disposed to get riled up when other folks in their village use it
the different way.” —That’s right.
“And what do they say when they get riled up like that? Don’t they say to the other
guys, ‘Hey, you’ve got it wrong!’”—Yeah, they do say that.
“So,” says Jones, “it sounds like these folks aren’t willing to let people get away with
their dispositions, or just chalk them up as different somehow. And they don’t decide the
matter by telling the other side, ‘You can just go mean by “snorker” whatever you like.’ ”
—“Right,” Smith concurs.
“Well then, I guess they’ll probably not decide to settle it by subscripting their snorker
talk.”—Nope.
“You know, when we stick to our guns and refuse to subscript some word, we usu-
ally have pretty good reasons for it. We think it really matters that we keep the word
around without breaking it down that way. We only do it when we think the word picks
out something special, something that’s worthy of our attention. Is that what’s going on
here?”—Yeah, sure. They think it’s important.
“So it’s not like that time you told us about when your community got all riled up
about ‘chair’, right?”—Right.
“Let’s set that aside for a minute, mister,” says another villager to Smith. “I’ve got a
different question for you now. Just how do these imaginary guys go about conducting
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this argument about whether their elks are snorkers?”
“Oh,” says Smith, gazing at the sky, “I guess by your rules I opened myself up for these
kinds of questions by telling an imaginary tale, didn’t I? Let me see . . . I guess they get all
terribly riled up, and they go back and forth, calling one another names, saying the other
side doesn’t know anything about snorkers. Maybe some fellows switch their opinions
around, but for the most part they stand their ground and refuse to budge.”
“Well now, see, that does sound pretty strange.”—How do you mean?
“See, you said just a bit ago that these guys care a great deal about whether an elk is
a snorker. But they’re not willing or able really to argue about that question. When it
comes time to dig in and try to work the thing out, all they do is sit around and trade
insults. And if I wandered into that town, I guess I’d figure that it was full of pretty angry,
stubborn folks, who don’t really care about whether an elk is really a snorker. I mean,
maybe they’re just so angry at one another that they’re temporarily out of sorts and unable
to muster a decent argument. Or maybe they’re just a bit shocked for the moment that
it has turned out that there was any room for disagreement about snorkers at all. But I’d
think they’d have some kinds of reasons why they care about whether an elk is a snorker,
and that once things cooled down, the more reflective ones would be able to trot out those
considerations.”
“I’m just not following you,” says Smith.
“It’s like this. Either there are some reasons available for thinking one side or the other
is right about snorkers, or there aren’t any reasons. If there are reasons for that, then I’d
like to know what kind of reasons they are before I say that these folks in your imaginary
village are just being stubborn. But if there isn’t anything that they can say in support
of their side, then it looks as if you’re right. We should laugh at these folks and think
that they’re being stubborn and ridiculous. Because they’d be disagreeing as if there was
some reason to think that they’re right and the other side’s wrong, but there just aren’t any
reasons like that.”
“Well, then there you go!” says Smith. “Now we know that these folks are being silly,
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because I sure can’t think of any reason for deciding that an elk is a snorker! In fact, I can’t
imagine anything anybody could say on either side of that dispute that would give me a
good reason to think that an elk is, or isn’t, a snorker. And I’ll bet that none of you can
either, can you?” he concludes, a smug smile playing at the corners of his mouth. The
crowd of villagers falls into a perplexed silence for half a minute or so, and most slowly
shake their heads. “See,” says Smith, “so I guess that there just aren’t any reasons for or
against thinking elks are snorkers. And now you finally see just how silly you guys look to
me. I can’t imagine a single thing you guys could say that would give me a good reason
for thinking that Poppy’s painting was borb, or that it was not.”
After a long pause, Jones replies, “You might be right, Mister, that there’s nothing that
we could say that would give you a reason to think one way or the other about borbity,
just like there isn’t anything that these other villagers could say that would give any of us a
reason to think one way or the other about snorkers. But it just doesn’t follow that there’s
nothing anyone could say that would give the members of the community who know how
to talk and think about snorkers reasons for thinking one way or the other about whether
elks are snorkers. As outsiders who just aren’t used to talking and thinking that way, who
don’t have any history with it, we just aren’t receptive to the kind of things that they can say
that should count as reasons for those insiders who do have that background. Maybe if we
lived among them for a while and started talking ‘snorker’-talk with them, we’d gradually
be able to come to have a reasoned view on the matter. Until we get that kind of handle
on it, nothing really should count as a reason for us one way or the other, and these guys
are going to look silly to people like us who can’t see why these folks are making the kinds
of moves they are.
“So now, fellow, I want you to try to think about what these imaginary villagers might
be saying to one another supposing they aren’t just trading insults. If they really care about
snorkers, what kinds of things would they argue about that might display why they care?”
“Okay, then,” says Smith. “I think I see how this would go. Maybe they have a bunch
of sayings about snorkers, and these sayings mention things like ‘the mane of a snorker’.
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Elks don’t have manes, so I guess maybe that counts a bit in favor of discounting them
as elks. In order to be consistent, they either have to tinker with those sayings, get rid of
them, or maybe even, if it isn’t too far-fetched, to think again about what counts as a mane.
Or maybe they have some religious beliefs about snorkers, claiming that the mountain
gods gave snorkers to the village because they’re strong and just the best creatures to use
for dragging logs around. Elks are even stronger and better at dragging logs than horses
are, so maybe that counts in favor of elks being snorkers.”
“Right,” says Jones. “Now you’re seeing how it might go, there, Stranger.”
4.3 DISCUSSION
At this point, let’s leave our intrepid interlocutors and turn to the question of what we can
learn from their labors.
Let’s draw out the lesson that is supposed to be thrown into relief by the example’s
use of a concept that is alien both to the reader and to the proxy Smith. The lesson is
this: When the concept under discussion is alien in this way, it is extremely tempting to
judge that the dispute is equivocal or vacuous, and to tie that judgment to the idea that
the term under consideration is ambiguous or that the concept itself is vacuous. Where
one is not a user of the concept in question, one will often take the approaches that Smith
takes in turn: that the community members are simply “talking past one another”, since
they mean different things by “borb,” or that they are grasping at the wind, since there
just is no such thing as borbity.
For during the course of the discussion we see Smith attempt to use a number of
distinct strategies to defuse or resolve the dispute, and in each case the villagers had good
reason for rejecting those strategies. This is not to say that the villagers might not be
wrong. For instance, it might turn out that their concept is confused, in the sense of
(Camp, 2002): that is, as we have seen before, it might turn out that from the point of
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view of the community itself, their own usage has run together two concepts that ought
properly to be distinguished and made to do their work separately. But the fact that some
such disputes can be resolved in this way does not entail that all can.
Based on what we have seen in these cases, I want to suggest the following preliminary
explanation of how contested concepts might emerge within a community, and what a
community might gain by having them. In doing so, I hope to satisfy, at least in part,
desideratum (A).
First, it is often the case that some of a community’s concepts are introduced in a way
that leaves their conditions of application unsettled and underdetermined. For instance,
a term “C” might be coined in a suggestive setting and the linguistic community might
have little in the way of explicit guidance for carrying on in applying the term.1 For
some concepts, this underdetermination might be intended: the concept is introduced
as abstract—that is the conceptual norms governing the application of the corresponding
term are introduced as attenuated or underdeveloped—on purpose, in order that the de-
tails might be filled in and developed through future activity—through further application
and theorizing—or because of a conviction that there is something onto which the concept
fastens. For other concepts, the underdetermination might be inadvertent and unrecog-
nized, the result of concept-users’ consideration of only a narrower range of candidate
cases, or from a mistaken conviction that the concept is already coherent and stable.
Second, a community’s employment of abstract concepts will often proceed apace
despite the weak and attenuated standards those provide. For a community will often
(and often correctly) have the sense that an abstract concept that they employ is important
or noteworthy—that their employment of it is responsive to some features of the world
which are worth noting, or that it points toward some feature of the world or our practices
that place demands upon our conduct. In such cases, a community of concept users will
1Of course, we can maintain this while still allowing that other among a community’s concepts might be
introduced as fully-fledged, stable, explicit concepts, with relatively sharp, crisp boundaries of application,
perhaps, by means of stipulation or some Kripke-style act of reference-fixing.
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often feel their way forward, deploying the concept and reasoning with it as best they can.
A community’s conceptual reach is thereby permitted to exceed its conceptual grasp, and
in doing so their concept use might generate a history or pattern of employment of that
concept that will contain lacunae or conflicts.
4.3.1 Conceptual disputes without conceptions
Notice first that the dispute over  does not consist of an argument over which of two
(or more) competing, full-blown conceptions is the correct one: Neither side in the dispute
has attempted to offer a general or complete formulation of the concept . Rather, the
dispute is framed in terms of one rather specific conceptual question: whether borbity
may involve humiliation or other forms of emotional pain, or whether only physical pain
contributes to the borbity of an act. However, even though neither party is prepared at
this point to articulate a particular conception of  and put it forward as the best,
proper, or correct one, it seems from their remarks that the participants are committed to
the idea that there is such a correct conception— witness their remarks about their aim to
discover what borbity really is, what it is that they have been talking about all along when
they have condemned acts as borb, and so on.
What are we to say about a dispute like this, in which a conceptual dispute takes place
without the articulation of specific competing conceptions? It would be a problem if my
view cannot accommodate disagreements that have this form, since many such discussions
proceed piecemeal at this level of abstraction, dealing with crucial conceptual disagree-
ments before the disputants have well worked out broad views about the content of the
concept as a whole. I suggest that the way to fit these sorts of discussion into the frame-
work I have proposed here is to say that such arguments involve general claims about the
best, proper, or correct conception. We may understand the disputants as in effect claim-
ing, say, that no conception of the concept could be correct unless it were responsiveness
to humiliation, or that whatever the correct conception of the concept  is, it must
be responsive to humiliation. Indeed, many conceptual contests may proceed this way
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without significant impairment, beginning with the piecemeal consideration of a specific
criterion of correctness on candidate conceptions, with the aim of winnowing down the
field of candidates in the hope that the correct one eventually will be revealed. Although
this sort of claim is more narrow and guarded than a claim that articulates a full-blown
conception, it nevertheless stakes out a substantive position in a conceptual contest.
4.3.2 The benefits of articulating conceptions
Now, with just a little work, we could certainly try to extract more specific conceptions
from the participants’ remarks. And there can be little doubt that even if such formulation
of conceptions is a difficult and tentative task, it enriches and deepens the discussion
considerably by revealing a web of interconnected issues the disputants would do well
(eventually) to confront. For instance, it seems that both sides hold in common that
borbity involves the infliction of some sort of pain, and that said infliction must result
from some intentional act. So given these areas of agreement and the point of disagreement
highlighted above, we might try to frame the parties competing candidate conceptions of
 in the following way:
Poppy’s Supporter’s Conception of BORB: An act is borb to the extent that it involves
the intentional, unwarranted infliction of some degree of physical pain.
Poppy’s Opponent’s Conception of BORB: An act is borb to the extent that it involves
the intentional, unwarranted infliction of some degree of physical or emotional pain.
In fact, as far as it is described in the narration above, the dispute over the borbity of
Poppy’s act might be understood in at least two different ways. The first, and perhaps
more plausible way, is that sketched immediately above: the parties are engaged in a dis-
pute over the concept of borbity, where something like these two conceptions are under
consideration. But there is another possibility that might emerge as a more apt character-
ization, depending the state of the community’s other concepts. For it might be, and we
might discover from the contours of continued discussion, that the dispute over the bor-
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bity of Poppy’s act instead turns on the contested concept . For perhaps it would be
apt to characterize the community as having in common the following shared conception
of :
A Shared Conception of BORB An act is borb to the extent that it involves the inten-
tional, unwarranted infliction of some degree of pain.
The dispute, then, would turn upon a conceptual question about : whether humilia-
tion (and perhaps other forms of emotional distress) can properly count as pain.
Either way of characterizing the dispute—as involving a contested concept of borbity
or as involving a contested concept of pain—will account for the bare fact of the villager’s
disagreement over the borbity of Poppy’s act, since each way of characterizing the dispute
equivalently highlights the local point of disagreement: whether an act can count as borb
in virtue of the humiliation it causes. But it would be a mistake to infer from that fact
that the two ways of characterizing the dispute are generally equivalent or that it is a matter
of indifference which way the dispute is characterized. For there will be wider conceptual
differences and repercussions depending upon which characterization is the more apt. If
the community has a contested concept of borbity, then we should expect the discussion
to remain limited to actual and hypothetical putative instances of borbity, maxims and
sayings about borbity, and so on. But if the concept  is contested within this com-
munity, we should then expect the discussion (eventually) to take a turn that is not (yet)
evident in the narrative above, highlighting cases and claims about pain that stretch far
beyond the scope of discussions of borbity.
4.3.3 Non-evaluative contested concepts
The “snorkers” case points the way toward showing that contested concepts might not
derive from evaluative or normative domains—that they can be, broadly speaking, de-
scriptive. We do not have to have examples that derive from value theory: they do not
have to be evaluative or normative. All that is needed is that the question of conceptual
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application is normative. Once we have that, as we have seen, there can be a bona fide
conceptual contest. It will turn on the issue of what sort of concept is in question. Is
 a species concept, one that is responsive to natural or historical facts? Is it a func-
tional concept, or perhaps a technical concept, one that involves the role that the animals
play in some profession? The discussion of the concept snorker suggests that these are the
sorts of issues that can be raised in a genuine dispute over a non-evaluative concept.
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5.0 THEORETICAL NOVELTY
Now that we have a better sense of the character of contested concepts and the way in
which disputes over them might be waged, I propose to return to the question raised in
my discussion of Ronald Dworkin’s remark at the very beginning of the thesis: whether
philosophers’ theories of content or meaning already have a place for contested concepts.
I have already argued (in §2.1) that the one sustained attempt to develop this framework
(W.B. Gallie’s) is not up to the task. In this chapter, I turn to the question of whether
other, better-understood tools from the philosophy of language or mind might provide an
adequate explanation of the phenomenon without running into the same difficulties.
In order to carry out this task, I consider seven alternative explanations of the phe-
nomena that contested concepts are supposed to explain. For each alternative diagnosis, I
briefly discuss the general strategy and show how the strategy under consideration works
for some cases that bear at least a superficial resemblance to Goofus and Gallant’s predica-
ments in cases (1)–(3) and to the villagers’ dispute in Chapter 4. But as we shall see, each
of these fails to account for the central cases of contested concepts or to provide a general
explanation of the phenomenon. Along the way, we’ll be learning lessons from these fail-
ures that will put us in a better position to understand the nature of contested concepts
and to understand their connection to other theories of mental and linguistic content,
addressing desideratum (B) from §1.4.
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5.1 THE EQUIVOCATION/DISAMBIGUATION STRATEGY
5.1.1 An explanation of the strategy
The first alternative explanation of the phenomenon exhibited in the target cases would be
simply to deny that the univocality condition is met, thereby rejecting Goofus and Gal-
lant’s conviction that they are reasoning univocally about fairness, cruelty, and apology.
Perhaps instead they are merely “talking past one another”—perhaps they have different
concepts, or have radically different meanings associated with their respective uses of the
terms. This diagnosis is made all the more tempting by the fact that in the examples
above the disputants have managed to articulate different conceptions of the relevant con-
cept. This opens space to raise the question whether some act would be cruel on Goofus’s
conception of cruelty, and then ask, separately, whether that same act would be cruel on
Gallant’s conception of cruelty. In fact, the disputants’ answers to such questions might
well coincide: that is, Gallant might well agree that on Goofus’s conception of cruelty,
Goofus’s taking half the medicine is fair, and Goofus might accept that on Gallant’s con-
ception of fairness, it is not.
Once these conceptions are distinguished, it is easy to mount a charge of equivoca-
tion and propose a strategy for disambiguating the term in question. One could simply
approach the parties in case (2), in which the concept  is under dispute, and say,
Look, this dispute is silly: You each just mean something different by the word “cruel”.
This dispute can easily be dissolved if we just take care to mark the difference between
what each of you is asserting. From now on, let’s just use the word “cruelO” when we
want to discuss cruelty as Goofus understood it, and then we’ll just use the word “cruelA”
when we want to discuss cruelty as Gallant understood it. So, Goofus, you have just been
(correctly!) asserting that your caricature was not cruelO, and Gallant, you have just been
(correctly!) asserting that his caricature was cruelA. And so you see: the two of you never
really disagreed after all!
Note that this is precisely the sort of charge that Smith raises—and which the villagers
reject—in the hypothetical example of the conceptual contest over . (See page
68.)
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Now, surely there are disputes for which this diagnosis is apt. As an instance, consider
the following example:
Case 4 (RESPONSIBILITY)
Goofus’s and Gallant’s cars have collided. Gallant disavows any responsibility, since
only Goofus had violated any traffic codes. Goofus replies that Gallant must be par-
tially responsible for the crash, since, after all, it would not have occurred if Gallant
had not driven his car into the intersection just as Goofus ran the red light.
Most likely the right thing to say about such a case is that there are two different concepts
of responsibility in play in the dispute—one a concept concerning liability or blame, the
other a concept concerning cause—and that, even though they might be interconnected
in interesting ways, each is important in its own right and distinct from the other: Failing
to distinguish them can only end in confusion, tears, and curbside rage.1
However, even though this explanatory strategy works in some disputes that resemble
the target cases (1)–(3), it is hard to stretch it to accommodate all such cases. In particular,
it cannot comfortably accommodate cases (1)–(3) themselves.
To start, let us note that there will be cases where the disputants reject the equivocation
diagnosis and continue to insist that they are reasoning univocally, all the while maintain-
ing that the other party is employing the concept of cruelty without fully grasping it. It
is true the parties might be mistaken about their own dispute, stubbornly or clumsily re-
fusing to accept an equivocation diagnosis when they should. Note too that it also can
happen that disputants accept an equivocation diagnosis when they should not. Thus
it seems that the acceptance or rejection of a disambiguation is an imperfectly reliable
indicator of whether there is genuine ambiguity at hand.
Here’s a reasonable test for the aptness of the disambiguation strategy in a particular
1An exception: Suppose Goofus goes on to contend that Gallant should get a traffic ticket, or to argue
that Gallant should have to pay for the full damages to his own vehicle, and so on. In such a case we should
probably understand Goofus to be articulating a particular conception—something in the neighborhood of
a strict liability conception—of the liability-related concept of responsibility.
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case—a test that is independent of the disputants’ explicit views about whether the strategy
is apt. Consider the stability of the resolution it brings to the dispute and other, relevantly
similar ones. If an appreciation of the disambiguated alternatives enables members of the
linguistic community to harmoniously go about the business of reasoning about respon-
sibility, without bogging down in related disputes, that would redound to the credit of
the equivocation diagnosis. For instance, suppose that when Goofus refuses to pay his
elevated auto insurance premiums, his agent brings him around by reminding him that
Gallant was only responsibleO for their crash. Or suppose that Gus recognizes that he
might be responsibleA for his employees’ malfeasance even though nothing that he did
caused them to take money from the till. Such results are good signs that an equivocation
diagnosis was the right approach.
However, the disambiguation strategy is unlikely to bring a stable resolution to the
disputes in the target cases, even if both parties were to accept the strategy initially. To see
that this is so, suppose that in case (3) Goofus and Gallant accept the counsel to take the
disambiguation approach to “apology.” Each pleads guilty to the charge of equivocation
and they agree to monitor their “apology”-talk carefully, the better to scrupulously dis-
criminate between these two “concepts” of apology. To mark the difference, they resolve
to use “apologyA” to pick out speech-acts that meet the constraints that Gallant proposed,
and to use “apologyO” to pick out speech-acts that meet Goofus’s constraints.
So far, so good. However, if we bring on board some reasonable assumptions about the
ways in which Goofus and Gallant’s community’s concept of apology resembles our own,
the apparent resolution of the dispute will almost inevitably turn out to have achieved
nothing more than moving the bump in the rug. For essentially the same dispute will
emerge once more, centered upon the question which of these two “concepts” picks out
“genuine” apologies—apologies of the sort that have been the subject of the community’s
earlier discussions of apology.
Why? The community’s previous, undifferentiated “apology”-discourse will likely have
provided them with ample reasons to care deeply about apologies: They will have a wealth
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of commitments about the status and consequences of apologies. For simplicity’s sake,
suppose that Goofus and Gallant’s community has long embraced the following principles
about apologies, which they have heretofore understood as univocal:
 To refuse to accept an apology is contemptibly rude.
 An apology goes a long way toward making amends for a harmful deed.
 ’Tis saintly to forgive an offense for which no apology has been offered.
Suppose, as is plausible, that members of the community remain committed to these
principles even after the disambiguation strategy is in place. As a result, the members
of the community consider themselves to be bound to employ these principles to make
judgments—judgments of rather great import—about the conduct and status of commu-
nity members. But now, in light of their acceptance of the disambiguation strategy, they
are obligated to consider the possibility that their set of principles equivocates about apol-
ogy. Surely there are some cases—likely including the “responsibility” dispute above—in
which the diagnosis of equivocation might help to disentangle some rather nasty (perhaps
latent or unnoticed) incoherencies in their principles (it is not too difficult to imagine the
incoherent principles that might have been endorsed by a community that has heretofore
failed to distinguish between the two sorts of responsibility discussed in Case (4) on page
86). And recall from the villager’s discussion of the concept  Smith’s report that
such a disambiguation strategy was successful in his own linguistic community to resolve
a dispute about the meaning of the term “chair” (see my §4.1 above at page 68.)
But what about a case for which disambiguation does not provide such aid? The case of
apology probably fits the bill here: the principles cited above do not appear to be rendered
co-tenable by reading “apology” as “apologyA” in some of the principles while reading it
as “apologyO” in others. In such a circumstance, there is no reason to think that the set of
relevant principles concerning apology are in fact equivocal, and the community members
will presumably be within their rights to return to their prior conviction that these crucial
principles are univocal. And now the dispute will quite naturally be framed in terms of
the question of which (if either) of the two proposed “disambiguations” of apology is the
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right one—the one that picks out the kind of speech-act, for instance, about which the
community has these long-standing commitments. Each side of the dispute, of course,
will come away thinking that their particular disambiguated version is the genuine one,
the important one, and the one that is entitled to inherit all the special statuses conferred
by those shared principles.
This, of course, brings  squarely back into line with the account of contested
concepts: There is a single concept in play, which admits of more than one plausible way of
spelling-out its content, and these spellings-out are properly understood as competing for
the status of the correct or right or proper conception of that concept. The disambiguation
strategy has proved unstable, and the equivocation diagnosis has faltered with it.
Of course, even if the argument of the preceding paragraphs is sound, I have only
demonstrated that one specific attempted disambiguation fails to explain one candidate
contested concept. But this particular discussion carries with it an important lesson that
might well generalize to reveal a common characteristic of contested concepts that makes
them resistant to the disambiguation move. It appears that a contested concept can meet
the Univocality Condition in virtue of the sort of role that the concept plays within a
community, including its incorporation in a set of general principles, where
(a) the community is strongly committed to those principles; and where
(b) those principles explain in part the significance of that concept, e.g., why it matters
whether an object falls under that concept.
Surely part of the reason Goofus and Gallant would not have been content to accept the
disambiguation strategy is that they recognize what hangs in the balance. For instance,
if his speech-act does qualify as an apology, then Goofus has begun to make amends for
the harm his remarks have caused, and Gallant must, on pain of being rude, accept his
apology.
This observation also serves the purpose of explaining why such disputes persist when
they do. It also serves in part to explain the earlier observation why so many central
instances of contested concepts are moral and legal concepts, where holding principles in
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common is crucial.
5.2 DISJUNCTIVE CONCEPTS
5.2.1 Explanation of the strategy
This diagnostic strategy takes its start from the observation that some of our concepts are
such that there are several distinct ways in which an object or event can fall under them.
So, in a relatively simple case, a concept  might just have two-pronged disjunctive criteria
of application: an object or event can count as F in virtue either of being G or in virtue
of being H. In more complicated cases, F might be responsive to a wider set of criteria
of application: meeting some sufficient number or some weighted combination of those
criteria, in different variations, might make an object count as F. Call such concepts—
concepts which can be understood as involving more than one distinct way of falling
under it—“many ways” concepts.2
5.2.2 How the strategy might work
It is fairly easy to see how concepts of this sort might be thought to generate disputes that
resemble those in cases (1)–(3). First, take some “many ways” concept F. Then come up
with a case in which at least one party to the dispute recognizes one (or more) of these
ways in which an object can count as F, but fails to recognize one (or more) of the other
ways. Call errors of this sort “one way out of many” errors.
2A number of other conceptual relations might fit in this category. Perhaps items fall under a generic
concept in virtue of falling under a subordinate species concept. Perhaps items fall under a determinable
concept in virtue of falling under a concept that is determinate with respect to that determinable. It might
be possible to gerrymander disjunctive criteria of application for any concept F such that F turns out to
be a “many ways” concept. I don’t think that this possibility matters for the project at hand, but if we
like we could say that a concept is a “one way” or “many ways” concept only relative to particular ways of
individuating criteria of application.
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To see this approach in action, consider the following (rather outlandish) modification
to Case (3):
Case 5 (Apology Redux)
After their exchange at the post-recital reception, Goofus and Gallant disagree over
whether Goofus has apologized. Why? Gallant contends that an apology must involve
the production of written text, whereas according to Goofus an apology is a vocal
performance.
A reasonable diagnosis of such a dispute would be that Goofus’s and Gallant’s “con-
ceptions” of apology are incomplete: Each captures one of the several ways in which one
might produce an apology, but each errs insofar as it fails to recognize (or explicitly pre-
cludes) other ways in which an apology might be manifest. In short, each is guilty of the
dreaded “one way out of many” error. On the basis of such a diagnosis, then, the right
approach to the dispute would seem to be to attempt to consolidate these two “concep-
tions” of apology, with the understanding that the concept apology is sufficiently broad to
comprise both vocal and written performances.
Will the same approach work for characterizing the disputes in the target cases? In
particular, can the disputes in those cases be understood as “one way out of many” er-
rors, without making recourse to the contested concept/competing conception frame-
work? Here’s how we might try to bring it off. We start by considering the claim that
in each of these disputes Goofus and Gallant have each fastened onto one among several
sets of criteria of application for the concepts they consider, and that each has mistaken
his favored set of criteria for the whole story about how an act could count as an instance
of fairness, cruelty, or apology. For example: we might attempt to characterize the dispute
in case (2) by saying that Goofus and Gallant have gotten mired in a dispute in which
each (correctly) presents one of the ways in which an act can properly count as cruel, but
in which she also (incorrectly) denies the legitimacy of the other ways. That is, we can
try to make the case than an act can fall under  either in virtue of causing physical
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pain or in virtue of compromising dignity. Or, to characterize case (3), we might use a
slightly more complicated scheme and suggest that the concept of apology is responsive
both to the acceptance of blame and to the degree of regret for the harm one’s actions has
caused. More specifically, we might suggest that in most cases an act will only qualify as
an apology if it involves the recognition of the wrongness of the act (this is “one way” in
which an act can count as an apology), but, in cases where the agent’s regret for the harm
her act has caused is sufficiently deep and sincere, that regret can compensate for her fail-
ure to appreciate the wrongness of her act (this is another way which an act can count as
an apology). Hence, we might say, each of Goofus’s and Gallant’s “conceptions” addresses
only one aspect of the concept of apology and ignores that aspect’s interaction with other
relevant considerations.
5.2.3 Why the strategy fails
So, does this approach provide us with a way of making sense of the interesting features
of cases without adverting to the notions of contested concept or competing conceptions?
Let’s start with the good news. Clearly the feature of concepts that gets central play here
is important and interesting; one of the central achievements of philosophies of language
and mind was getting us explicitly to recognize that our concepts can involve such com-
plexities. And just as clearly, we can make use of this bit of theory to sharpen up the
presentation of our critique of the “conceptions” on offer in case p5.
But now the “bad” news. The “one way out of many” error approach is not going to
supplant the contested concept/competing conception framework. In fact, quite often the
“one way”/“many way” approach will turn out to depend on that framework.
How could that be? We are quite sure, when we address case (5), that we have correctly
assessed the state of the debate: Goofus and Gallant are simply mistaken about the concept
, each having committed a “one way out of many” error. And it seems that we
have been able to develop this assessment without making use of the notions of contested
concepts or competing conceptions. If we have been able to do so, however, I think it
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is because Goofus’s and Gallant’s positions in case (5) are so obviously defective that it is
hard to take seriously the idea that anyone in the dispute has offered a plausible, competing
conception of apology. But now suppose that we were asked to provide reasons to back up
our assessment of Goofus and Gallant’s troubles. That is, suppose that, having offered the
“one way out of many” error account of case (5), we are asked, Why should anyone think
that Goofus and Gallant have each captured only one of several different ways in which
apology can be instantiated?
The strongest argument we could muster, I think, would take the following shape. We
would be able, presumably without much trouble, to point to a number of prior instances
where the community has counted the production of written text as an apology, as well
as a number of other cases where the community has counted spoken words as apology.
Moreover, we might well expect that we would discover near-consensus in native speaker
informants’ responses to various posed hypothetical scenarios: Apologies can either be
written or spoken.
With this support on board, we could press our case in the following way:
Goofus [/Gallant] must admit that his own conception of apology is mistaken, or else
he must endorse and defend the following position: No written [/spoken] performance
properly counts as an apology, and thus all of the earlier cases where written [/spoken]
performances were counted as apologies, as well as the present disposition of native speak-
ers to count them as such, must be understood as errors.
And of course it is hard to suppose that anyone would be able to sincerely, plausibly, or
reasonably endorse or defend those positions. This, I think, is what underwrites our strong
conviction that each of these boys has only got part of the story about apology: to get the
whole story right, we see, they’d almost certainly have to adopt the “many ways” account
of apology in order to relieve themselves of the obligation to defend the position about the
community’s employment of apology.
The same strategy is presumably what we would turn to for support of our “one way
out of many” diagnoses of cases (2) and (3). To demonstrate that Goofus and Gallant
each focus on only one of the “many ways” in which an act can be cruel or a performative
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can be an apology, we should try to show that our “many ways” approach squares with
the community’s employment of each of these concepts, and that Goofus’s and Gallant’s
commitments to their respective “one way” positions puts them in less tenable positions
when they attempt to account for their community’s employment of the term in question.
For the time being, I won’t go into the details of how our arguments might go here. But
we should recognize that our “one way out of many” diagnosis will be rather more difficult
to maintain here than it was in case (5), largely because what Goofus and Gallant have
on offer in these cases will presumably square better with the community’s employment
of the corresponding term and will put each of them in a stronger position to defend the
position that the community has been wrong about apology in the past or to respond to
our contention that they fail to recognize other ways in which an act could qualify as an
apology. So far, so good. It surely looks like we’re holding our own against Goofus and
Gallant.
But wait a minute. Our objective was not to enter into the dispute with Goofus and
Gallant; rather, we were trying to provide a diagnosis of their dispute that didn’t rely on
the notion of contested concepts. But now that it’s clearer what’s involved in making a
“one way”/“many ways” diagnosis plausible, we are in a position to see why this diagnosis
will in many cases depend upon the notion of contested concepts rather than supplanting
or obviating it.
In the course of the discussion, I have been happy to let the reader carry on with
the initial impression that “we” have solely occupied the position of detached observers:
philosophers of language or mind who are studying some hypothetical disputes and try-
ing to figure out how to fully explain those disputes using the “one way”/“many ways”
distinction. No doubt that is a reasonable way of understanding “our” relationship to the
dispute in those cases where we take ourselves to have fixed in place—by means of stip-
ulation, assumption, or even on the basis of sound reasons—a commitment to the view
that the concept in question must be understood as a “many ways” concept. For instance,
this seemed to be our situation when we were trying to explain case (5). But not all in-
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teresting cases will rest on that fixed point. When we consider more subtle disputes like
those in the target cases—or even when we are pressed to defend that commitment in
simpler cases like (5)—we will often find that in order to offer a “one way”/“many ways”
explanation of a dispute, we must slip into the position of becoming a participant in the
dispute. We will find ourselves, that is, having to argue that the best way of spelling out
the concept in the dispute involves understanding it as a “many ways” concept—and hav-
ing to do this as a precursor to offering the “one way”/“many ways” explanation of the
dispute. And of course what we’re doing under those circumstances—when we are trying
to meet our obligation to argue that a particular concept is best understood as a “many
ways” concept—sure seems to fit nicely with the contested concept/competing conception
framework laid out in §1.3.
Thus a second alternative explanation has fallen by the wayside. But once again, in
demonstrating its inadequacy we have learned a bit more about the way in which disputes
over contested concepts work.
5.3 CONTEXT SENSITIVITY
5.3.1 Explanation of the strategy
Perhaps the disputes between Goofus and Gallant are to be explained by appeal to way in
which the concepts involved are sensitive to the context in which they are employed. This
strategy has been used with a fair bit of success in explaining other apparently vacuous
or irresolvable disputes. Consider contextualist accounts of knowledge, such as those in
DeRose (1992) and Lewis (1996). On these accounts, the concept of knowledge is sensi-
tive to whether a putative knower is in a position to rule out all of the relevant alternative
possibilities, where the relevance of various possibilities varies from context of ascription
to context of ascription. Thus a detective who has found solid alibis for the maid, the
valet, and the chauffeur might well count as knowing that the butler murdered Mr. Jenk-
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ins when the question is posed within the epistemic context in play down at the station
house. But that same detective might not count as knowing that the butler did it when
the question is posed during a discussion of skepticism in the philosophy seminar room,
since she cannot rule out the (there-relevant) possibility that the whole investigation was
just a hallucination.
5.3.2 How the strategy might work
Here’s how context sensitivity might be thought to generate the curious features of cases
(1)–(3) without recourse to the notion of contested concepts or competing conceptions.
Suppose that an epistemologist and a beat cop meet right after work at their favorite
local bar to discuss one of the detective’s cases over a beer. We should not be terribly
surprised if they emphatically disagree on the question of whether the detective knew that
the butler did it. We might even find that each of them is able, Goofus and Gallant-style,
to offer a “conception” of knowledge that they take to ground their assessment of the
detective’s epistemic state. (The Beat Cop: “If all the other explanations are unreasonable,
you know the one you’re left with is right.” The Epistemologist: “No, knowledge requires
being able to rule out every logically possible alternative!”) Thus it might appear that
each disputant is defending a distinct, competing conception of the concept of knowledge.
Nevertheless, viewing the matter through contextualist lenses, we can now see that the best
explanation of the dispute might well be that each disputant has continued to carry on the
conversation as if he were still in the epistemic context he left behind at work. Perhaps
all disputes over contested concepts similarly mistake contextually varying standards for
competing, incompatible conceptions.
No doubt context sensitivity has a role to play in a number of disputes concerning
the concepts from the target cases (1)–(3): Some of the concepts under dispute in those
cases appear to be context sensitive in several respects. For example, it seems quite clear
that cruelty is context sensitive: the same action-type might well be cruel if performed in
one context—at, say, a christening—but not if performed in another—at a Friars Club
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roast. So too it seems right to say that one and the same act—say, Goofus’s caricaturing of
Guy—would count as cruel when assessed according to the standards in effect in the chris-
tening, but again, might fail to count as cruel when assessed according to the standards
in place when Slappy White is on the dais at the Friars Club. And surely it would be a
mistake to treat these differences as constituting distinct conceptions of cruelty (the chris-
tening conception of cruelty and the Friars conception of cruelty?) that compete with one
another for wholesale adoption by those who are considering the question what cruelty
is. One of the advantages of contextualism is that it accounts for our intuition that our
assessments of knowledge, moral status, etc. can and should shift across settings; without a
contextualist explanation of the legitimacy of these shifts, they might otherwise appear ir-
rational or erratic. Goofus and Gallant would do well to learn this lesson and to steer clear
of conceptions that are so finely individuated that they fix in place the standards of cruelty
from a particular context. Each might even be able to incorporate such flexibility into his
own position in the dispute: for instance Gallant’s claim that cruelty is the compromise
of dignity becomes more plausible—and better able to accommodate our intuitions about
the christening and Friars club—if we allow the standards of dignity to vary with context.
5.3.3 Why the strategy fails
But can context sensitivity be the explanation of the particular disputes considered in cases
(1)–(3)? I think not, and that instead the right conclusion to draw is that contextualism
complements the contested concept view rather than subsuming or supplanting it. To
see why, think about the point at which DeRose and Lewis join the argument over the
concept of knowledge. The sophistication of their contextualism shouldn’t lead us to lose
sight of the fact that they start from a specific and rather contentious understanding of
what knowledge consists in, something akin to the following: to know that p is to be in
an epistemic position to rule out relevant alternative possibilities to p. This starting point
is one among many competing theories of knowledge on offer, and it should probably be
viewed as slugging it out with reliabilist conceptions of knowledge, causal conceptions of
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knowledge, epistemic virtue theories, and the like. That is, contextualist theories should
be understood as offering and fleshing out one particular competing conception of the
contested concept . We still must use that contested concept/competing con-
ception framework in order to make sense of contextualist theories’ role in the broader
debate about the concept of knowledge.
Here is another line of thought that leads to the same result. The contextualist theories
we have considered so far have worked by suggesting that a target concept is sensitive to
standards (of relevance, of dignity) that are supplied by context. Variation of standard is
what accounted for the different “conceptions” of knowledge offered by the beat cop and
the epistemologist. But what sort of variation of standard might be thought to explain the
different conceptions offered by Goofus and Gallant in the target cases? What accounts
for the different standards that Goofus and Gallant employ in their disagreement in those
cases? The sort of contextualist approach we are considering here will account for their
dispute only if we can find some common ground regarding cruelty—something that can
occupy the same role for cruelty that was occupied in the detective story by the ability
to rule out relevant alternatives—and then explain what sort of standard that common
ground relies upon, and, ideally, explain why Goofus and Gallant disagree about which
standards are operative. The prospects for getting this done appear quite dim for the case
of the concept of cruelty.
It might be thought that we should now consider another, broader sort of contextu-
alist approach. Perhaps what contexts supply in cases like (1)–(3) is not a standard, but
rather a conception. On this approach, we might say that the concept cruelty somehow
varies widely in its content from context to context: in one setting, cruelty is the inflic-
tion of physical or emotional suffering, in another it is the compromise of dignity. This
strategy might work, but it is rather ad hoc and smacks of desperation. (Think about
how unsatisfying a contextualist theory of knowledge would be if it were to report that in
some contexts knowledge is the ability to rule out all logically possible alternatives, while
in other contexts knowledge is a reliably veridical mental representation of some state of
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affairs, and so on.) Surely it would be better, if we could, to find some common con-
ception of cruelty that provides a substantive account that explains what unifies or holds
together our judgments and inferences about cruelty. (And if we can’t find something that
does that job, perhaps we should check to see whether those judgments involve equivoca-
tion!) Note, too, that to take such a broad contextualist approach would be to offer up a
particular (and not altogether satisfying) conception of cruelty, which would properly be
viewed as in competition with other conceptions, including Goofus’s and Gallant’s.
It doesn’t appear that contextualism will do all the work we hoped our theory of con-
tested concepts would do. None of this should be taken to minimize the achievements
of contextualist theorists, or even to suggest that their arguments have no bearing on ar-
guments over contested concepts. The works of DeRose, Lewis, and others have made
a contribution to the broader investigation of knowledge by showing that a certain con-
ception of knowledge can elegantly address some persistent problems. That’s not only an
achievement in its own right, but it also gives their conception of knowledge a leg up over
other conceptions that cannot adequately address those problems.
5.4 SORITES VAGUENESS
5.4.1 Explanation of the strategy
I have said that contested concepts are indeterminate. Perhaps, then, contested concepts
might be assimilated to another, well-studied sort of indeterminacy: vagueness. Of course,
there is much disagreement about how to understand disputes over vagueness, so such
assimilation would not resolve all the problems from the target cases. But there would still
be some obvious benefits to this strategy, if we could make it work. It would provide us
with a menu of well-studied approaches to the target cases, and we would free ourselves
from the obligation to provide a distinct philosophical account of contested concepts.
Our hopes here might be buoyed by the fact that there are cases of disputes over
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vagueness that have at least the same superficial structure as the target cases. Even better,
we can construct such a dispute using one of the putatively contested concepts discussed
in the target cases: .
Case 6 (CRUELTY REDUX)
Gus is a willing participant in a psychological experiment in Professor Z’s lab. He
is strapped into an apparatus that is primed to send 50 volts AC coursing through
him at various stages of the experiment. Graduate Assistant Gallant claims that such
a jolt would cause Gus so much physical pain that it would be cruel to carry out the
experiment. Graduate Assistant Goofus, however, claims that the experiment would
not be cruel: 50 volts will cause a fair bit of physical pain, he allows, but not enough
that the experiment is cruel.
As with the target cases, we may assume that the dispute emerges in spite of the parties’
agreement on a wide range of cases in which the concept is brought to bear (e.g., each
agrees that to strike Gus with a tire iron would be cruel and that to offer him his choice
of beverage would not be cruel) and that the dispute does not rest on a disagreement over
other facts of the case (each is roughly familiar with the amount of physical pain 50 volts
usually induces, each knows, from prior misadventures, a fair bit about Gus’s capacity to
tolerate pain, and so on). Moreover, the parties to the dispute stake out different positions
on the question of how the concept  should be understood as more determinate,
and these positions conflict or compete with one another. But for all that, case (6) is
fairly clearly a classic dispute over vagueness. Doesn’t this demonstrate that the concept
—and other apparently contested concepts—is simply vague?
5.4.2 Why the strategy doesn’t work for the target cases
Before answering that question, we should be careful to consider what vagueness consists
in. If by “vague” we just mean that a concept is unspecific, or indeterminate, or that it
is capable of being made more precise, then surely contested concepts are vague. But the
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sort of vagueness that philosophers have studied extensively—the kind displayed in the
concepts , , , and —involves a particular pattern of indeterminacy,
one with a distinctive sort of structure.3
A concept F is vague in this philosophers’ sense if and only if its under-determined
cases can be ordered into a sorites-style array. That is, F is vague just in case its underde-
termined cases can—in a way on which almost all those who grasp the concept F would
agree—be put into in a sequence such that the following principle appears to hold: For
each member of the sequence, if that member of the sequence is F, then the next member
of the sequence is F. So, for instance,  is vague in virtue of the fact that it is possible
to arrange borderline cases of baldness in a sequence based on the number of hairs present
on a head, where it seems correct to say that if a head with n hairs on it is bald, then a
head with n + 1 hairs is bald.
So this is the sort of indeterminacy—the kind with “fuzzy boundaries” and susceptibil-
ity to sorites paradoxes—that philosophers have studied under the heading of vagueness.
And while some of the perplexities that arise concerning vague concepts stem from general
problems related to indeterminacy, most of what philosophers have come to understand
about vague concepts instead concern the question of how to address their curious features
that depend upon their having this particular structure. In order to figure out whether the
phenomenon of contested concepts can be explained within the framework of vagueness,
we need now to ask whether contested concepts can be shown to involve indeterminacy
that has this particular structure.
So, then, let’s return to the concept . I think that Case (6) does succeed in
showing that the concept  is vague in the sense discussed above: That is, it shows
that cruel does involve borderline cases that allow for the sorites-style ordering distinctive
of vague concepts. Is 50 volts of alternating current a cruel jolt to administer to Gus? It
sure looks like a borderline case, and Goofus and Gallant differ in their answers. How
can philosophical theories of vagueness contribute to our understanding of the dispute
3See Keefe (2000) for a nice survey of the various attempts to say precisely what this structure consists
in.
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between them? Presumably Goofus and Gallant can find some related cases—past misad-
ventures or hypothetical instances—on which they concur. Say that Goofus and Gallant
agree that it would not be cruel during the course of an experiment to administer 1 volt
of alternating current, but to administer 100 volts would be cruel. Now the dispute be-
tween Goofus and Gallant is primed to lapse into sorites paradox. Principles that express
an appropriate sorites sequence for the case are easy to come by:
(A) If administering n volts would be cruel, then administering n + .01 volts would be
cruel; and
(B) If administering n volts would not be cruel, then administering n - .01 volts would
not be cruel.
Noting these facts does help us to understand certain features of Goofus and Gallant’s
dispute in Case (6). For instance, in Case (6) neither Goofus nor Gallant offers a “concep-
tion” of cruelty that marks a sharp boundary at which a jolt becomes cruel. The vagueness
of  explains this, by showing why Goofus and Gallant would have difficulty drawing
or defending a sharply-defined general answer to the question of what level of voltage does
the trick. It also explains why Goofus and Gallant will be wise not to allow their agreement
on related cases and on principles (A) and (B) above to get them to agree to a common
judgment about the 50 volts case: The same principles that could be used to argue Goofus
down from 100 volts to 50 volts could be used to argue him down to the position that 1
volt was cruel (and vice versa for Gallant). Thus, not only is the argument suspect because
it leads us to conclusions we suppose are false, but because an equally plausible argument
leads us to a contradictory conclusion.
So it appears that  is a vague concept. I will not have anything to say here about
the more widely-studied question of how to understand vagueness in general, or about
how to address it as it bears on the concept of cruelty. What I do want to emphasize
is that the discovery that a concept is vague does not preclude the possibility that it is
contested in addition. It is uncontroversial that one of the ways in which an act can be
cruel is by the infliction of physical pain. It appears that all we have done in case (6),
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then, is to isolate one feature or dimension that is uncontroversially connected with a
concept—an aspect that is not contested—and then locate a dispute where the only issue
that is contested is the intensity or degree to which that feature must be present in order
for the concept to apply or fail to apply. At best this shows that the concept is vague
with respect to that feature. But the target case concerning Goofus’s caricature appeared
to show that there can be disputes over the concept  may also turn on other sorts of
considerations, considerations that are independent of the degree of pain required for an
act to count as cruel. In particular, the dispute turns upon whether physical or emotional
harm is necessary for cruelty, and whether affronts to dignity must be present in cases of
cruelty. It remains to be shown that the phenomenon of vagueness can handle these sorts
of complications.
Now, of course, vagueness can be more complicated than our initial discussion sug-
gested. In particular, a concept might be vague in a way that involves borderline cases that
are arrayed along a number of distinct dimensions. For instance, color concepts—which
are thought to be vague if any concepts are—are best understood as arrayed not along a
single dimension but at least three: hue, saturation, and brightness. For simplicity’s sake,
philosophical discussion of vagueness tends to proceed in the manner described in the last
paragraph: We ignore the sorites sequence that arrays candidate bald heads in virtue of
the thickness of their hairs, and we focus instead upon the sequence that is ordered by
number of hairs. But there’s no reason to think that the consideration of these new di-
mensions adds any in-principle or theoretical difficulties. Loosely speaking, we just move
from thinking of a vague concept as inducing a fuzzy border upon a one-dimensional array
of cases to thinking of that concept as tracing a fuzzy-bordered region in an n-dimensional
array of cases. Perhaps contested concepts are just vague in this more complicated way.
Nevertheless, not even multidimensional vagueness can capture the full variety of in-
determinacy involved in . Consider again the details of the target case concerning
. Remember that the indeterminacy there turned on the question of whether phys-
ical or emotional harm was necessary for cruelty (Goofus’s view) or whether cruelty need
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only involve compromise of dignity (a consequence of Gallant’s view). This dispute seems
not to involve variation along any specific dimension(s) that admits of sorites sequencing.
Instead, it seems to turn upon questions that concern whether and how a given feature
or dimension is connected with a concept: whether physical or emotional harm, or com-
promise of dignity, is necessary at all for cruelty, in any measure or degree. To be sure,
these issues set the stage for further questions that are obviously connected to vagueness.
If it were agreed that cruelty is the compromise of dignity, we might be able to arrange a
sorites array that poses the challenge of saying what measure of compromise is required for
cruelty. But Goofus and Gallant are not here engaged in a dispute over fuzzy boundary
lines among some such dimension(s): they disagree instead over whether the concept is
responsive to those features or dimensions at all. A dispute over this sort of indeterminacy,
with its call for a sharp yes-or-no answer rather than boundary-drawing, doesn’t fit the
structure we find in vagueness cases.
Vague concepts and contested concepts have challenges in common. Both must, for
instance, withstand objections to the coherence of indeterminacy. And contested concepts
can have areas of vagueness, as cruel does. But not all of the indeterminacy involved in
contested concepts has the same structure that characterizes cases of vagueness.
5.5 MERELY EPISTEMIC INDETERMINACY
5.5.1 Explanation of the strategy
In the Indeterminacy Condition—condition (2) from the specification of contested con-
cepts in §1.3 of Chapter 1—I contended that the disputes in the target cases arise due to
the indeterminacy of the contested concepts involved. This alternative approach to the
target cases urges us to reject that contention, and instead understand apparently con-
tested concepts as instances of merely epistemic indeterminacy: That is, we could accept
that there is a fact of the matter whether what Goofus has offered is an apology, but that
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it is not possible for Goofus and Gallant to achieve a certain sort of privileged epistemic
standing (knowledge, knowledge of their own knowledge, certainty) with respect to that
fact.
There is a history of applying this strategy to instances of sorites vagueness, arguing,
e.g., that there are sharp boundaries for our concepts like  that outstrip even our po-
tential grasp of them, in the sense that we cannot even fathom how we might go about
inquiring where those sharp boundaries are drawn. What makes such epistemic accounts
implausible, I suppose, is that it’s hard to see how our concepts could outstrip our epis-
temic or conceptual grasp. I propose to consider two different sort of cases where this
sort “outstripping” is plausible, and to show why they don’t provide reasonable hope that
something similar is driving the phenomena exhibited in the target cases.
5.5.2 A case where the strategy works
There are at least two sorts of example we should consider here. Let us start with an exam-
ple that explicitly involves an empirical concept—the concept —and then consider
a case that has no such clear empirical ties.
Case 7 (SLEEP)
Herb and Flo are early 20th century physiologists who specialize in the study of sleep.
A comatose patient is delivered to their laboratory, and the question is posed: Is the
patient is asleep? Herb argues that the patient is asleep: Sleep, he contends, is a state of
unconsciousness that results from diminished brain activity, which is probably what
is present in cases of coma. Flo counters that the comatose patient is not sleeping:
What is characteristic of sleep, she says, is merely a different, rather than a diminished,
pattern of brain activity. Since the comatose patient has a diminished pattern of brain
activity (as Flo and Herb conjecture in common), that patient is not asleep.
This case is superficially similar to the target cases. Each disputant has marshaled a par-
ticular “conception” of sleep, a different way of “spelling out” what sleep consists in. One
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might worry that Herb and Flo are odd physiologists for their day, since their theories of
sleep tie the phenomenon to a physiological feature (brain activity) they cannot hope to
measure. They might not, if pressed, even be able to say much about what “brain activity”
consists in, nor, presumably, could they begin to anticipate how to go about testing claims
about patterns of brain activity. But someone who takes contested concepts seriously can-
not insist that these features differentiate the present case from the target cases: Gallant
might not have been terribly articulate on the topic of dignity if he had been pressed in
the target case (2) concerning cruelty.
In light of the paucity of evidence and conceptual material for them to work with, it
seems likely that the question of whether the comatose patient is asleep is epistemically
indeterminate. But it also appears that Herb and Flo are not confronting a genuinely
indeterminate question. There is, we think, a determinate fact of the matter at the time
of the dispute about which (if either) of these types of state sleep is, and a determinate
answer to the question whether to be comatose is to be asleep.
Why does that question have a determinate answer? Here’s one familiar sort of ac-
count, due to Putnam and Kripke. “Sleep” is a natural kind term, and through the appro-
priate sort of reference-fixing activity it came to pick out a specific physiological state-type.
In the wake of that reference-fixing activity, standard uses of the term within the language
community have picked out exactly that physiological state. Subsequent neuroscience has
revealed that this state is a distinctive pattern of brain activity. It has also revealed that this
pattern is not found in comatose patients. But a community need not be in a position
to know any neuroscience or indeed to know anything about the underlying makeup of
the natural kind before it gets to use the term with referential success. The term “sleep”
picked out exactly that state even before anyone could have known anything about the
nature of that state, just as standard uses of “water” referred to H2O long before anyone
could have known anything about the nature of water’s chemical composition. Of course,
the scientists in that community still had much heavy lifting to do to reveal the underly-
ing nature of the kind (its composition, its “essence”), or even to develop the concepts in
106
which an account of that nature could be framed. Nevertheless, referring to exactly that
kind was a snap: You just had to be a member of a community that had the right sort of
reference-fixing activity to get you started, and Presto! your words would refer.
That is one plausible and widely accepted story about how our concepts can “outstrip”
our grasp of them. So then the challenge is this: Why not think that the same sort of
determinacy could be present in the target cases? As we have seen, many of the concepts
we would want to count as contested are moral or evaluative concepts. Perhaps the only
reason why we find disputes over these concepts perplexing—and the only reason why we
are tempted to characterize these concepts as indeterminate—is that we stubbornly refuse
to be realists about the domain under consideration. If only we were realists about (in this
case) moral properties, this objection runs, we could then explain the target cases as cases
of merely epistemic indeterminacy. An act can be fair, cruel, or an apology even in cases
where Goofus and Gallant cannot have any way of knowing whether it is. Granted, it’s
hard to say what sort of kinds moral kinds might turn out to be. It would be presumptuous
to claim without argument that moral concepts pick out acts in a way that is driven by
underlying microphysical properties. Presumably cruelty is not the sort of property we
should expect neurophysiologists to tell us anything about. But perhaps there are moral
kinds despite our inability to frame coherent views about their underpinnings.
However, I mentioned above that there was another avenue one might take to make
the argument that the target cases involve merely epistemic indeterminacy. Here’s another
case in which epistemic indeterminacy is plausible, but where appeal to an “underlying
kind” doesn’t involve appeal to underlying microphysical composition.
Case 8 (FOLLY-WAGER)
Consider a late 16th century English tavern where the patrons are gambling before the
development of rudimentary probability theory. A term to conjure with among these
folks is “Folly-Wager”. One evening Nigel wagers 10 pence for a chance at winning
20 pence if a face card is drawn from the deck: “Folly-Wager!”, his friends exclaim.
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(“Should not have taken that one, Nigel!” they cry: “Wish I could get some poor
mind to stake that wager with me!”) Discussion of whether a bet is a “Folly-Wager”
focuses on matters that have to do only with the structure of the bet itself rather than
on features that are particular to the bettor, such as his financial state or the number
of mouths to feed waiting at home. (For instance, standards for Folly-Wager talk
wouldn’t countenance “It is a Folly-Wager to stake your last pence”; but they would
countenance a claim of the form “It’s mad to put your last pence on a Folly-Wager”.)
The concept also is independent of actual outcomes: If Nigel were to win his 10-for-
20 bet, his peers wouldn’t rescind their assessment that he had accepted a Folly-Wager,
but would instead say that he was lucky to have ended up profiting from it.
All parties accept that Nigel’s 10-for-20 wager was a Folly-Wager. But the cases get
trickier. Nigel later wagers 7 pence to win 20 if he draws a face card. Disputes follow
around the table over whether Nigel has made a Folly-Wager. Although they’re a bit
lost in these waters, Nigel gamely tries to defend himself by pointing out that 7 pence
is not very much to stake in order to win 20. Reginald, the most ardent advocate of
the Folly-Wager charge, argues it is altogether too rare to draw a face card, and that
hence this must be a Folly-Wager.
Again we have a case that superficially resembles the target cases. Nigel and Reginald
disagree over whether the bet is a Folly-Wager, and each attempts (in especially crude
fashion) to explain what it is that qualifies it as a Folly-Wager. And again the kicker
is that, although our merry gamblers don’t have the conceptual apparatus required to
recognize or to articulate it, it nevertheless appears that there is an objective thing that
they mean by “Folly-Wager”: A Folly-Wager is a bet that has negative expected value.
Later developments of probability theory, we think, has revealed exactly what these fellows
were talking about when they were talking about Folly-Wagers.
The earlier challenge recurs, then, and this time without any need to appeal to nat-
ural kinds or underlying microphysical constitution. Since there is (apparently) a correct
way of understanding Folly-Wager that outstrips the epistemic and conceptual capacities
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of the tavern gamblers, what grounds do we have for thinking that there is no objective
conception of apology, cruelty, etc. that lies beyond our grasp, at least for the time being?
(And of course the objector can urge that we need not ever come to grasp them.) Suppose
that civilization had been wiped out before we came to understand brain activity or prob-
ability theory. Wouldn’t the concepts still have had determinate boundaries of application
fixed by the (now eternally unknown) facts?) If so, then it would turn out that contested
concepts are merely epistemically indeterminate and do not place new demands upon our
theories.
5.5.3 Why the strategy fails for the target cases
In my response to this challenge, I will neither attack nor defend the direct reference view.
Nor do I plan to consider the prospects for, or plausibility of, the sort of moral realism I
sketched above. For the sake of the present argument, I will just grant that some version
of both positions is true. My aim instead will be to show that even with those positions
in place, the sleep and Folly-Wager disputes are substantively different from those in the
target cases—different in a way that makes the epistemic indeterminacy explanation of the
target cases implausible.
Let us first get a sense of why it works when it does; then we will come back through
and see why the target cases lack those attributes. The advocate of this view will want
to contend that the sleep and Folly-Wager cases are examples which have the following
features: (a) two distinct conceptions have been offered and (b) there is a fact of the
matter which (if either) is correct. I think instead that features (a) and (b) are in tension
with one another. In particular, I contend that the reason that we think that there is a(n
epistemically inaccessible) determinacy to the concepts in the sleep and Folly-Wager cases
is that we suppose that the parties to the dispute actually already tacitly share a conception
of the relevant concept, and hence they are not involved in a conceptual dispute. If we give
up that supposition and try to shape the dispute into a genuine conceptual disagreement—
a contest between competing conceptions of the relevant concepts—then we are also led
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to give up the idea that there is determinate fact of the matter whether the concept applies
in the cases at hand.
To get a sense of what I mean, let us return to the sleep case. Given the description
of the events in that case, it appears that despite their disagreement about the case of the
comatose patient Herb and Flo actually agree upon a conception of sleep. Each of them
appears, from the description of the case, to agree that sleep is to be spelled out as a natural
kind concept, for which the (then as yet unknown) underlying biological nature fixes the
boundaries of correct application.
Though Herb and Flo differ in their “theories of sleep”—in their views about “what
it is to be asleep,” it appears to me that there is a difference between the sort of theories
they are offering and what we would properly call, in the idiom of the thesis, conceptions
of sleep. Why? Because in our thinking about how to assess their dispute, we treat their
claims in the sleep case as grounded upon (I) their (shared) view about how to understand
the concept sleep (as a natural kind concept, with its boundaries of correct application
fixed by the facts of biology), in combination with (II) their (divergent) favored guesses,
conjectures, or informed surmises about which biological features that concept will turn
out actually picks out. Their divergent guesses in (II) lead them to different claims about
what sleep “really is”. But only (I) is the conceptual rather than the empirical part: (I) is
a conceptual commitment, involving taking the “constitutive stance” to underlying neu-
rophysical constitution: It takes the position that what it is to be asleep is to be in some
particular (as yet unknown) neurological state-type. The only contribution that (II) makes
is empirical rather than conceptual.
How are we to distinguish the two different “conceptions” of sleep Herb and Flo offer?
What we have in this case is not a difference in the content of their commitments: rather
it’s a difference in the force with which they are held. Here’s how we can tell. Here’s
why we think that (I) is (strictly) conceptual, whereas (II) is only indirectly conceptual,
depending on an admixture of empirical claim.
Much the same can be said for the concept F-W in Case (8). In thinking
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about that case, we suppose that there are determinate boundaries of application of the
concept only because we understand Nigel and Reginald to share the same core concep-
tual commitments about Folly-Wager, even though they are unable at the moment to
explicitly grasp or articulate them, and that those core conceptual commitments picked
out a determinate phenomenon from probability theory. To see that you expected this,
you can ask yourself what you would have anticipated Nigel and Reginald to have said
if you had led them through a number of less computationally demanding exercises in
probability theory. You also anticipate that they would say that the following game did
not involve a Folly-Wager for either party: “Two bettors (‘Red’ and ‘Black’) each stake 10
pence. A checker is blindly drawn from an urn containing 500 Red and 500 Black check-
ers.” You also anticipate that both Nigel and Reginald would think that the same game
would be a Folly-Wager for Black if the urn contained 500 Black and 501 Red checkers.
You also expect that if we were to sit them down for a quick course in the rudiments of
probability theory, Nigel and Reginald would both accept this spelling-out of the con-
cept Folly-Wager, or that they would lack sensible grounds for objecting. That is, that
their present commitments about the nature of Folly-Wagers already commit them to the
expected utility conception of F-W.
5.6 CONFUSION
5.6.1 An explanation of the strategy
It might be thought that the disputes in the target cases are due to the disputants em-
ploying confused concepts of fairness, cruelty, or apology. Some cases of confusion—most
noticeably, those in which the participants are able to spell out what they take the content
of the concept under discussion to be—are in principle indistinguishable from within the
context of the dispute from disputes over contested concepts. In such a case of confusion,
the participants may well take themselves to be engaged in a dispute over a single con-
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tested concept: they might well understand themselves to be arguing about which of two
ways of spelling out or understanding a certain concept is correct or better. But in cases
of confusion, unlike cases of contested concepts, the rival “conceptions” will turn out to
be independently important and neither will have a greater claim to correctness. The only
way to determine whether a dispute rests upon confusion or upon a contested concepts,
perhaps, is to consider it from outside the context of the dispute, either retrospectively,
once we determine whether these conditions are met, or from the point of view of an
observer who is conceptually and epistemically equipped to diagnose the confusion.
5.6.2 How the strategy might work
Let me illustrate what I mean by describing a toy case of confusion which is viewed from
within as a dispute over a contested concept. (This example is decidedly not intended to
mirror the actual history of the development of the concepts involved.)
Case 9 (ACCURACY)
Smith and Jones live in the early days of rigorous measurement, and that they are
jointly designing some measuring device. In their conversations about the desired fea-
tures of this instrument, they assure one another that they want to make the device as
“accurate” as they reasonably can. Accuracy, they and other measurement aficionados
of the day agree, is a cardinal virtue in the measurement business. When prompted
to explain what the concept of accuracy involves, Smith, Jones, and their cohort have
a standard, textbook answer: the accuracy in a measuring device is the closeness with
which the device’s readings track the measured quantity.
But suppose that to this point in their theories of measurement, the community has
not yet distinguished
the fine-grainedness of a measuring device’s readings (what we outside of the dispute
would call its precision)
from
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the extent to which correctly measures the quantity in question (what we outside of
the dispute would call its accuracy).
Now, suppose all of Smith’s and Jones’s assertions and inferences about accuracy have
been responsive to both of the features of their devices, without having occasion to
recognize that the features are distinct. Perhaps this confusion has been made possible
because all prior developments in instrumentation have improved devices along one of
these dimensions without sacrificing progress along the other. In the past, say, when
they have modified the device in a way that improves the things fine-grainedness of
measurement, Smith and Jones have exclaimed in unison, “Terrific! An improvement
in accuracy! Now our measurements will track the quantity more closely!” And when
they have modified the device in a way that produces an improvement in the correct-
ness with which the device tracks the measured quantity, they have cried out, “Yet
another improvement in accuracy! Now our measurements will track the quantity
even more closely.”
But now suppose that Smith and Jones enter into a stage of development of instru-
mentation at which trade-offs in development or comparisons between machines must
be made in ways that are responsive to these two different features of instruments. At
such a stage, Smith and Jones may well begin to disagree in our application of our
concept of accuracy. Smith, for instance, might judge that a particular instrument
is an extremely accurate device, since its readings are extremely fine-grained; whereas
Jones might judge that it is not, since its readings are moderately unreliable. Upon
reflection, if they have their wits about them, it will become clear to them that there
are two distinct ways of spelling out the concept of accuracy that has been in play in
their discussions–two ways of spelling out what is meant by the closeness with which
the device tracks the quantity in question. Once they have distinguished these two
ways of spelling out the concept accuracy, it might well be that Smith takes the fine-
grainedness reading to be the (uniquely) proper spelling out of the concept accuracy,
and Jones might similarly plump for spelling it out as correctness. If so, they might
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well take themselves to be involved in a dispute over the contested concept of accuracy,
and take themselves to be offering competing conceptions of that concept.
5.6.3 Why the strategy fails for the target cases
But I think that this case is properly understood as a case of confusion, and that such cases
are distinct from cases of contested conceptions. Here’s why.
Once we have distinguished the two distinct plausible conceptions, Smith and Jones
will likely come to appreciate that each of these stands on its own, independently of the
other, as important and worthy of a place within our conceptual framework. Moreover,
their previous employment of the concept—due to its imprecision and roughly equal bal-
ance between the two conceptions—does not favor with either of these two conceptions.
Properly understood, these two “conceptions” are not competing for survival or value—
the recognition of the merits of one does not threaten our recognition of the merits of the
other. The proper move for Smith and Jones to make is to distinguish the two and pre-
serve both of these conceptions as distinct concepts. Perhaps they would be wise to decide
to confer upon each concept a distinct term to aid in avoiding future confusion. But in
any event, the dispute is distinct from a dispute over a contested concept in that it fails
in this way to meet the Competition Condition from the account of contested concepts
above: the conceptions turn out not to be competitive with one another.
Moreover, given the development of instrumentation as I have described it above, the
dispute fails to meet the Competition Condition in another way as well. For it doesn’t
seem that either of these “conceptions” (or any other candidate precisification) could pos-
sibly be said to be a proper or correct or best way of spelling out what the concept of
accuracy. For instance, each precisification seems to fit nicely under the slogan that we
used to present the content of the concept of accuracy–the closeness of the measurement
in tracking the quantity. So there would seem to be no grounds for a preference between
the two readings on those grounds; Smith and Jones have just come to understand that
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there are two distinct senses of “closeness” that our earlier judgments and inferences were
running together. And since those judgments and inferences involving the term “accuracy”
up to now were equally responsive to both of these senses of “closeness to the quantity”,
our past usage and commitments seem not to provide us with grounds for declaring that
one or the other was better or more correct. The measurement community would better
served by going back over those judgments and inferences and recasting our earlier procla-
mations and inferences in light of our conceptual enrichment, determining which of the
two distinct concepts properly applies in that instance.
5.7 TEMPORAL EXTERNALISM
5.7.1 An explanation of the strategy
The view I wish to consider here stems from the work of Mark Wilson and Henry Jack-
man. (Wilson disavows the label “temporal externalism” and some of the consequences
that Jackman draws out of his work.) The analysis in these articles draws from examples
where a community is imagined using a term “locally”—in a range of familiar circum-
stances. We are asked to imagine cases where a new item is introduced into the community,
and the community seamlessly and without deliberation accommodates this new addition
into its conceptual use (say, by applying the term). But then we are asked to consider an
alternative course of events, in which the community encounters the new type or kind in
a different setting or context and seamlessly, naturally, and without deliberation accom-
modates the new addition by making a different semantic move—perhaps even precisely
the opposite semantic move (accepting cases that were banished in the earlier example and
banishing cases that were accepted in the earlier version of the example).
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5.7.2 How the strategy might work
Let me try here to relate the point to the sort of indeterminacy discussed in and by tweak-
ing one of the examples originally presented in Wilson (1982) and discussed in Jackman
(1999): the case of Grant’s zebra.
In that historical example, the term “Grant’s zebra” is introduced upon a first en-
counter with a group of zebras. Unbeknownst to Grant and his party, there is a morpho-
logically distinct population of the same species dwelling nearby. At this point, it looks
as if there is no fact of the matter whether these beasts fall under the term. That is, it
appears that there are no facts that could determine at this stage which group the term
“Grant’s zebra” picks out: the morphologically distinct subspecies or the species. Looking
at this concept-introducing activity from the outside, and in light of the zoological facts,
we can tell that there are (at least) two incompatible ways in which the indeterminacy of
the term could be resolved by future developments. If Grant’s expedition were to travel
next to an area where the morphologically distinct members of the species interbreed with
those originally dubbed “Grant’s zebra”, then Grant would naturally, without reflection,
extend “Grant’s zebra” to cover these little beasts. However, if Grant were to travel next to
an area where the subspecies do not intermingle, the term would likely not be extended in
this way.
To translate this into concept-talk: Grant introduces a concept: G’ . This
concept is simply the cluster of norms that govern the employment of the linguistic term
“Grant’s zebra”. At the outset, these norms are rather puny and underdeveloped. In fact,
at such an early stage it is hard even to produce a linguistic formulation of those norms.
Perhaps: #Apply term t to the members of the population that Grant has discovered#. Or:
#Apply term t to these sorts of animals#. However formulated, it seems quite clear that the
concept is indeterminate, in a way that comes out clearly when we consider the particular
linguistic formulations that are attempts to formulate these norms (Which population did
Grant discover—the species, or the subspecies? Which sort of animal are these?) Cer-
tain objects—those individuals Grant originally happened upon—fall under the concept
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Grant’s zebra. Other items—ham sandwiches—do not. But some objects—the undiscov-
ered, morphologically distinct, interbreeding zebras—are neither included nor excluded
by the norms that constitute Grant’s zebra.
In his discussion of Wilson’s example, Jackman (1999) quickly (and, I think, correctly)
dismisses the following avenue of response:
Had Grant been presented with the full set of zoological facts immediately after his intro-
duction of the term, he would have reached such-and-so a decision about the scope of the
term.
Jackman doesn’t deny the truth of such a subjunctive claim in the kind of case at hand.
Rather, he denies its relevance for the sort of questions about meaning that he is addressing.
The response considered above works only by describing a different sort of development of
the facts of the case. But it is precisely the point of temporal externalism that different ways
the case might develop would resolve the indeterminacy differently without “changing the
meaning” of “Grant’s zebra”. (One of the most salutary results of temporal externalism
project for my own efforts here is its suggestion that resolutions of indeterminacy of this
sort do not involve changes in meaning.)
5.7.3 Why the strategy fails for the target cases
Jackman and Wilson explicitly restrict their accounts from covering the sort of cases where
there is explicit deliberation about which extension of a predicate is the correct one. The
phenomena on which they focus their attentions are ones where different historical devel-
opments result in different extensions of a predicate because those differing developments
result in different patterns of use, with all of this playing out absent any deliberation or
attention from the linguistic community. Moreover, both Jackman and Wilson are con-
cerned not with cases where the semantic issue concerns whether an entire community
seamlessly and unreflectively expands the extension of a particular predicate or refrains
from expanding it, depending upon those historical developments.
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Nevertheless, I want to suggest that tweaking the development of Wilson’s original
case can point us in the direction of the sort of phenomenon that is exhibited in contested
concepts.
Let us suppose that instead of moving his encampment, Grant stays in place and devel-
ops a research program around the beasts he encounters there. He develops and publishes
a mass of observations about “Grant’s zebras,” building up a little cottage industry around
them and intriguing the natural history community.
Now suppose that after a decent spell of his research, Grant is presented with the
news that there is a population of morphologically distinct zebras interbreeding with the
population he has studied. The question is posed: Are these newly discovered animals
Grant’s zebras or not? To translate it into the idiom of the thesis: We can ask, which
conception of Grant’s zebra is correct—the one whose norms require inclusion of the new
animals or the one that requires exclusion of them? It seems right to say at this point
that the question might well not be settled—the extension of the term might still be
indeterminate, even if Grant happens to have a view on this off the cuff. It also seems
right to say that at this stage it might not just be up to Grant to stipulate that these
new beasts are, or are not, Grant’s zebras. Nevertheless, it also seems right to claim that
there can be principled arguments about which is the best or correct way of resolving this
indeterminacy. In saying that these arguments are “principled,” I think we mean that they
amount to something more than mere attempts to stipulate a correct answer or to appeal
to a bare intuition. These disputes will often be quite fervent, and might be carried out
by theorists who think that there already is a settled, natural, and correct answer to the
question and therefore that the term is not, in fact, indeterminate.
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6.0 CONTESTED CONCEPTS AND COMPETING CONCEPTIONS: A
POSITIVE ACCOUNT
In this concluding chapter, I shall attempt to tie together the lessons from the previous
chapter and draw from them a more general positive account of the phenomena of con-
tested concepts.
Before I do so, I should make it clear that the work I develop in this chapter is quite
speculative and tentative. Although I believe that contested concepts are an important and
interesting phenomenon, and that they have been given insufficient theoretical attention, I
harbor no illusions that providing such an account will be easy or fully manageable within
the space of a thesis. Ultimately, I stand by the account that I offer here and think that
something like it is ultimately correct. But even if the reader is not similarly convinced
by the positive view, I hope that the work up to this point is compelling at least as an
advertisement for further work in this area.
I hope that the work developed up to this point has made some significant progress
in understanding contested concepts. Indeed, I think that the references that I have made
throughout the text to points of connection between our discussion and the desiderata go
a long way toward helping us to understand the general phenomenon. However, there are
two remaining major issues presented to which we must attend in order to develop a more
complete positive account.
One of these remaining issues is meeting desideratum (D): providing the resolution
of the paradox that emerged in Chapter 1 between the Indeterminacy and Competition
conditions. This issue will be the final piece of the account in the thesis, presented in §6.3
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below. However, in order to have the tools required to resolve the paradox, we must try
to address the other chief remaining issue, which is a holdover from desideratum C and
our discussion of W.B. Gallie’s work, from §2.1. The conceptual disputes discussed to this
point in the thesis have provided us with some examples of conceptual contests and has
provided us with some sense of the connection between the character of those disputes
and the content of contested concepts. However, I propose now to draw together those
lessons and assay a more general treatment of this issue. In particular, my aim will be to
try to meet the vindicatory burden—I raised in Chapter 1 and reiterated in the discussion
in §2.1 of Gallie—of showing that disputes over contested concepts may be rational and
genuine disputes.
6.1 RATIONAL AND GENUINE DISPUTES
I have contended that disputes over contested concepts, when they are conducted in an
appropriate way, are principled, rationally grounded exercises in justification and reason-
giving, more closely akin to truth-seeking and rational inquiry than they are akin to at-
tempts at politicking, stipulative definition, or bare conflicting reports of idiosyncratic
ways of understanding a general term.
To say that disputes about contested concepts are subject to rational, impartial stan-
dards is not to deny that disputes over contested concepts will sometimes—indeed, per-
haps often—fail to meet that standard. Surely some such disputes are in fact conducted
with an eye toward self-interest, or conducted in bad faith or in a self-deceived way in order
to shape the development of the concept in a way that suits the preferences or situations of
the disputant. For instance, in target case (2) in Chapter 1 concerning the concept -
, it might be that Goofus’s position in the dispute is motivated and shaped (whether
consciously or not) by a reluctance to view his own mocking behavior as cruel. An account
of contested concepts cannot plausibly deny that this often happens. But an account of
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contested concepts does not have to show that there aren’t any political or bad-faith or ad
hoc considerations appealed to in conceptual disputes. It merely has to show (i) that there
are grounds that might provide grist for the sort of rational inquiry described above, and
(ii) that disputants may hold themselves and other disputants to those standards, rather
than being forced to appeal strictly to selfish, prudential, ad hoc, or other generally ara-
tional or idiosyncratic considerations.
What sort of rational grounds might there be for conducting and adjudicating these
disputes? Now that we have seen (in Chapters 4 and 5) some longer and more detailed
presentations of these disputes, we can mine that earlier discussion for those elements
upon which the participants may draw in the course of their arguments. What we have
learned, I claim, is that disputes of this sort will regularly involve (i) appeals to the his-
tory of the community’s employment of the concept in prior cases, (ii) consideration of
hypothetical cases—either counterfactual tweakings of actual cases, or the wholesale gen-
eration of novel, imaginary cases that are understood to have certain stipulated features
that are appealed to during the course of the dispute, and (iii) general principles concern-
ing the concept, including tentative general formulations of the concept, shared sayings
and general precepts and commonly held convictions involving the concept. In addition,
the univocality condition on contested concepts places additional rational pressures on the
disputes, in that it places a burden on the disputants to take into account and accommo-
date their fellow concept-users’ appeals to their own prior judgments and commitments
concerning the concept.
The following subsections trace through these elements in greater detail and offer an
account of how they might be appealed to in conceptual contests in ways that underwrite
the claim that these disputes may be rational and genuine. Then in §6.2, I argue that these
patterns of argumentation we observe in disputes over contested concepts are properly
understood as instances of the method of reflective equilibrium. I close the thesis by
considering the consequences of this connection for the way that we understand contested
concepts in general.
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6.1.1 The rational force of prior agreement
Argumentation over contested concepts will often draw upon a rich and broad history of
previous judgments involving the concept. To how see this works, let us consider again the
example of the hypothetical conceptual contest over  from Chapter 4. The villagers
in that earlier hypothetical example are in a position where there are actual instances of
previous coincident judgments involving the concept : there are cases where the
community (largely) agrees that an act was borb, and other cases where the community
(largely) agrees that an act was not borb. When a conceptual dispute arises out of a setting
where that sort of agreement is present, as is the case for the concept , argumentation
over controversial cases may effectively appeal to these prior cases of coincident judgment.
But some careful attention must be paid to the way in which these particular cases are
incorporated into the argument. How can a case on which the parties already agree provide
a reason for one or the other side in the dispute to change their position regarding a case
over which they disagree? If we have nothing more than bare agreement and disagreement
over cases, then it is hard to see how cases of agreement can exhibit any sort of rational
force in making progress in a dispute. However, one way in which these cases of agreement
may become fit to play that rational role derives from one of the customary features of
conceptual contests.
To see how, let us start with perhaps the simplest sort of case, one so simple it is
not explicitly canvassed in the  example in Chapter 4, but which we may easily and
quickly sketch here.
Suppose that one of the prior cases on which there was wide community agreement
was one where community members agreed that an act was borb, but where it is also
generally understood that the act did not involve physical pain. If there is such a case,
then Poppy’s detractors have an obvious line of reasoning with which they can confront
those who defend the narrower conception of :
You claim that (1) in order to be borb an act must inflict physical pain. However, in an
earlier case, we all agreed in our judgment that (2) act A1 was borb. Surely you still accept
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that (3) act A1 did not cause physical pain. (1), (2), and (3), however, are inconsistent:
You have contradicted yourself! So you should give up (1) and accept instead ¬(1): an act
need not inflict physical pain in order to be borb. 1
Such a line of reasoning clearly must exhibit devastating rational force upon a dis-
putant who is committed to (1), (2) and (3), by showing that her commitments regarding
a particular case are not co-tenable with the general conceptual claim she has advanced.
Of course, a disputant who finds herself in that position has a number of different ways
she can extract herself from it.
First, she might simply follow the resolution that her opponent proposed, upholding
her earlier commitments concerning act A1 while renouncing (1) her conception of .
Such a move would amount to capitulation and concession: The conceptual dispute would
be brought to a close, at least on this particular issue and for the time being.
Second, she might retract her earlier judgment that (2): She can claim that her earlier
judgment that act A1 was borb was mistaken. In doing so, she will endorse the judgment
that the act in fact was not borb, and that other community members are mistaken to think
otherwise. This response leaves the conceptual dispute open and alive: The judgments
regarding particular cases have been brought in line and made to cohere with the general
pronouncements about the content of the concept in question, and the disputants are
prepared for further argument or challenge.
Finally, the disputant might reject just (3) and reject her earlier commitment to the
idea that the act caused physical pain. Of course, lest this maneuver be blatantly ad hoc,
it will have to be accompanied by further considerations adduced to demonstrate that the
act had inflicted physical pain. In its simplest version, these further considerations might
rely on revisiting certain questions of fact, shifting the dispute (at least temporarily) from
a conceptual one to an empirical one. In more complicated versions, her rejection of (3)
might rely upon articulating a view about what properly counts as physical pain. In such
1The same strategy might be employed in the other direction, in order to defend the narrower conception
of , if there are cases where an act intentionally inflicted a great deal of unwarranted humiliation but
where (in explicit judgments or perhaps by omission of a judgment that the act was borb) the community
members appear to be committed to the claim that the act was not borb.
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a case, the original conceptual dispute over  turns into a conceptual dispute over the
concept  .
When they are available, such arguments involving straightforward judgments about
earlier cases are among the most obvious and easily presented: no doubt one of the first is-
sues that a conceptual disputant will have to address is the presence of any such straightfor-
ward incoherence between their general position in the dispute and their prior judgments
about particular cases.
But as the details of the  dispute show, there are other, rather more baroque ways
in which judgments about past cases can feature in a conceptual dispute. Recall that in
the villagers’ discussion, one disputant reminded the others of their general agreement
that (4) borbity comes in degrees, and then reminded them of their common comparative
judgment that (5) one act A2 (Shep’s dragging Vic behind Vic’s own horse) was more
borb than another A3 (Shep’s dragging Clem with Shep’s horse), even though (6) acts
A2 and A3 did not differ with respect to the amount of physical pain involved. This is
presented as a challenge or a puzzle: What is it that explains our shared commitment to
(5), given that we are also committed to (6)? The proponents of the broader conception
of , then, may contend that their own conception is superior to the narrower one,
since its incorporation of humiliation into the concept provides an extremely plausible
explanation of our commitment to (5) and grounds for our continued endorsement of it:
it is the humiliation involved in being dragged behind one’s own horse that makes act A2
more borb than A3. And to the extent that the broader conception can account for this
pattern of judgments while the narrower conception cannot, we have a reason to think
that the broader conception is better, closer to correct, or more proper than the narrower
conception.
Of course, as in the initial simple example above, there are a number of available
responses to this line of argument: indeed, given the comparative complexity of the argu-
ment, there are even more potential responses, not all of which I can consider here. For
instance, one might renounce the community’s earlier commitment to (5), rejecting it as
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a mistake. This would have the effect of undercutting the putative explanatory advantage
of the broader conception by arguing for the elimination of the phenomenon that only it
is supposed to explain. Alternatively, one might disavow (6) and attempt to show that the
two acts did differ in the physical pain they caused, and that this is what explains the com-
munity’s differential judgment about A2 and A3. This strategy amounts to trying to argue
that the narrower conception does not suffer a comparative disadvantage since it, too, can
explain and justify the pattern of judgments in the cases at hand. Or one might argue
that there is some other difference in the two acts—something other than a difference in
physical pain or humiliation—that explains and justifies the differential judgment. Such
a maneuver might well involve offering, and arguing for, a new candidate conception of
: one that differs from either of the two originally under consideration.
In a conceptual dispute, these earlier cases are presented in a number of different ways:
in the borbity dispute, they are adduced in order to show that a commitment to applying
the concept in one case leads to a commitment to applying the concept in another case.
The preceding discussion makes clear, I think, at least two ways in which agreement on
previous cases can play an argumentative role in a dispute over contested concepts: either
by highlighting inconsistencies between a particular conception and earlier judgments,
or by providing grounds for a claim of explanatory and justificatory superiority for one
conception over another. Arguments of either can exhibit a sort of rational force in such a
dispute. However, we have also seen that the sort of rational force that they impose may
be resisted or answered in ways that also exhibit rational force. One person’s modus ponens,
as it is sometimes said, is another’s modus tollens. Nevertheless, it is also apparent that the
choice between these two options will have further rational repercussions, in the form of
forcing the thinker to adjust her other commitments in accordance with her choice. The
question that remains on the table, then, is whether there is any method or vantage point
from which we might ground the whole enterprise and say that one or the other of these
choices is superior or correct. Formulating and addressing this question will form the heart
of 6.2, later in this chapter.
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6.1.2 The role of hypothetical cases
One curious, and likely controversial, feature of the fictitious borbity dispute concerns
its participants’ appeal, in the course of their argument, to judgments about hypothetical
cases. Where the supply of actual cases runs out or requires further supplementation of
detail, the villagers are quite content to sketch in a non-actual case and invite one another
to judge whether the concept applies or fails to apply, and they welcome and encourage
their fellows to do the same in return. There are some parallels between the villagers use
of these examples and the use we are used to seeing in philosophical arguments. However,
note that although developing and offering these hypothetical cases requires some con-
ceptual sophistication (as any subtle argument will), it does not require any philosophical
training to appreciate that they exhibit that a commitment to a particular judgment about
a hypothetical case may be consistent or inconsistent with other judgments to which one is
committed. Even disputants who have little experience with conceptual argument can ap-
preciate that hypothetical examples seem to exhibit this sort of rational force in arguments
of this sort.
Nevertheless, there are a number of philosophers who have raised objections to the
introduction of judgments about hypothetical cases into philosophical arguments. (See,
inter alia, Fodor (1964).) Given our interest in showing that disputes over contested
concepts may be rational and genuine, we must turn our attention to this issue.
The objections to appeals to hypothetical cases can typically and usefully be decom-
posed into three parts. In the first part, the objector describes the features of hypothetical
cases themselves. In the second part, she describes features of the judgments that thinkers
tend to make about hypothetical cases (perhaps explaining these features in terms of the
cases themselves). In the third part, the objector explains why these features render judg-
ments about hypothetical cases unfit to play the roles in arguments for which they are
pressed into service.
So, first, let’s consider the features of hypothetical cases that are worrisome. Hypothet-
ical cases are under-described: They fail to include crucial features or details that might
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be relevant. The selection and the presentation or description of hypothetical cases can be
tendentious: a thinker who wants to advocate for a particular conception can choose cases
selectively that will favor their own conception, in the sense that they will choose cases that
tempt other thinkers into accepting their favored conception. Or hypothetical cases may
be packaged in a leading vocabulary by a disputant who has a particular conceptual axe to
grind. Moreover, once discussants are no longer limited to the discussion of actual cases,
and once stipulation is introduced as an acceptable device, this will permit the invention
of and appeal to “hypothetical” cases that are physically or even logically impossible. Every
philosophy instructor is familiar with the reaction of her undergraduates to some of the
more bizarre hypothetical cases. We can wonder, as our students do, how these cases might
play a role in any substantive investigation—even a “merely semantic” investigation.
Second: what are the troubling features of thinkers’ judgments about hypothetical
cases? (As I remarked before, some of these can no doubt be understood as consequences
of the first type of complaint.) First, our judgments about hypothetical cases are often ex-
tremely weak, in the sense that thinkers who contemplate them might not have especially
strong intuitions one way or the other about them. Second, the judgments about hypo-
thetical cases might be unreliable, in the following sense: a thinker’s reports about what she
would say when she considers a case as hypothetical, do not coincide with the judgments
that reporters offer when they confront similar actual cases.2 Or the judgments might be
unstable, in the sense that they vary over time, even in the case of a single thinker who is
presented with the same case at different times. On the other end of the spectrum, there
is the concern that even a sincere thinker’s judgments about a hypothetical case might be
subject to a sort of theory bias. If a thinker already has formulated and endorsed a “theory”
about the concept in question, that formulation might well make it more likely that she
will adjudicate the case in a way that follows that formulation.
Third and finally, then, objectors conclude (usually with some gesture toward the first
2Much of what is interesting in recent work in “experimental philosophy” is dedicated to conducting
psychological experiments that show that non-philosophers’ judgments about hypothetical cases are radically
different from philosophers’ judgments.
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two sort of concerns to underwrite this concern) that judgments about hypothetical cases
are simply too faulty a tool for the role that they play in arguments. Here we would do
well to ask what that role is. The objector might respond, “Well, does it matter? Assuming
that my concerns above hold, then hypothetical cases and judgments about them seem
altogether unfit to play much of any rational role.” This is a reasonable challenge, and
amounts to a sort of shifting of the burden of the argument to those who wish to insist
that they do have a role: Given the disturbing features of intuitions adduced above, what
sort of role could they reasonably play? Nevertheless, we should have a sense of what sort
of rational force judgments about hypothetical cases are expected to play before we decide
that they are unfit for that purpose.
My strategy in response to this family of objections will be to largely concede many of
the first two sorts of complaint about “thought experiments” about what we would say, but
then to deny the last. Though hypothetical cases and our judgments about hypothetical
cases do suffer from the sort of deficiencies and problems that objectors decry in them,
they are nevertheless often sufficient to play—and indeed, they are the only candidates
that are available to play—the sort of more modest role that my own theory demands of
them. The argument for this claim will have to wait until we have a richer model of the
kind of reasoning involved in conceptual disputes, and only appears in §6.2.
But before we get to that stage, we can get a better sense of why the objectors to
hypothetical cases are troubled by considering two of the most straightforward ways of
characterizing what contests over competing conceptions are supposed to discover—what
role they might reasonably be expected to play. The most straightforward way we might
understand their purpose would be to characterize them in the way in which those who
participate in these disputes characterize them: the dispute is targeted toward getting at
the truth about what it is for an act to be an apology, for instance. We can understand
this objective in a realist sort of way, or we might understand it as simply a question about
meaning or content of the corresponding linguistic term.
Understood in the former (realist) way, we might be tempted to understand the use
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of judgments at hypothetical cases to serve as evidence of some empirical or metaphysical
truth quite independent of our concepts.
Understood in the latter way, contemplation of hypothetical cases is a way of extracting
“submerged meanings”. This is something like the hope that Peacocke has for the “offline
processing” of hypothetical cases to reveal implicit conceptions: see again §2.2. On this
way of understanding judgments about hypothetical cases, they are to be construed as
something akin to sonar pings from which we can read off the contours of a subpersonal
or implicit conception.
If these are the objectives for which judgments about hypothetical cases are to be
recruited, it seems that hypothetical cases might not be of much help for either. And
for each objectives, it seems that the deficiencies mentioned in the first two parts of the
objection help us to see why. Our judgments about hypothetical cases just appear to be
too weak, too unstable, too incoherent, and too easily defeasible to provide much in the
way of evidence.
However, there is another type of role that judgments about hypothetical cases might
be called upon to play, and, I claim, it is precisely this role that they are called upon to
play in disputes over contested concepts. And this role, as we shall see, is one for which
they are fit despite these demerits pointed out by their critics.
6.1.3 Another role for general principles
The example disputes I canvassed earlier in the thesis above also demonstrate ways in
which general principles play a role in the dispute, in addition to judgments about partic-
ular cases. One obvious such role for general principles to play, and which we have already
seen them play in the target cases, involves their being offered as candidate conceptions
of the concepts—formulations of the concept that attempt to articulate the conceptual
norms more fully. In conceptual contests, we have the various parties articulating general
claims about the correct way of spelling out a concept—e.g., that no act can be cruel in
virtue of the humiliation it causes. With those general claims in place, the earlier cases
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about which the parties agree can have fairly straightforward relevance to the dispute.
As an example, consider the disputants’ appeal in the borbity example to the general
principle that borbity admits of degrees (see §4.1 above). The plausibility of that gen-
eral claim—its fit with the prior history of particular judgments—and the community
members endorsement of it, places rational constraints on the conduct of the dispute by
putting forward a partial articulation of the norms that constitute the concept. In par-
ticular, it places constraints on the conceptions that might be defended: no conception
that entailed a flat or digital notion of cruelty could be counted as correct, unless one were
willing to give up this other general principle.
So disputes over contested concepts have a place for those general principles that at-
tempt to formulate the concept and spell it out, and for subsidiary general principles that
attempt to partially articulate certain structural features of the concept. But there are other
types of general principles that may play a role in the dispute, other than those that attempt
to articulate or formulate any portion of that concept. There can be other general prin-
ciples and observations about the concept that may be invoked in arguments over which
conception of a contested concept is the right one. For instance, these general remarks
might express not the content of that concept but rather the role that it plays within the
community: its function, significance or point. We have already seen one such example
(§5.1.1, p. 89) concerning sayings or bromides that concern the concept . As
another brief specimen of this other sort of general principle, consider the example that
“cruelty is the worst thing that we can do to one another.” As another example, consider
the general pronouncement that, say, the point of the practice of apologizing is to promote
reconciliation between aggrieved and offending parties. These general principles would,
if accepted, place constraints upon the admissible conceptions of a contested concept.
For instance, in the first example, no conception of cruelty that minimized or trivial-
ized cruelty, or made it subordinate to some other sort of wronging of another, would be
compatible with the first principle. And if the principle cited in the second example is
accepted, then that would count in some measure against any conception of apology that
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would admit the off-putting “I am sorry if I offended you” as an apology.
For a more elaborate discussion of the way in which considerations of the theoretical
background might play a role, let us return to the counterfactual example discussed above
in §5.7.3. In that example, a tweaking of the example from Wilson (1982), we suppose
that rather than pressing on across the continent, the zoologist Grant has set up camp and
begun to write reports about the population of zebras he has discovered. Only after some
such work has been done does Grant discover that the zebras that have been the target of
his observations, and which he has named “Grant’s zebras,” are a morphologically distinct
subspecies of zebra. Suppose that Grant and a research associate (or rival!) are engaged in a
dispute over the question whether the concept G’  picks out the species or the
subspecies: whether the broader or narrower conception of G’  is the correct
one. Here is the sort of role that general principles might play in resolving that question.
If the body of theory that has grown up around Grant’s zebras has rested heavily on the
claim that Grant’s zebras constitute a species, then that would presumably count heavily in
favor of the broader conception. However, if that body of theory has heavily emphasized
some morphological or behavioral trait that is distinctive only of the subspecies, then that
would count in favor of the narrower conception. Other sorts of general background
practices and theoretical considerations can also play a role. If zoological tradition has
historically favored dubbing subspecies with their discoverer’s name rather than dubbing
species, that fact about scientific practice would count in favor of the narrower conception.
Inquiry about the correct conception of G’  can proceed by balancing these
considerations, including discounting some earlier applications or claims as erroneous.
To see how considerations of fecundity or theoretical fruitfulness might play a role,
let us consider the example of the concept , which (I hereby tentatively claim)
has been contested at various points during its history. In particular, let us consider the
case of negative numbers. Some mathematicians (e.g., Carnot) were committed to the
general claim that numbers were quantities and thus (since they were also committed to
the general idea that there were no negative quantities) the so-called “negative numbers”
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could not be numbers at all. We might even suppose that the community’s outward and
avowed commitment to the connection between number and quantity was greater than
its commitment to the algebraic features of numbers. However, the theoretical fruits
of adopting the algebraic conception of number were sufficient to dwarf concept-users
explicit commitments that ran contrary to that conception. Hence the earlier claims that
numbers were quantities were discounted as erroneous, and the corresponding conception
of numbers as quantities was ruled out as erroneous.
6.1.4 Interpersonal agreement
Recall that we observed in our discussion of Gallie (§2.1.3.3) that in order to demonstrate
the genuine and rational character of a dispute, it was not sufficient to meet a bare standard
that insists only upon the consistency of an individual disputant’s judgments. For some
disputes that are canonical examples of arational and pointless disputes—e.g., disputes
over matters of taste—are subject to that standard. The previous subsections, I believe,
have put us on the path to understanding what other sorts of elements might be involved
in underwriting the rational and genuine character of those disputes. One further feature
of the disputes provides further grounds for this claim. That feature is the interpersonal
character of these disputes. Disputants over a contested concept must be willing to take
account of and give weight to not only their own judgments, intuitions, and formulations
of the concept, but also to those of other concept-users. Thus, for example, the fact
that other members of a community strongly favor a judgment about a particular case
will exert some rational force on a concept user’s own assessment of a dispute. So, for
instance, when a disputant finds herself at odds with many of her competent conceptual
compatriots in her judgments about controversial or hypothetical cases, or in her own
attempts to formulate a conception or to argue for a restriction on the class of admissible
conceptions, that would provide strong prima facie reasons against her own views.
The divergent judgments of others will not constitute dispositive or indefeasible ratio-
nal force: The fact that the majority of the community thinks that the contested concept
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fails to apply to a particular case in a conceptual dispute, for instance, does not, in general,
entail that their employment of the concept is correct. A party to the dispute might claim
that it does, but in doing so they are either (a) making an erroneous assumption about the
way that the content of concepts is fixed in general, or (b) they are making a move in the
conceptual dispute by asserting that this concept is one whose content is determined by
a decidedly non-standard, democratic sort of way, according to which the meaning of the
corresponding general term could be uncovered simply by a descriptive linguistic survey.
Why must a disputant give weight to the judgments and formulations of other parties
in a conceptual dispute? Can we give an explanation of the rational force of others’ com-
mitments? No doubt it is due in part due to a general demand for intellectual modesty
that is not specific to conceptual disputes: In the face of a mass of countervailing judg-
ments, one should never simply presume that one’s own view must be correct. But there is
complementary explanation of the force of others’ judgments which is specific to disputes
over contested concepts, and which is due to the Univocality Condition from the original
specification of contested concepts.
The Univocality Condition from Chapter 1 is met not because, or not merely because,
the patterns of prior interpersonal agreement provide evidence for the claim that a com-
munity is using a concept in common. As we have seen, part of the reason why disputes
over contested concepts are sustained is due to a conceptual community’s commitment to
employing the same concept in common. We have also seen that this commitment may
be forsaken, and that sustained and intractable disputes might provide reasonable grounds
for a break or division within a community, for the various parties to decide that they do
not have a concept in common after all. But so long as the commitment to univocality
is in place, it entails commitments (a) to giving credence and weight to others’ judgments
concerning a concept, and (b) to refraining from assigning special weight to one’s own
prior judgments and convictions simply because they are one’s own.
It is certainly acceptable to object to other parties’ views in conceptual contests and
discount them as erroneous. However, in relying on that maneuver too quickly or re-
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flexively, a disputant must be wary of discounting such a wide range of their opponent’s
judgments that it is no longer plausible to maintain that the concept is being used uni-
vocally across the community. Moreover, discounting those views carries with it a price:
It entails an intellectual obligation to provide a justification of that maneuver that goes
beyond merely rejecting the others’ views because one happens to disagree. To say that
it incurs such an obligation is not to say that the obligation must be immediately met,
lest the charge be counted as false. A disputant may tentatively count others’ views as
erroneous for reasons she cannot quite express at the moment, in which case the obliga-
tion may merely remain on the books as debt or an acknowledged deficiency that must be
repaid later. And we have seen some of the other considerations that can be invoked in
meeting that obligation: those views’ poor fit with the community’s pattern of particular
and general judgments, or with general principles that posit a plausible view of the point
or function of the concept, and the like.
6.2 CONCEPTUAL CONTESTS AS EXERCISES IN REFLECTIVE
EQUILIBRIUM
§6.1 was intended to provide a general summary of the sort of rational and principled
reasons that may be understood to have force in disputes over which conception of a
concept is the correct one. In this section, I will argue that the patterns of reasoning that
we have just surveyed are examples of the method of reflective equilibrium. Thus, I will
argue, the proper way to construe contested concepts is by understanding them in light of
the notion of reflective equilibrium: the aim or goal of disputes over contested concepts, I
claim, is best understood as directed toward achieving reflective equilibrium.
What, then, is reflective equilibrium? In order to handle this question sensibly, we
must distinguish between reflective equilibrium as a state and the method of reflective
equilibrium, which is designed to bring that state about. Let us start with the former.
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Reflective equilibrium is a state of an interrelated system of judgments. A system
in reflective equilibrium is understood in an equilibrium state because such a system has
attained a harmony, coherence, and mutual reinforcement among those judgments. A
system in reflective equilibrium is understood to be in a reflective version of such a state
because that equilibrium has been achieved via the considered, deliberative method re-
ferred to as the method of reflective equilibrium, to be described below in §6.2.2.
What does it matter whether a system of judgments is in a state of reflective equi-
librium? Typically, the point of appealing to reflective equilibrium is to invoke it as a
source for conferring justification upon judgments whose justification might otherwise
seem mysterious or inexplicable. For example, the first apparent appeal to the notion of
reflective equilibrium appears in (Goodman, 1965). Considering the question of how a
rule of inference might be justified, Goodman rejects the idea that the justification of de-
ductive inference rules must advert to their self-evidence or to “rules . . . grounded in the
very nature of the human mind” (p. 63) Instead, he argues,
[p]rinciples of deductive inference are justified by their conformity with accepted deduc-
tive practice. Their validity depends upon accordance with the particular deductive in-
ferences we actually make and sanction. If a rule yields unacceptable inferences, we drop
it as invalid. Justification of general rules derives from judgments rejecting or accepting
particular deductive inferences.
This looks blatantly circular. I have said that deductive inferences are justified by their
conformity to valid general rules, and that general rules are justified by their conformity
to valid inferences. But this circle is a virtuous one. The point is that rules and particular
inferences alike are justified by being brought into agreement with each other. A rule is
amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates
a rule we are unwilling to amend. The process of justification is the delicate one of making
mutual adjustments between rules and accepted inferences; and in the agreement achieved
lies the only justification needed for either. (Goodman, 1965, pp. 63–64)
Rawls (1971) explicitly appropriates this notion of justification from Goodman (and coins
the phrase “reflective equilibrium”) and applies it to justification of principles of justice and
political morality. Indeed, it is perhaps unsurprising that we should discover that method
that is employed in disputes over contested concepts should fit the model of reflective equi-
librium. After all, the two have a common history in Rawls’s work. Moreover, something
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akin to the method of reflective equilibrium seems to be at work in Ronald Dworkin’s
account of legal interpretation. In the present account, however, I will argue that the
method of reflective equilibrium has a role in investigating and deliberating over issues of
conceptual content. Indeed, here is an ambitious and immodest way of construing the
project of the remainder of the thesis: There is a method that Nelson Goodman invoked
for approaching questions involving inferential rules and practices. John Rawls invoked
that same method in order to approach questions involving the justification of principles
of political morality. What I aim to do is to show that the same method is an appropriate
fit for the kind of conceptual contest under discussion in the present work, and thereby
show that this sort of enterprise has a role in theories of conceptual content.3
6.2.1 Structural similarities between reflective equilibrium and contested concepts
So why should we believe that reflective equilibrium is what lies at the heart of the con-
tested concept phenomenon? Let us begin by getting a more general characterization of
the distinctive structural features of the domains in which appeals to reflective equilibrium
are invoked, and consider the parallels with what we have discovered about contested con-
cepts.
6.2.1.1 Levels of generality First, questions of reflective equilibrium seem to arise
only for interconnected systems of judgments that stretch across a spectrum of generality.
At the level of greatest generality, we have a (collection of ) general principles, rules, com-
mitments, or standards. These might be explicitly formulated, or they might be implicitly
held. By contrast, at the level of greatest specificity, we have judgments about individual,
concrete cases, about which the members of a community have a history of judgments,
and a set of “intuitions” or judgments about hypothetical cases. In between these extremes
of generality and particularity, there might be some judgments concerning an intermediate
3In fact—although I will not have the space to argue for it in this thesis—I believe that each of those
previous areas to which reflective equilibrium has been applied can be seen as particular instances of the
general phenomenon of contested concepts.
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level, say, in the form of subsidiary or supplementary principles, or in the form of judg-
ments that group together individual cases. This system of judgments is interconnected,
in the sense that the general standards or rules are properly understood as having specific
application to those particular cases, and the particular cases are understood as particular
instances or applications of the general rule.
We have noted that the same structural feature holds for disputes over a contested
concept F. On the one hand we have general rules or principles—the general concept and
the various conceptions that are on offer or under consideration, which may be more or
less explicit—that purport to tell us, in general, which things are F (and perhaps why
they are F), and the general principles about that concept. On the other hand, we have
particular cases, both actual and hypothetical, about which we have specific judgments
concerning their F-ness.
6.2.1.2 Multiple dimensions of interdependence In the systems of judgments where
reflective equilibrium is invoked, the interconnection across those levels of generality is
multi-directional. If we consider the question of direction of fit or justificatory primitive-
ness, neither the general nor the specific judgments will have absolute priority over the
other. The general judgments in a reflective equilibrium system are not absolute or foun-
dational; none of them is self-evident or capable of justifying itself non-circularly against
other competing or conflicting general principles. Nor are those general judgments “first
principles” in the sense of being axioms from which particular judgments must be derived
or upon which they must depend for their justification. But neither are the general prin-
ciples simply summaries or generalizations that tally up and report our judgments about
particular cases. The general principles and the judgments about particular cases are un-
derstood as “mutually supportive”: to the extent that they coincide or cohere with one
another, our commitment to each redounds to the credit of the other.
Much the same sort of pattern of interdependence applies in questions over contested
concepts. Concept-users do not understand disputes concerning general principles gov-
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erning the application of the term as an issue to be confronted independently of, or prior
to, questions about the employment of the concept in particular cases. Rather, as we
have seen from examples of conceptual contests, disputants move back and forth between
consideration of the two, paying attention to the fit and agreement between them.
6.2.1.3 Conflicting judgments and commitments Once we have in place an inter-
connected system of judgments about general principles and specific cases, this opens up
the possibility of discrepancies and conflicts among these commitments. For now we have
introduced the possibility of conflict: the general principles might conflict with one an-
other (for instance, two general principles might dictate different results for a particular
case), or they might conflict with the particular judgments about earlier or hypothetical
cases. Of course there is nothing in the abstract structure of such a system of intercon-
nected judgments that entails that there will be conflict: It might be that the general
principles within that system are in harmony with one another and with the judgments
about concrete individual cases. In such a case, the system is already in equilibrium and
perhaps no further work need be done. However, in most broad and non-trivial systems of
judgments, there will be conflicts among the judgments. However, in the case of contested
concepts we have a system of judgments and commitments, often involving intrapersonal
and interpersonal conflicts of judgment.
6.2.1.4 Degrees of commitment or “weight” The systems of judgment that are stud-
ied by reflective equilibrium theorists involve different degrees or levels of commitment to
various judgments that they trying to bring into equilibrium. Sometimes discussions of
this point in the reflective equilibrium literature express it using the metaphor of weight
to express degrees of commitment to a judgment: some of the judgments in a system are
weightier, in the sense that we will be more strongly committed to some of them than we
are others, less willing or able or justified in abandoning some of them than we are others.
This will hold true at each of the different levels of generality. Some of the general
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principles will be weightier than others. To take an example from rules of inference: It
seems plausible to say that we are more strongly committed to modus ponens than we
are to the rule of contradiction-elimination—that it would weigh more heavily against a
logical system if it were to exclude modus ponens than if it were to exclude one of the
other two. In a similar vein, we will observe that there differing degrees of commitment
to our judgments about particular cases, including hypothetical cases. To use an example
from Rawls’s work: We are more deeply committed to the judgment that slavery is unjust
than we are to the judgment that income inequity is unjust; our slavery judgment is
weightier or counts for more than our judgment about income discrepancy. And this
pattern of comparison is supposed to apply across levels of generality as well, in a way
that lends itself to comparative judgments of weight or strength of commitment between
judgments involving general principles and judgments involving particular cases. Thus,
the strength of a commitment to a general principle can be assessed against the strength of
a commitment to a particular judgment. So too with contested concepts: as we have seen
from consideration of the disputes over them, a concept-user or a conceptual community
will have different degrees of commitment to the various general and particular conceptual
judgments they make.
These, then, I contend are the four distinctive structural features that characterize cases
where questions of reflective equilibrium are apt. And all of these features are also present
in cases of contested concepts as well. With these structural features in view, we are now
in a position to turn to the question of what the method of reflective equilibrium is.
6.2.2 The methods of argument: weighing, retraction, revision
The structural features delineated above present us with a system of interconnected, con-
flicting general principles and particular judgments, where neither the principles nor the
particular judgments have priority as such, but where each principle and judgment is
understood as having some “weight.” The method of reflective equilibrium is, in part,
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a method for inducing or restoring coherence between general principles and particular
judgments through a process of “mutual adjustment” of the conflicting principles and
particular judgments. Recall the italicized portion of Goodman’s remark about the justifi-
cation of inference rules, quoted on my page 135:
A rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is
rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend. (Goodman, 1965, p. 63)
I propose the following variation on Goodman’s remark in order to express the way in
which this same method—the method of reflective equilibrium—is involved in conceptual
contests:
A conception is amended if it yields a verdict about a particular case that we are unwilling
to accept; a judgment about a particular case is rejected if it violates a conception we are
unwilling to reject or amend.
Goodman’s remark, and my own variation on it, are a little cursory. We can, and
should, amplify upon them a bit.
To simplify things for ease of discussion at the outset, let’s begin by returning to the
case of an argument that appeals to a single individual’s own commitments, setting aside
the issue of the interplay between different parties to a dispute. Recall the “easy objection”
from §6.1.1 (see p. 122). The objection was raised against an individual villager who in
the earlier case had judged that a particular act was borb but where the act had caused no
physical pain. The objection, then, exploited the inconsistency between the general claim
(that any act could only be borb if it caused physical pain) and a specific judgment about
a past concrete case (that a painless but humiliating act was borb). Her interlocutor, in
pointing out the conflict among her commitments, thereby shows that the system is not
in harmony or equilibrium. It appears that her commitment to the general claim commits
her to the claim that the earlier case was not borb (which is incompatible with her earlier
particular judgment) and her earlier judgment about the particular case commits her to
the claim that some borb acts do not involve physical pain (which is incompatible with the
general principle she endorses). When a general principle someone endorses conflicts with
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one of her judgments about a particular case, a general rational demand for consistency
and coherence demands that at least one or the other of these commitments must be
renounced and counted as an error.
At least one must be renounced. But which one? Of course, the interlocutor who
we imagined posing this easy objection had a specific proposal for a way of returning
the system to equilibrium: He proposes that the villager who was target of the objection
should continue to endorse her particular judgment that this is an instance of borbity, that
she should reject the general principle borbity must involve physical pain, that she should
accept, more specifically, that humiliation or emotional pain is a way in which an act
might be borb, and, finally, that she should accept that Poppy’s branding of his children
was borb. For the opponent who mounts the objection, then, this earlier case serves as a
counter-example to the villager’s general claim.
But as we saw earlier in §6.1.1, the conflict can also be resolved by renouncing the
commitment to the earlier particular judgment: Rather than rejecting the conception
because she is unwilling to change her judgment about that case, she might instead reject
her judgment about the particular case because she is unwilling to reject the conception.
When we broke off our discussion of this point earlier, we wondered how, given that
either maneuver would remove the inconsistency, one or the other of these two options
might be better than the other, in the sense of being the more rational or the better justi-
fied. Proponents of the method of reflective equilibrium have available at least a general
strategy for answering this question, based on the structural feature discussed in §6.2.1.4.
An individual villager may have different degrees of commitment to the general concep-
tion and to the particular case, and one of these commitments may be said to “outweigh”
the other. The method of reflective equilibrium, then, when applied to the case of an
individual, tells us that an individual ought to retain the commitment to the “weightier”
judgment and reject the judgment to which she is less strongly committed.
In the case of the individual villager whose commitments are inconsistent in the way
described in the “easy objection” case above, this suggests that an individual should reject
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or modify a conception that conflicts with her judgments about a particular case whenever
she is more strongly committed to the particular judgment than she is to the conception—
the general judgment.
There are some obvious complications that require comment here.
First, note that our discussion thus far has for the sake of simplicity dealt with the
question of the equilibrium of an individual’s judgments and commitments. Theorists
who discuss reflective equilibrium typically pay less attention to this complication, in part
because they pay less attention than we are paying to active disagreements among par-
ties. It is apparent given the univocality condition—and given the failures of W.B. Gallie’s
program we witnessed in §2.1—that only the latter, interpersonal sort of reflective equi-
librium holds promise for making sense of contested concepts.
Second, we should make certain that we appreciate the ways in which the simplicity of
the “easy objection” has simplified the above illustration of the method of reflective equi-
librium. (The simplicity of the slogan from Goodman fed into this oversimplification.)
The chief way in which the “easy objection” was easy, recall, is that it involved a fairly
localized conflict between a single general judgment and a single judgment about a par-
ticular case. Rejecting one or the other was understood as something that could be done
in way that was largely insulated from the villager’s other past judgments and commit-
ments. Thus the “weighing” involved in the method could be understood as comparing
the strength of the villager’s commitment to the general principle and the strength of her
(perhaps intuitive and unreflective) commitment to the non-borbity of Poppy’s act against
the strength of her commitment to her classification of that prior pain-free act as borb.
However, in most cases the network of judgments will be broader and its interdepen-
dencies more global than we have supposed in this simple case, as we can see by consider-
ing even the slightly more complicated example from the borbity case where the purported
counterexample involved a commitment to the claim that the borbity of acts come in de-
grees. There will normally be more than just two or three different judgments that might
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be renounced or judgments in order to repair the inconsistency, so there will be several
different options that will have to be weighed against one another. Moreover, the rejection
of one judgment will more typically require the rejection or adoption of other principles
and judgments in order to maintain coherence. Thus it seems that the “weight” of a par-
ticular judgment within a system will depend not only on its own “weight”—the strength
of a thinker’s commitment to it individually—but also upon the cumulative weights of
the other judgments that must also be rejected along with it. Thus in general the pattern
of “mutual adjustment” will be much broader and more complicated than it might at first
have seemed.
On this point, Rawls (2001) helpfully distinguishes between different sort of reflective
equilibria: “wide” and “narrow.” The distinction is one of degree, and it reflects the
breadth and variety of the judgments that are under consideration in the course of the
process of mutual adjustment.
6.2.3 Hypothetical cases revisited
In § 6.1.2, I described the concerns about the limitations and defects of judgments about
hypothetical cases, and deferred discussion of the question whether these defects might be
troubling in the case of disputes over contested concepts until we had a better sense of
how those judgments play a role in those disputes. Now that we have on the table a richer
sense of how those disputes are conducted, let us turn to that question again.
If the question is, “Should we trust our intuitions?”, the question we want to ask in
return is, trust them for what purpose? We have seen that the role that judgments about
hypothetical cases are supposed to play in these exercises is much the same as the role that
is played by judgments involving the application of the concept to actual, prior cases: The
way that they function is to elicit, display, and test a pattern of commitments to use the
concept across a range of cases and to test those commitments against general principles
in accordance with the method of reflective equilibrium.
As such, we can see the way in which the appeal to hypothetical cases may be justified:
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they are justified in much the same way that judgments about actual cases are justified.
The role that they play in conceptual disputes is to elicit (often weak, often defeasible)
and display commitments about how the concept ought to be employed in these cases, to
test them against general principles, and then to be folded into our system of judgments.
6.3 CONCEPTUAL CONCEPTS AND REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM
I am now in a position to provide a succinct statement of my proposed positive account
of contested concepts.
Contested concepts are best understood as a system of judgments that are subject to
justification by reflective equilibrium. To say that a community has a contested concept
C is to say that the community members are committed to a variety of conceptual norms
governing the employment of the corresponding general term “C,” where these conceptual
norms are of varying levels of generality, and where these norms conflict with one another.
These commitments will generally result from patterns of conflicting but plausible appli-
cations to prior cases.
Despite these conflicting norms, the community is also committed to the position
that C is a single concept, used univocally over time and across different concept users,
and they are committed to the position that C is a coherent, unified organic whole—that
there is a unique best, proper, or correct way of spelling out C, resolving the community’s
conflicting conceptual norms. They are also committed to the position that this correct
way of spelling out those conceptual norms exhibits what “C” has meant all along, even if
no community member might have been able to explicitly formulate its meaning, or even
if this best way conflicts with some of their own convictions involving the concept. More-
over, the members of the community exhibit a willingness to defer to that best conception,
in the sense that they understand their own judgments and pronouncements involving the
concept are liable to that standard, whatever it might be. And when they engage in ratio-
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nal attempts to discover that best conception, community members employ the method
of reflective equilibrium.
In light of all of these observations, the most reasonable conclusion to reach is that the
best, proper, or correct conception of a contested concept C is that system of conceptual
norms that resolves the conceptual community’s set of conceptual commitments involv-
ing C into reflective equilibrium. Or, in the event that the system of conceptual norms
might be resolved into one of several available equilibrium points, then the best, proper, or
correct conception will be the system of conceptual norms that resolves the community’s
commitments into the global maximum equilibrium point.
All of this might be the right account of contested concepts even if the community
members do not understand their own conceptual disputes in this way, either because they
do not have the theoretical framework to understand it in that way (say, because they are
unfamiliar with the notion of reflective equilibrium), or because they explicitly reject it in
favor of some other theoretical framework. The case that I have made above rests solely on
the claim that the account I have is the most reasonable characterization of the conceptual
commitments and behaviors of a community engaged in a dispute over a contested con-
cept. The positive account that I have offered is vulnerable, therefore, to objections that
I have failed properly to characterize the conceptual activity of a community with respect
to its contested concepts, or that some other account provides a better characterization of
that activity.
Of course, my positive account is vulnerable to plenty of other sorts of objections as
well, including objections to the notion of reflective equilibrium itself. I turn to those
below in §6.4. But first I would like to consider one further significant advantage of my
positive account: that it provides us with a way of meeting desideratum (D) by resolving
the apparent paradox concerning contested concepts from Chapter 1, on p. 15.
Here’s a reminder of that apparent paradox. On the one hand, the Indeterminacy
Condition requires that in order for a concept to be contested, there are some cases in
which competent concept-users who suffer from no epistemic or linguistic deficiency may
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reasonably disagree over whether the concept applies or fails to apply. Moreover, the
Conception Condition requires that there are a number of distinct, plausible conceptions
available for spelling out the content of that concept. However, on the other hand, the
Competition Condition tells us that the candidate conceptions are competing for the
status of unique correct conception of that concept, where the sort of correctness involved
is understood as revealing what the content of that concept has been all along.
How, then, does the incorporation of reflective equilibrium into the account of con-
tested concepts help to resolve this apparent paradox? It does so precisely by providing
a way in which the correct conception can be settled by an issue upon which compe-
tent concept-users who suffer from no epistemic or linguistic deficiency can reasonably
disagree: the issue of which conception resolves the community’s pattern of conceptual
commitments into the global maximum reflective equilibrium point.
6.4 OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
Tied as it is to the notion of reflective equilibrium, the positive account of contested
concepts that I have offered above stands to inherit that notion’s features, favors, and
faults. The last task of the thesis—the task of this section—will be to consider the potential
problems that flow from that inheritance.
There have been a number of trenchant criticisms of the notion of reflective equilib-
rium over the years. I will have the space here to consider only three of those that are
most relevant and potentially fatal to the account of contested concepts that I have devel-
oped. Two of these are what we might describe as “internal” to the notion of reflective
equilibrium, and the last is what we might describe as “external” to that notion.
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6.4.1 Internal objections
The first category raises what we might call “internal” worries about the notion of reflective
equilibrium—“internal” in the sense that they are ones that might be raised by someone
who is generally sympathetic to the notion of reflective equilibrium, but who nevertheless
foresees critical difficulties that might well arise in an attempt to execute the method of
reflective equilibrium and thwart its practitioners’ aims.
6.4.1.1 Mistakes in the method of reflective equilibrium? The first internal ob-
jection to the notion of reflective equilibrium focuses on the possibility of errors in the
conduct of the method of reflective equilibrium. Even quite adept concept users are finite
and fallible, and they are prone to make errors in judgment that will affect the outcome of
the method. In fact, thinkers are often quite poor at recognizing that a pair of judgments
conflict with one another, much less at deciding which member of the pair is “weightier”
or which of the pair should be eschewed in order to achieve the maximal equilibrium
point if several such equilibria are available. There is no assurance, then, that a conceptual
community engaged in the method of reflective equilibrium will reach any equilibrium
point at all; and if they do reach equilibrium, there is no assurance that it will be a global
maximal equilibrium point. There is nothing to prevent a conceptual community from
exercising the method of reflective equilibrium to the best of their abilities but nevertheless
getting stuck in a local equilibrium point.
One response to this objection would appeal to the idea that a conceptual community
that persistently scrutinized its own commitments for inconsistencies and which strove
to attain a wide equilibrium by canvassing a broad range of hypothetical cases and candi-
date conceptions would eventually discover inconsistencies in its commitments that would
throw them out of the local equilibrium point and back on track toward the global max-
imum. Perhaps this is so, but I will not argue for that claim here. Instead, I will point
out that nothing in the positive account I have offered requires that the community actu-
ally progress toward achieving equilibrium in their explicit commitments. A community
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might never resolve the conceptual norms to which they are explicitly and reflectively
committed into any equilibrium point; so long as there is a global maximum reflective
equilibrium point that would resolve those conceptual norms, that is sufficient on my
account to constitute the correct conception of the concept.
The possibility of a community’s failure to make progress toward a global maximum
equilibrium point does raise one interesting complication for my positive account, but I
believe that it is merely interesting and not fatal.
Suppose that a conceptual community does get stuck in a local equilibrium point
rather than resolving its conceptual norms into the unique maximum point that (I claim)
fixes the best conception of a contested concept. Thus, although the community will
have settled upon a stable conception of the contested concept, it will nevertheless be
an erroneous conception according to my account, since the conception on which they
have settled is not the one at the maximal equilibrium point. However, if the community
remains stuck in that local maximum, we may suppose that the community’s patterns
of judgments and commitments involving that concept—their continued misuse of the
concept—will become reoriented around the stable local conception to which they are
explicitly committed. The community might even become so strongly committed to their
new system of conceptual norms through this misuse that the local maximum will become
the global maximum: a shift to the prior maximum equilibrium point might no longer
be an improvement, if adopting that conception requires giving up conceptual norms to
which the community now has a stronger commitment. Thus, this new equilibrium point
fixes a new correct conception, and is treated by the community retroactively as “what it
is we have been talking about all along.”
6.4.1.2 No unique maximum equilibrium point? The second internal objection to
reflective equilibrium raises the possibility that there might be no unique global maximum
reflective equilibrium point. This might either be because there is a “tie” between the two
greatest equilibrium points, or because two or more equilibrium points are incomparable
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or incommensurable. Thus, given the positive account I have provided, there would be
no unique best conception to which the community can defer, despite their continued
conviction that there is one.
What might bring about such a state of affairs? Some of the circumstances we consid-
ered earlier in the thesis might be the cause. For instance, a tie between two equilibrium
points might be due to the community’s conceptual confusion: the resolution of that con-
fusion might reveal two distinct concepts which the community was running together,
each of which fit nicely with one of the equilibrium points but poorly or imperfectly
with the other. Or it might be that a tie or two incommensurable equilibria points result
from widely divergent, irreconcilable conceptual commitments among the members of the
community; perhaps despite community members’ convictions that their concept use was
univocal across the different members of the community, there is simply no way that this
can be sustained upon due consideration because different factions are simply too deeply
committed to incompatible patterns of judgment involving that concept. In cases of this
sort, we should be pleased with the verdict rendered by my proposed account of contested
concepts—that there is no best conception of the concept in question.
There might be other circumstances where there might be no unique global maximum
reflective equilibrium point that resolves the community’s conceptual commitments. For
instance, suppose that a community becomes engaged in a conceptual contest concerning
a fairly novel concept: one that the community has not employed very widely at all, and
regarding which the community does not yet have a robust or varied history of employing
the concept. Nevertheless, the community forges ahead in its employment of the concept,
committed to the notion that they are reasoning univocally and quickly founders on a
controversial case where opinions diverge in a way that meets the conditions for contested
concepts put forth in §1.3.
Now, in such a case it is plausible that the conceptual norms are so scarce and thin that
they do not determine a unique global maximum reflective equilibrium point: scarcely any
rational constraints are imposed on the method of reflective equilibrium by the scant his-
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tory of prior judgments, underdeveloped and weak intuitions about hypothetical cases,
and few, tentative general principles that have been introduced. Nevertheless, we may
suppose that the concept-users in question remain convinced that their concept has fas-
tened on to some unique noteworthy or salient trait, and they proceed to make judgments,
assess arguments, and engage in disputes in light of that shared conviction.
The univocality commitment is what licenses the assumption of a single, best concep-
tion, and permits the continued use of contested concepts even when there is not a unique
best conception. In those cases where there is unique maximum equilibrium point, a
heated conceptual contest might proceed apace as the community continues to develop
and enrich the history of that concept’s employment. When that history of use develops
to the point where there is additional or sufficient material that there is a unique maximal
equilibrium point, that conception may retroactively become “the correct conception,”
“what we were talking about all along,” and this conception may be used fruitfully to
evaluate earlier judgments and inferences.
6.4.2 An “external” worry
In addition to these “internal” objections, I want to consider and answer one serious “ex-
ternal” objection to my reliance on the notion of reflective equilibrium in the positive
account of contested concepts. By an “external” objection, I mean a worry about whether
the method of reflective equilibrium itself is the right sort of technique for addressing
questions about the correctness of a conception. In order to mount an external objection
to the notion of reflective equilibrium, we can simply stipulate for the sake of argument
that the two internal objections above can be met. So let us suppose that the method of
reflective equilibrium has been carried out without error, and let us further suppose that
it has led a conceptual community that has been engaged in disputes over that concept
to explicitly endorse the conception which in fact resolves their earlier conceptual com-
mitments into a genuine global maximum reflective equilibrium point. The objection I
have in mind will argue that even in light of the successful execution of the method of
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reflective equilibrium, it would be a mistake to identify the system of conceptual norms
that provides the global maximum reflective equilibrium with the correct conception of
the concept.
To raise this objection, I will have to distinguish between two different ways that the
point or value of reflective equilibrium might be understood, or what sort of justification
it might be understood to confer.
First, there is what we might call the “constitutive” or “constructive” use of reflective
equilibrium. On this model, reflective equilibrium is strictly a self-contained enterprise: it
does not involve an attempt to mirror or represent the structure of some facts, features, or
properties that are independent of our concepts or practices. This way of understanding
the method has intuitive plausibility for concepts like , for example, where the
concept seems to derives from a practice that is itself the creation of, and presumably
subject to the authority of, the community. Perhaps the concept of apology just amounts
to nothing more than whatever the community’s considered, reflective judgments entail
it must be. If disputes over contested concepts are to be understood as constitutive or
constructive in this sense, then perhaps there is little to worry about here.
However, there is another, less direct way of understanding the point of reflective
equilibrium—what we might call the epistemic use. The method of reflective equilibrium
might be understood as conferring a sort of indirect warrant for a claim that the concept
or beliefs will correctly track some property or some states of affairs that are independent
of the method. Let us consider an example where the method might be employed in this
way.
Suppose that a team of detectives is investigating the murder of Mr. McGillicuty and
has amassed a great many interconnected judgments concerning the crime, virtually all
of which point to Mrs. McGillicuty as the perpetrator. As a result, the global maximum
reflective equilibrium point drawn from their current judgments leads to a strong com-
mitment or a great deal of weight to the judgment that Mrs. McGillicuty is the murderer.
There are a number of issues that an objector might raise here about whether wide
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general reflective equilibrium confers warrant or justification on the detectives’ judgment
that Mrs. McGillicuty is the murderer. But given the strength of the claim made in the
positive account above, the objector can set those aside and simply cut to chase by making
the following point:
It is one thing for the judgment that Mrs. McGillicuty is the murderer to be in wide
general reflective equilibrium; and it is quite obviously something wholly other for Mrs.
McGillicuty to be the murderer. We recognize that we should not identify the two in Mrs.
McGillicuty’s case. Coherence, even idealized coherence, is simply different from truth.
Why, then, should we follow the positive account above in identifying the two when we
are confronting questions like whether Goofus’s caricature was cruel?
Let us suppose, for example, that our objector avers that she is a Platonist about some
notion corresponding to a contested concept in her community: e.g., . Thus, she
tells us, she will have none of our nonsense talk about past judgments, intuitions, and
reflective equilibrium in order to settle the issue of whether Goofus’s caricature was cruel.
Goofus’s act simply was cruel or it was not, just as Mrs. McGillicuty either is the murderer
or she is not, and our judgments about the matter can try to reflect, but not affect or
influence, the correctness of that judgment.
This objection has obvious appeal. Nevertheless, I think it is ultimately misguided
when it used to address the category of contested concepts. Although it quite clear that
the question of whether Mrs. McGillicuty is a murderer is independent of the strongest
evidence we could muster in its favor, it is not quite so clear that the question of whether
an act is cruel is in a parallel way independent of the strongest argument we could muster
in its favor. The case of Mrs. McGillicuty obviously turns upon an empirical fact which the
detectives simply do not know. If confronted with the question of how, ideally, with any
method of inquiry, they might have investigated the question of Mrs. McGillicuty’s guilt,
the detectives—indeed, anyone with an interest in the case—can suggest a number of
idealized methods of inquiry that do not explicitly avert to anything resembling reflective
equilibrium in order to resolve the question, including simply being present to observe the
event itself as the crime as committed. But there is no corresponding, idealized method of
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inquiry that might be used to resolve the question of whether Goofus’s caricature was cruel
other than engaging in the sort of arguments that characterize contested concepts. What this
shows, I think, is that there are good reasons for supposing that the question of whether
Mrs. McGillicuty put the poison in her husband’s coffee is independent of the question of
what sorts of reasons we have for believing that she did, but that those good reasons are
not present when we turn to the question of whether Goofus’s caricature was cruel.
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7.0 EPILOGUE: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
I hope to have demonstrated that there is a philosophically important conceptual phe-
nomenon that is exemplified in the target cases presented in §1.2 and that is specified
by the four conditions developed in §1.3: the phenomenon of contested concepts. That
phenomenon rests on the distinction between an abstract concept and conceptions of that
concept—different ways of explicating the content of that concept. Contested concepts,
then, are those concepts that are liable to what appear to be genuine, principled disputes
about which of several competing conceptions is the correct one.
I have claimed that in order to give a successful account of contested concepts, we
ought to figure out whether there is a way to take seriously the disputants’ conviction
that their disagreements are genuine and liable to rational standards of argumentation. I
also claimed (in Chapter 5) that once we attend to the features of those disputes, we see
that the contested concept phenomenon is theoretically novel with respect to theories of
content: The disputes that underlie them cannot be resolved or explained by the most
likely candidates currently on offer in the philosophy of mind or philosophy of language.
Once we understand the kinds of considerations that exert legitimate rational force in
these disputes, I claim, we will come to see that conceptual contests are best understood
as appeals to reflective equilibrium, and that the best, proper, or correct conception is
the one that provides the most satisfactory equilibrium point, bringing the community’s
conflicting commitments and judgments involving that concept into a coherent, well-
justified whole.
As I have noted, a number of philosophers (most notably John Rawls and Ronald
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Dworkin) have explicitly appealed to the notion of competing conceptions of a concept
in their own work. Moreover, I think that many other philosophers appeal to the notion
in their work without explicitly recognizing it. However, after the seminal article by W.B.
Gallie (Gallie, 1962), the contested concept phenomenon has seldom been the target of
sustained philosophical inquiry in its own right: Its repercussions and consequences for
theories of content remain largely unexplored by philosophers of language and philoso-
phers of mind. This is unfortunate, since (as we saw in §2.1), Gallie’s article provides only
an important and flawed starting point for an inquiry into this rich, important, fertile
ground for research, rather than the final word on the theory. Of course, I cannot and
do not claim that my remarks in this thesis offer anything remotely approaching the final
word on the topic, either. This territory is vast and the terrain is rough, and what I have
developed in this thesis is admittedly quite tentative and preliminary. But I hope to have
made some progress in the right direction, and perhaps to have offered an advertisement
for further discussion of contested concepts among philosophers of language and mind.
I would like to close the thesis with a discussion of my own aspirations for future
research on this topic.
Of course, one of the chief tasks that lies immediately before me is the elaboration and
defense of the tentative account I have begun to develop in §6.3. Although I have long
thought that the notion of reflective equilibrium constituted the key to making sense of
contested concepts, these ideas have only recently begun to take shape on the page.
I also plan to develop the technical notion of assessment of a sentence relative to a
conception of one of its ingredient concepts—a notion that is sketched in the broadest
possible strokes in §3.3.1.
I am also interested in surveying a wider range of concepts that I believe properly
count as contested. Of course, if my earlier claims are correct, much of the philosophical
work involved in applying the contested concept framework to specific problem areas is
already underway; for philosophers and others have been arguing over contested concepts
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for years, with varying levels of explicit appeal to that framework. Nevertheless, I think
that explicit attention to the way in which the contested concept framework can be used
to interpret and evaluate disputes over particular concepts cannot help but sharpen our
understanding both of those particular concepts and of the framework itself. One that
I am especially eager to consider is the concept of race, which seems to me to involve
competing conceptions from a variety of different disciplines and settings.
I would like to turn to a couple of philosophical discussions that seem self-consciously
to involve appeals to something much like the account I have begun to offer here. Two
particular instances I have in mind to pursue are David Lewis’s discussion of pain in “Mad
pain and Martian pain” (Lewis, 1980) and Imre Lakatos’s discussion of the concept -
 in his Proofs and refutations (Lakatos, 1976). I do not wish to suggest that either
Lewis or Lakatos would endorse my account of contested concepts or that they would
accept my characterization of the methods of argument they are considering. Indeed, nei-
ther of them explicitly uses the terminology I employ here: neither of them refers to the
distinction between concepts and conceptions or to the notion of reflective equilibrium.
Nevertheless, the sort of conceptual questions that they confront and the methods of ar-
gumentation they employ in their discussions exemplify and illustrate the methods under
discussion in the thesis and provide an illustration of the sort of rational force they can
exhibit.
I am also convinced that coming to terms with the concept/conception distinction
will recast and clarify a panoply of heated debates on philosophical issues that are a little
further afield, some of which have been touched upon in the thesis but which require
further discussion: essentialism, conceptual analysis, analytic truth, thought experiments,
appeals to intuitions about hypothetical cases, and the normativity of linguistic and mental
content, among others. All of these are topics I hope to pursue in future work. But I would
like to end this thesis by sketching the way in which the contested concept framework
might shed light upon the topic that originally launched my dissertation research.
My work on this thesis began with an enquiry into the topic of arguments from con-
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ceivability to modality: specifically, inferences from the claim that it is inconceivable that
p to the claim that it is impossible that p. As I began to work on that topic, I became
convinced that conceivability claims were tacit appeals to a sort of conceptual modality. I
was led to the topic of contested concepts in part by thinking about the sort of conceptual
modality involved and about the setting in which appeals to conceivability are introduced
in philosophical arguments over modality.
Here is what I tentatively concluded. The claim that it is conceptually necessary that
Fs are Gs, for instance, is to be understood as a claim that the norms that constitute the
concept F and the norms that constitute the concept G have the following feature: any
(actual or hypothetically entertained) object that the concept F enjoins us to count as an
F is such that the concept G enjoins us to count that object as a G as well. Thus, for
instance, the conceptual necessity of the proposition that bachelors are unmarried consists
in the fact that the norms that constitute the concept  are such that every (real
or hypothetically stipulated) object that counts as a bachelor also counts as unmarried,
given the constraints imposed by the concept .
The claim that it is conceptually possible that an F could be G, then, is to be un-
derstood as a claim that the norms that constitute F and the norms that constitute G are
compatible, in the sense that there is some (actual or hypothetically entertained) object
such that the norms that constitute the concept F permit us to count that as an F while
the norms that constitute the concept G permit us to count that same object as a G. Thus,
for instance, the conceptual possibility of the proposition that a woman could be President
of the U.S. consists in the fact that the norms that govern “female” and “President of the
U.S.” are compatible: we can coherently stipulate a hypothetical situation in which there
is an object that the concepts  and U.S. P each permit us to count as
qualifying for application of the corresponding term. And conceptual impossibility, then,
amounts to the incompatibility of the concepts involved: The conceptual impossibility of
a married bachelor consists in the fact that no real or hypothetically entertained object that
qualifies as falling under the concept  also qualifies as falling under the concept
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.
Understood in this way, conceptual modality will turn out to be a much more interest-
ing and robust phenomenon than the simple and uncontroversial examples above might
suggest, as we can see when we switch to considering cases involving concepts which are
controversial and under dispute. It is in these sorts of cases where we will sometimes find
philosophers appealing to conceivability considerations in order to underwrite claims of
possibility and impossibility. In fact, it seems to me that most of the interesting cases
where philosophers appeal to conceivability considerations or thought experiments turned
upon contested concepts of the sort considered here. Such appeals are not, I think, reports
of one’s own psychological capacities or incapacities, but rather are assertions of positions
within the sort of conceptual dispute considered in the present work. For instances, it
seems to me that an assertion that it is inconceivable that an F could be G were tacit
claims about the admissible or correct conceptions of the concepts F and G: that there is
no admissible conception of F and no admissible conception of G that are co-applicable
or compatible in the way described in the previous paragraph. In order to make sense of
that proposal, of course, I realized that I would have to develop a more complete view of
contested concepts. But as that work nears completion, I would like to return to consider
its application to the topic that triggered my investigation at the outset.
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